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This dissertation explores the relation between Aristotle‟s account of the 
generation of substances and his attempt to lay the foundations for his natural 
philosophy.  The central question concerns the injunction posed by the Eleatic 
philosophers to the study of nature on the basis of the principle “ex nihilo nihil” 
which they formulated into argument against the intelligibility of nature.  
Aristotle‟s Physics begins with a sustained attempt to defeat the Eleatic 
prohibition by demonstrating that change in general can be understood once a 
few principles are established.  My reading of the arguments that constitute 
Aristotle‟s refutation of the Eleatics and the rehabilitation of the Milesian project 
of natural philosophy corrects the traditional view that interprets Aristotle‟s 
understanding of substantial generation by means of his general account of 
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change in Physics I.7.  This correction, however, complicates the issue of the 
coherence of Aristotle‟s arguments establishing the legitimacy of the science of 
nature.  To resolve the issues raised here, an appeal must be made to Aristotle‟s 
definition of motion in Physics III in order to reinterpret Aristotle‟s account of 
substantial generation in terms of potentiality and actuality.  This definition once 
properly understood applied as a model for substantial generation allows for a 
more satisfactory resolution to the Eleatic dilemma.  
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Introduction 
 
Aristotle‟s Physics is arguably the most important work to study in order 
to understand his contribution to the history of philosophy and science.  Despite 
this, it is the least studied of his major works in modern scholarship likely 
because of an erroneously perceived obsolescence.  Further, his enduring 
contributions to philosophy and science are not merely of historical interest.  
Aristotle can provide modern physics with philosophical considerations of 
fundamental importance to its goal of discovering the truth of nature.  His 
investigations into the essence of motion, place, and time as presented in the 
Physics are crucial to any possible science of nature, including modern 
mathematical physics.  The need to raise this type of question has for the most 
part escaped the notice of the contemporary sciences, but such questions are as 
relevant now as they were in his own time. 
Since the originators of modern science (primarily Galileo, Bacon, and 
Descartes), the scientist has been relieved of the obligation to ask such questions.  
For the most part it is satisfactory, and even necessary, to take as given what the 
meaning of motion, nature, etc. are, in order to facilitate progress in experimental 
research.  Modern science is in fact founded on a rejection of the kind of 
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questions that guided Aristotelian investigations.  A juxtaposition of two well 
known passages from Descartes illustrates the modern prejudice:  
To render [motion] intelligible, [the Aristotelian Schoolmen] have 
still not been able to explain it more clearly than in these terms: 
motus est actus entis in potentia, prout in potentia est, which terms 
are for me so obscure that I am constrained to leave them in their 
language, because I cannot interpret them.  (And, in fact, the words, 
„motion is the act of being in potency, insofar as it is in potency,‟ are 
not clearer for being in French [English here, of course]. (Descartes 
Le Monde) 
Motion… is nothing more than the action by which any body passes 
from one place to another. (Descartes Principles of Philosophy II, 
24) 
Two things are immediately evident.  There is no refutation of the Aristotelian 
doctrine of motion, and there is no explicit effort to understand it.  It is arguable 
that there was no real attempt by the fathers of modern science to refute this 
conception of motion.  They sought simply to replace it.  Further, the definition 
of motion that Descartes offers does not determine the essence or meaning of 
motion but only identifies what type of motion ought to be studied, i.e. 
quantifiable locomotion.  Formally speaking Descartes‟ is not a definition at all 
insofar as it is gratuitously circular („motion is passage in place…‟).  The 
circularity of the definition can be ignored by the practicing scientist but not by a 
philosopher.  The scientist can carry on with his work without questioning 
definitions, but the philosopher cannot.  There arises here a gap between modern 
science and philosophy.  The necessity of mending this disparity becomes more 
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apparent the more distant the truth of the sciences has become from the sense of 
human experience.1 
The retrieval of Aristotle‟s insights could act as a corrective device and 
supplement for the sciences which have perhaps lost sight of their original goal, 
i.e. to allow the lived world to be understood.   This briefly illustrates the general 
philosophical impetus of the following dissertation and the reasoning behind my 
recognition of a need for a serious philosophical consideration of Aristotle‟s 
investigations into the fundamental principles of nature. 
The historical intellectual tradition out of which Aristotle‟s natural 
philosophy grew left him with what appeared to many of his contemporaries as 
insurmountable obstacles in establishing a genuine science of nature.  
Parmenides, reasoning that genuine knowledge ought never to change, came to 
the conclusion that changing things cannot be knowable.  Thus the only viable 
object of genuine knowledge would be solitary and immovable Being.2  Aristotle, 
                                                 
1 Similar remarks could be made about modern science‟s rejection of teleological causes 
in nature, of which, again, there was no rationally argued refutation.  Such a refutation 
would require experimentally verifiable demonstration as to the non-existence of ends or 
purposes in nature.  This, I submit, is not possible even in principle.  Yet the founders of 
modern science managed to convince the majority of the learned that purposefulness in 
nature is not scientifically rational and did this without providing a rational justification 
of their own claim.  The foundations of modern science arose either out of a lapse of 
memory or a willful ignorance of questions such as Aristotle sought to raise.  This causes 
a great deal of trouble when modern science tries to relate its findings to the sense of 
human experience (for who understands in their experience of light Maxwell‟s equations 
[e.g., c = 1/(e0m0)1/2]?).  Even though the conclusions of Aristotle‟s investigations can 
often be considered obsolete, many things found in his natural philosophy square better 
with human experience than much of the fruits of modern science. 
 
2  Heraclitus, on the other hand, came to the same conclusion concerning the 
impossibility of knowledge of nature: because the whole is constantly in flux, there can 
be no unchanging knowledge of it and hence simply no knowledge. 
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however, wished to demonstrate that the changeable world is intelligible in the 
most rigorous philosophical sense.  The greater part of the dissertation follows 
Aristotle‟s attempt to establish the legitimacy of the science of nature. 
The central difficulty concerns the very intelligibility of change, specifically 
the kind of change involved in the generation of substances.  As Aristotle 
understood him, Parmenides had leveled a fundamental objection to the 
possibility of natural science in the form of a paradox seemingly insoluble to 
reason.  Aristotle articulates this paradox of generation in Physics I 
approximately thus: A thing can neither come into being from what-is-not nor 
from what-is.  What-is-not cannot come to be something (for, as the saying goes, 
nothing comes from nothing), and what-is need not come to be because it already 
is.  This led Parmenides to the conclusion that, because change seems always 
bound up with non-being, what changes is strictly speaking unknowable (or even, 
on an extreme reading, non-existent).  For Parmenides, what is left for 
philosophy to speak of and have knowledge of is changeless Being.  Some of 
those, however, who accepted at least partially the charge of unintelligibility 
suggested by the Parmenidean paradox were led to account for the rationality of 
change while making do without the genuine coming into being of substances 
(Empedocles, Democritus, et al.).  Aristotle‟s treatment of change in Physics I 
represents an attempt to establish the possibility of physics as a viable science. 
Among Aristotle‟s predecessors, the attempts to give an account of nature 
were only successful insofar as they did not recognize substantial generation or 
even the existence of substances.  Thus they did not, in Aristotle‟s view, fulfill the 
5 
 
task of comprehensively accounting for all of the phenomena of nature.  
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and Democritus, for example, were in a way able to 
make nature intelligible but at the expense of the existence of genuine 
substances.  Yet this is precisely to avoid the Parmenidean paradox where it is 
most poignant.  For to come into being from what-is-not in its strictest sense 
means to come into being from what-is-not any way a being, and this applies 
most of all to substantial change.  For what changes in place or quality or size 
must in some sense already be, but when substances are-not they simply do not 
exist.  The result is that in order for Aristotle to resolve the Parmenidean paradox 
comprehensively for all the phenomena of change, he must make intelligible the 
generation of substantial beings.   
The dissertation arises out of the necessity for a developed consideration 
of Aristotle‟s response to the Eleatic critique of natural science and his arguments 
seeking to establish the legitimacy of such a study.  The explicit goal of Physics I 
is to establish the number and character of the principles involved in the study of 
nature.  What is less explicit is that this means Aristotle is going to show that 
nature is rational and can therefore be the subject for a rigorous science.  This 
requires, in addition to a refutation of the Eleatic denial of the existence of such 
principles, a critical appraisal of the research of his predecessors as well as an 
original explanatory account demonstrating the intelligibility of change. 
Chapter one of the dissertation sets the intellectual context for Aristotle‟s 
investigation into the principles of natural science through a reading of his 
interpretation of the doctrines of his predecessors in Metaphysics I.  This text 
provides insightful comparisons between the first Milesian natural philosophers, 
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the Eleatics, and the poets.  This chapter demonstrates that for Aristotle the 
difference between these schools of thought is based on an epistemological 
conflict between them. 
Each school of thought carries a particular attitude toward nature and in 
particular the extent to which it is knowable by human beings.  The poets believe 
knowledge of nature is limited for humans since it properly belongs to divine 
beings and perhaps a few humans who have the privilege of divine inspiration.  
The Eleatics claim that a science of nature is impossible insofar as the subject 
matter itself is incompatible with the character of genuine knowledge.  Since the 
Eleatics suppose that the nature of knowledge is unchanging, they also must hold 
that the objects of knowledge must be unchanging.  Therefore nature, the 
changing world, cannot be a subject for unchanging knowledge.  Only unmoving 
Being itself is a proper candidate for such knowledge.  But since not all of the 
Eleatics restrain themselves to the realm of Being but make claims also about the 
world of change, they must maintain an epistemological distinction between 
knowledge and opinion.  Natural philosophy, then, is a subject of opinion and 
cannot be considered a rigorous science.  These remarks generally pertain to all 
of the Eleatic philosophers but they are most explicitly stated by Parmenides.  
Aristotle makes subtle distinctions between Parmenides, Melissus, and 
Xenophanes which will be described in more detail in order to clarify the 
distinction between knowledge and opinion operative in Aristotle‟s response to 
the Eleatic prohibition to the study of nature. 
In the earliest natural philosophy of the Milesians, the claim to knowledge 
is implicit.  They do not make a distinction between knowledge and opinion but 
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operate under the assumption that their investigations have a rightful claim to 
truth.  Their immediate competition is the poets whom Aristotle distinguishes 
from the Milesians on the grounds that they reason and approach nature 
differently.  I argue that the Milesians are the primary subject of the Eleatic 
critique of natural philosophy and that strangely enough this reflects an affinity 
between the Eleatic‟s critique of the Milesian natural philosophy and the attitude 
of the poets concerning the possibility of knowledge of nature. 
The Eleatic response to Milesian natural philosophy constitutes an 
epistemological critique.  Aristotle‟s response to the Eleatic injunction to the 
study of nature takes the form of a rehabilitation of the Milesian project that is 
predicated on the establishment of an epistemological justification of natural 
philosophy.  In the milieu of conflicting opinions about the limits of human 
knowledge, Aristotle finds himself at odds with the poets and the Eleatics but 
allied with the Milesians.  However, the relationship with Parmenides is complex 
owing to the fact that Aristotle inherits through Plato a conception of knowledge 
similar to that of Parmenides.  All three of these figures, each in his own way, 
suppose that knowledge must not be changeable.  Plato and Aristotle, unlike 
Parmenides, expand the domain of what is knowable through the disidenification 
of the object of knowledge from the being about which there is knowledge.  That 
is, for Aristotle, when you have knowledge of a natural being, knowledge is by 
means of the principles governing and underlying that being.  Likewise, Plato 
allows knowledge of things albeit indirectly through the knowledge of immutable 
Forms, which are causes or archetypes of natural beings.  Even though for Plato 
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the changeable beings are not knowable in themselves, they are images of things 
that are in themselves knowable.  
The core chapter of the dissertation is devoted to an analysis of the 
development of the argument of Physics I paying particular attention to 
Aristotle‟s argumentative strategy.  The results of my analysis indicate that 
Aristotle engineers a response to the Eleatic critique of natural science that takes 
place in two stages.  The first is largely rhetorical and polemical while the second 
supplies an original account of change that proposes to circumvent the paradox 
of motion, which is the source of Eleatic bar to the study of nature.  In order to 
understand Aristotle‟s response to the Eleatics, it will be necessary to provide a 
detailed reading of the arguments in Physics I.2-6 that constitute an initial 
refutation of Eleatic monism and Aristotle‟s characteristic review of the doctrines 
of his predecessors.  This portion of the dissertation resembles neoplatonic and 
medieval commentaries in that it provides a running commentary to Aristotle‟s 
text intertwined with an argument that develops along with the text.  The 
necessity for this approach for this portion of text is not only required by its 
density but by the subtle rhetorical strategies that it employs.  Through this close 
reading, I develop an interpretation showing that the entirety of Physics I is an 
extended argument to establish the legitimacy of natural philosophy. 
The review of the predecessors in Physics I takes the form of a critique of 
their views about change.  But Aristotle‟s original account of the principles 
underlying change is not without difficulties of its own.  Aristotle‟s initial attempt 
is to offer an account of change that makes use of three principles (two contraries 
in a persisting substrate).  This account has the advantage of being able to 
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comprehend a large range of the phenomena of nature.  However, the one type of 
change that Parmenides treats as presenting the fundamental road block to 
understanding change is not easily understood in terms of this three-principled 
account.  In the case of the coming into being of substances the persisting 
substrate is not readily identifiable.  For example, when a seed becomes a full 
grown organism, the substrate itself (which in this context Aristotle explicitly 
identifies as the seed) undergoes a transformation so that the identification of 
some third persisting principle becomes difficult if not impossible. 
Traditionally commentators address this by claiming that Aristotle holds a 
doctrine of “prime matter,” which is a substrate that survives any and all change 
by virtue of being completely indeterminate.  Alternatively commentators who 
deny that Aristotle held such a doctrine often account for the difficulty of 
identifying the persisting substrate by claiming that Aristotle‟s argument or 
reasoning is somehow defective.  While there is evidence for both of these 
arguments, the first appears to me to be untenable (the reasons for this opinion 
are complex and must be addressed later).  While I am sympathetic to the idea 
that the argument is in some way deficient, I reject the idea that this is due to 
some negligence or misunderstanding on Aristotle‟s part.  It is more plausible 
that Aristotle in fact understands the limitations of the argument he presents but 
that he has no reason to bring attention to these shortcomings.  Since his goal is 
to persuade the reader that the following investigation is worthy of serious study, 
he would have no inclination to undermine an argument that supports this 
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belief.3  There is a third view prevalent in literature that attempts to make 
Aristotle‟s account of generation coherent by identifying the substrate as in every 
case something relative specifically to a given change (i.e. the “proximate matter” 
interpretation).  Even this view which is perhaps closest of the three to being 
correct has critical flaws.  I address the shortcomings of each of these positions 
and in turn provide an alternative view that accounts for the peculiarities of 
substantial generation. 
One of the difficult tasks of chapter two of the dissertation is to 
demonstrate Aristotle‟s recognition of the deficiency of the three-principled 
account.  I attempt to do this through a close reading of chapters seven and eight 
of Physics I.  Some of the key pieces of evidence for my view are Aristotle‟s 
varying usage of the term substrate in the contexts of different kinds of change, 
his ambivalence about the number principles that must be involved to account for 
motion, and Aristotle‟s allusion to an alternate solution that is not explicitly 
presented.  The most difficult aspect of these chapters of the Physics is 
determining the relation between the three-principled account of change in 
chapter seven and the resolution of the Eleatic paradox of motion in chapter 
eight, which Aristotle claims follows directly from the analysis in chapter seven.  
While chapter seven has received a great deal of attention, chapter eight has been 
left relatively neglected and poorly understood.  I seek to remedy this deficiency 
                                                 
3 If Aristotle recognizes that the Parmenidean paradox may not be wholly resolvable and 
that at the same time he believes that one ought to study nature despite the Eleatic 
injunction, I see no reason why Aristotle would feel obliged to undermine the credibility 
of an account that is at least an improvement over other existing accounts.   
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by drawing the argumentative connection between these chapters and situating 
them in the context of Physics I as a whole. 
In the beginning of the investigation proper concerning nature (Physics 
II.1), we find a peculiar absence of the notion of substantial generation.  For 
though he tells us there that the things that clearly exist according to nature are 
animals and their parts, plants, and the elemental bodies, he tells us that this is 
most evident insofar as these are subject to locomotion, growth, and change of 
quality.  Yet, what is most evidently natural about these things, however, is that 
they are primarily cases in which we are likely to identify occurrences of 
substantial generation. 
The conspicuousness of the absence from the list of natural changes at the 
beginning of the chapter is reaffirmed at its end where Aristotle shows (in an 
admittedly obscure passage) that nature, in one of its fundamental meanings, 
means “being born” (in the sense applicable to the generation of plants and 
animals, which are exemplary substances).  The allusion to the problem of 
substantial generation is made clear in the immediate sequel where he raises an 
aporia arising from this meaning of nature.  The difficulty is in what sense 
“privation” (that from which substantial generation takes place) might be said to 
have being.  That is to say, in what sense is that which becomes a substance, for, 
as we saw before, a thing cannot come from what-is or from what-is-not.  Yet he 
does not address the problem here but defers it to a later investigation.  This 
deferment is an indication of Aristotle‟s recognition that the inclusion of 
substantial generation within the study of nature is not yet secured (this is 
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accentuated by Aristotle‟s etymological pun, for it becomes a question of whether 
“to grow” or “to be born” (fu/etai) can be a subject of the science of “nature” 
(fu/sij). 
 Before approaching the definition of motion, the last section of chapter 
three begins to clarify the issue raised in Physics II.1 concerning character of 
privation involved in the generation of substance.  Here I provide a reading of 
passages from On Generation and Corruption that address the general subject of 
potentiality as a kind of privation and the specific example of the transformation 
of elements which serve as an archetype for the generation of substances.  These 
passages illustrate the difficulties that arise when a potentiality is conceived of 
that does not have any positive predicates.  That from which a substance comes to 
be (what-is-not a substance), when it is conceived of as a potentiality, would be 
precisely this sort of being. 
In the forth chapter I bring Aristotle‟s definition of motion to bear on the 
problem of substantial generation.  The central question is whether and in what 
sense substantial generation can be understood by means of the definition of 
motion.  In Physics V, Aristotle draws a distinction between motion and change 
the latter being the wider category encompassing the former.  The only species of 
change that does not belong to the narrower category of motion is substantial 
generation.  Aristotle makes this claim on the grounds that the role of the 
substrate in substantial generation differs from that in locomotion, growth, and 
qualitative change.  He does not however make explicit that the definition of 
motion is meant to apply to the wider category of change or that substantial 
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generation should be included in that definition.4  This chapter provides an 
extensive discussion of Aristotle‟s definition of motion that shows that it is first of 
all a coherent understanding of motion and which illustrates how substantial 
generation can be understood by it.  The definition of motion proves to be helpful 
in solving the Eleatic paradox by understanding the substrate involved in any 
change as a potentiality that remains.  This interpretation also acts as a 
reconstruction of the alternate solution to the Eleatic dilemma alluded to in 
Physics I.8 where Aristotle tells us that the ideas of potentiality and actuality 
could be appropriately applied to the problem without telling us how or where he 
does so. 
 
Comment on Method 
The general strategy of investigation will involve close reading of the 
portions of Aristotle‟s physical writings that deal with the problem of substantial 
generation.  Aristotle‟s texts are not loosely compiled lecture notes or sketches 
but are carefully constructed scientific prose.  The analysis of such texts requires 
the utmost attentiveness to word choice, form of argument, and the context in 
which the specific arguments occur.  As much as is possible, it will be necessary to 
follow strictly the best surviving texts of the Aristotelian corpus without 
                                                 
4 The distinction made in Physics V.1 appears even to go so far as to remove substantial 
generation from being a form of motion (ki/nhsij) in the strictest sense.  It will be of the 
utmost importance to determine whether or not substantial generation can be 
understood to fall within the bounds of the definition of motion as given in book III.  For 
“since,” as Aristotle says, “nature is a source of motion and change,” this will aid us in 
determining in what ways an account of substantial generation can or cannot be included 
in the science of nature. 
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succumbing to the temptation of interpolation or textual emendation (our own or 
that of modern editors). 
The question of the chronology of Aristotle‟s texts will have the least 
possible bearing on my interpretation.  On top of the fact that ultimately there is 
no way to establish a satisfactory chronology (though there may be sufficient 
evidence to date some of the works), the employment of such a framework opens 
the danger of reconciling apparent contradictions found in Aristotle‟s text in a 
way that obfuscates a genuine Aristotelian problem or intention.  The fact that 
there are contradictions in Aristotle‟s texts is undeniable.  But if we are open to 
the possibility that Aristotle need not have felt he had to solve every problem 
once and for all, the reconciliation of such contradictions allows the possibility of 
bearing more fruit than dismissing an “earlier” view in light of what we take to be 
a “later” and more mature view.5  
It will also be necessary to take care not to take arguments out of the 
context in which they were written.  This caution will not disallow cross-
referencing relevant passages from texts other than that being analyzed, but it 
                                                 
5 More often than is generally recognized, Aristotle does not provide decisive conclusions 
to the problems he raises.  This is especially the case when dealing with the most 
fundamental issues.  It is therefore necessary to be extremely sensitive to what he does or 
does not ultimately conclude in a given series of arguments.  He often suspends 
judgment about the most important problems and wishes to bring the reader to a 
developed state of constructive aporia.  This I believe stems from recognition on 
Aristotle‟s part that some philosophical problems ultimately offer no definitive solution.  
What he will offer the reader then is the best possible way of handling a given problem in 
order that the reader may be equipped to deal with the deepest philosophical problems 
on her own.  These are important and too often overlooked aspects of Aristotle‟s 
dialectical method. 
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will guard against importing ideas that Aristotle is purposely withholding from a 
given argument.  For example, we will respect Aristotle‟s reticence to employ the 
concepts of potentiality and actuality in his initial account of substantial 
generation in Physics I, though we will be compelled to consider why he chooses 
not to do so. 
Even though book divisions, chapter divisions, and even paragraph breaks 
in Aristotle‟s texts are artificial creations of later editors they reflect a deep 
consideration of the argumentative structure of Aristotle‟s works.  My approach 
to the text respects this to a high degree.  It is uncommon for me to make appeals 
to passages outside of the immediate context of an argument under consideration 
in order to provide crucial support for my interpretation.  As will be especially 
evident in Chapter 2 where I give a sustained interpretative reading of Physics I, 
even the relations between chapters in a given book can provide deep insight into 
the matters under consideration.  Understanding the argumentative structure 
relies heavily on the order and manner of presentation insofar as Aristotle‟s 
writing is engineered in specific ways to guide the reader to an insight or aporia.  
The one substantial excursion from the text of the Physics is On Generation and 
Corruption, but it relates to the material in the Physics by addressing themes not 
touched upon in much detail in the Physics, i.e. the question of Prime Matter and 
the exploration of the idea of potentiality as it relates to coming into being. 
16 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
The Origins of Natural Philosophy 
 
 
We his students, however, wish not 
only to remember the man but also 
to entertain our children and 
audiences with his speech. 
-Diogenes Laërtius‟ Lives of 
Eminent Philosophers, I.39 
(speaking of Thales) 
 
The love of truth, faith in the power 
of the mind, is the first condition of 
Philosophy. 
-Hegel‟s Lectures on the 
History of Philosophy 
 
 
The intention of this chapter is to provide a preparatory narrative dealing 
with a narrow selection of Aristotle‟s predecessors insofar as they posed the 
questions which constitute the earliest insights into nature and which serve as 
guideposts for Aristotle‟s natural philosophy.  The interest here is to gain insight 
into how Aristotle understood the relation of his own inquiries into nature to 
those of his presocratic predecessors.  This will provide guidance when we begin 
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to approach themes in the dissertation that I claim are central to Aristotle‟s 
thinking in natural philosophy.  This is especially the case with the issue of the 
generation of natural substances which I believe lies at the heart of Aristotle‟s 
thinking of nature and which has its roots in the thinking of his predecessors.  
These thinkers were the first either to put forward physical doctrines or to 
concern themselves with what we might call the epistemological problem of the 
changing world.  The most relevant aspect of this early history of natural 
philosophy for the purposes of approaching the foundations of Aristotle‟s 
investigations into nature is determining the relation between the groundwork of 
natural philosophy established by the Milesians and the critical response it 
received from the Eleatics.6  The dynamic between these two groups in particular 
captures the essence of a tension found in Aristotle as well as in Plato between 
the desire to put forward truthful accounts of the natural world and the 
recognition that the standard by which genuine knowledge must be measured 
may be higher than any possible knowledge of the natural world. 
In order to understand the importance of Aristotle‟s physical inquiries, we 
must begin by looking at some of the founding thinkers who investigated nature 
                                                 
6 The question of whether or in what sense these two groups constitute „schools‟ in terms 
of actual associations is not wholly irrelevant.  I am less interested in the 
historiographical and philological questions than in the progression of ideas more or less 
explicit in these thinkers.  Thus for present purposes the interest is more in following the 
history of ideas that leads up the Aristotle‟s attempt to justify natural science as a field of 
knowledge in the most rigorous sense.  For a comprehensive guide to both the actual 
historical details of the earliest Greek thinkers as well as their contributions to the 
history of thought I refer the reader to Kirk, Raven, and Schofield‟s Presocratic 
Philosophers (1983, abbreviated KRS from here on). 
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so that we may understand their influence on Aristotle.7  Aristotle‟s project is in a 
certain sense aligned with neo-Ionian natural science (Empedocles, Anaxagoras, 
Leucippus, perhaps Heraclitus, et al.) in that he seeks to revive the Milesian 
project of adequately understanding nature by discovering the principles that 
underlie it while at the same time overcoming the problems posed by the Eleatic 
critique which threaten to negate any claim to genuine knowledge concerning the 
natural world.8  Aristotle inherits from the Milesians the project of investigation 
into nature and from the Eleatics the standard of knowledge by which such an 
investigation must be judged if its findings are to be considered bona fide 
knowledge.9 
The basis of this Eleatic critique arises from the consideration of an 
apparently irresolvable paradox of motion, namely that that which comes to be 
must come to be from either that which is or that which is not, either of which is 
impossible.  For that which is need not come to be since it already is, and that 
                                                 
7 To gain some historical perspective on the importance of these thinkers as well as 
Aristotle, we should realize that they initiated a tradition of natural scientific inquiry 
which spanned an epoch at least four times as long as the modern scientific tradition 
which we immediately inherit.  Determining these motivations is not only profitable for 
its own sake, but because the questions of the early inquirers into nature formed the 
basis of the investigation of Aristotle‟s Physics, we will find our way into one of the 
central problems at the heart of Aristotelian physics by means of them, namely the 
problem of the intelligibility of motion as such. 
 
8 The distinction between the Milesians and the neo-Ionians is theoretical rather than 
geographic.  Miletus was the city in Ionia where Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes 
resided.  The neo-Ionians, whatever their geography, are called such primarily because 
they take up similar directions in the study of nature. 
 
9 Of course, both of these inheritances are mediated by Plato who undoubtedly shaped 
Aristotle‟s views of these thinkers.  The study of Plato‟s influence on Aristotle‟s history of 
philosophy would be an interesting and immense project beyond the scope of the present 
essay.  Cherniss‟ work on Plato and Aristotle‟s interpretations of the presocratics would 
be an excellent starting point for such an investigation (cf. Cherniss 1964 and 1944).  
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which is not cannot be that from which something comes to be since nothing can 
come to be from nothing (cf. Parmenides fr.8, 5 ff. and especially 18-21; cf. also 
Physics I.8 191a25 ff.).  The Neo-Ionians, generally speaking, manage to 
overcome the first horn of the Eleatic dilemma by supposing that the material 
substrate or substrates of the natural world are themselves eternal so that despite 
the fact that physical things come to be and pass away, there is always something 
immutable out of which they come to be and into which they perish while 
themselves never coming into being or perishing in an absolute sense.   
The figures that I focus on in this introduction constitute an admittedly 
selective group.  I touch upon Hesiod, Thales, and Anaximander relatively briefly 
and spend considerably more time grappling with Parmenides and the Eleatics‟ 
critique of cosmological and physical theorizing.10  The Eleatic critique is of 
fundamental importance in that it sets the point of departure for Aristotle‟s 
argument legitimating the science of nature and in particular the central problem 
of the generation of natural substances.  What is most important for the purposes 
of the present investigation is to see what exactly it is that Aristotle is responding 
to when in the first book of his Physics he takes pains to argue that change (and a 
fortiori nature) is knowable by means of rational principles. 
Let us begin by looking at the origins of the investigations into nature in 
the Greek tradition by considering two founders of Greek thought, Hesiod and 
Thales.  The distinction between them will be the guiding thread in addressing 
                                                 
10 For the sake of brevity in this chapter I refrain from discussions of Empedocles, 
Anaxagoras, the Atomists, Pythagoras, and the Pythagoreans who all in their own way 
formulate responses to the Parmenidean critique.  There will be opportunity to return to 
some of these figures in looking at Aristotle‟s review of predecessors in Physics I where 
he shows the limitations of some of their responses to the Eleatic dilemma. 
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the problem of what motivates one type of thinker to approach nature in terms of 
rational, “scientific” principles rather than accepting or elaborating traditional, 
mythical cosmologies and cosmogonies.  The importance of this will become 
clearer as we begin to see that not only do some of the presocratic thinkers 
specifically set themselves over against the tradition of the poets, but that on 
several occasions Aristotle himself explicitly marks the poets as adversaries to his 
natural scientific research.11  This immediately brings us to an examination of the 
key differences that Aristotle identifies between philosophers and poets and 
indeed among the philosophers themselves to the extent to which they suppose 
that the study of the natural world is a subject of knowledge or opinion. 
 
1.1 Philosophy and Myth 
The discussion of the question of the origin of philosophy in the west 
traditionally sets itself the task of locating in time a transition which takes place 
from pre-scientific, mythical-poetical attitudes to rationalistic scientific thinking 
about the world.12  Hesiod and Thales are often invoked as prototypes 
representing poetic and scientific approaches to understanding the natural 
                                                 
11 For example, Aristotle cites Hesiod as holding a certain view of place which must be 
considered alongside other alternative theories (Physics IV 208b29).  See also 
Metaphysics I 983b29 ff. 
 
12 This attitude is largely anachronistic in the context of contemporary scholarship but 
there is a persistent presence of it in popular views and text books on philosophy.  Since 
Dodds‟ important work The Greeks and the Irrational (2004) published in the mid-
twentieth century this attitude is much less common.  The work of French classicists 
Brisson (2008), Vernant (1983 and 2006), and Detienne (1999) have done much to help 
dispel the legitimacy of this point of view. 
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world.13  The differences between these two figures are meant to provide the basis 
for the idea that there is a gulf separating reason and non-reason, or myth and 
logos.  It is the historical transition from the dominance of one kind of thinking to 
the other, or from the evolution of one out of the other, that we are meant to 
grasp as the birth of philosophy out of irrationality. 
Another typical strategy for making the distinction between the poets and 
the first philosophers is to say that the latter became concerned with different 
subject matters.  It was no longer the Gods that they wanted to talk about but 
rather nature.  Direct and anecdotal evidence both contradict this.  It is clear that 
both poets and natural philosophers often address the same subject matter.  
Take, for example, questions concerning the genesis of the cosmos, the nature of 
man, and subjects relevant to political life.  The presence of all of these themes is 
evident in Hesiod‟s Theogony which treats many cosmological themes.  But if it is 
not in the subject matter that the distinction comes to light, perhaps it is 
apparent in the mode of writing with which they choose to communicate.  It is 
clear however that if one tries to reduce the distinction poets and philosophers to 
a matter of narrative style, one finds immediately that this distinction is 
inadequate as well.  For example, one cannot distinguish Parmenides or 
Empedocles from the poets on the grounds of style or mode of expression alone 
                                                 
13 One example among many is Zeller: “He [Thales] is at any rate the first we know to 
have instituted any general enquiry into the natural causes of things, in contradistinction 
to his predecessors, who contented themselves partly with mythical cosmogonies, and 
partly with isolated ethical reflections”  (Zeller 1881, 216). 
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given that they both wrote in verses which in fact resemble closely the style of 
Hesiod.14   
The common mistake is to look too much into form/content distinction 
and ignore differences in motivations and presuppositions which underlie the 
particular way that the philosopher approaches and talks about the world which 
he investigates in contrast to that of the poet.  It is precisely the insight into the 
differences in motivation which underlie Aristotle‟s treatment of the Hesiod and 
the natural philosophers in Metaphysics I.15  Aristotle‟s survey of his 
                                                 
14 Both Parmenides and Empedocles are traditionally thought of as representing  the 
philosophic and scientific type.  However, recent scholarship on Parmenides and 
Empedocles (including the discovery of new manuscripts in the latter) has allowed 
scholars to entertain the distinct possibility that there is a stronger religious and poetic 
subtext in these thinkers than has previously been thought.  Consider particularly the 
work of Peter Kingsley on both Parmenides and Empedocles as well as the literature on 
the newly discovered Empedocles manuscripts.  Cf. Kingsley 1999 for Parmenides and 
Kinglsey 1997 and 2002 for Empedocles.  See the introduction to Inwood 2001 for the 
significance of the newly discovered Empedocles manuscripts.  
 
15 Aristotle‟s accounts of his predecessors and of the origins of philosophy have been 
criticized consistently on the grounds that he views them through the lens of his own 
philosophical project.  Especially Cherniss who devotes his important book Aristotle’s 
Criticism of Pre-socratic Philosophy to the systematic prosecution of Aristotle on this 
point. Indeed he admits  as much: “But the purpose for which we are recounting these 
things is this: that we might understand from these people both what they set down as 
causes, and how they fall in with the kinds of causes described [by us]” (986a14).  This 
statement is made in the context of Aristotle‟s account of Pythagorean number theory 
but clearly refers generally to his examination of his predecessors as a whole in 
Metaphysics I.  Even though our purpose here is not primarily to reconstruct the 
historical origins of philosophy, we must make some effort to distinguish Aristotle‟s 
accounts of his predecessors with the little evidence we have from the presocratics in the 
surviving fragments. 
We must always keep in mind that however „objective‟ we wish to be in disarming 
the influence of Aristotle on our view of the presocratics, Aristotle, along with Plato, 
provide us with our primary means of access to understanding them.  Gadamer believes 
that Plato and Aristotle‟s influence is to some extent unavoidable but that the 
hermeneutic challenge is to overcome this influence as much as is possible by 
contrasting the various accounts of the presocratics from different historical periods 
(Gadamer 2001, 33 ff.).  Less historically minded commentators often make the mistake 
of taking for granted that there is a transparent lens of objectivity that allows them to see 
through the distortions of history as if they did not exist.  The most obvious prejudice is 
easily recognizable from the very fact that we refer to this group of thinkers as „pre-
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predecessors in Metaphysics I, as I hope to show, constitutes an argument which 
not only distinguishes philosophers from poets on the grounds of distinct 
attitudes towards nature, but more fundamentally constitutes an argument which 
makes this distinction based on their respective epistemological commitments.  
That is whether, how, or to what extent the poet or philosopher believes human 
beings can obtain genuine knowledge of nature. 
In the first book of the Metaphysics Aristotle tells us several things about 
Hesiod, what he has in common with and how he differs from figures more 
recognizable as philosophers, i.e. Thales and Parmenides.  The arguments 
contrasting Hesiod with Thales and Parmenides revolve around the question of 
the original authorship of the four Aristotelian causes, but they also serve to 
reveal fundamental differences between the poetic and scientific approaches to 
understanding nature.  Aristotle tells us that Hesiod: 1) is considered by some to 
                                                                                                                                                 
socratics,‟ a name which reflects that these thinkers are already thought retroactively in 
terms of a lineage that begins with Socrates and follows through Plato and Aristotle.  
Thus there is really something to Nietzsche‟s insistence (Nietzsche 2001) that we refer to 
these thinkers as pre-platonic insofar as whatever picture we have even of Socrates is 
Platonic (and of course Xenophonic though perhaps less so).  There is no way to 
absolutely circumvent this influence given the fact that the majority of the surviving 
fragments of the presocratics are handed down to us through other ancient sources. 
The most systematic attempt to dismantle the Aristotelian influence on our 
understanding of the presocratics is Cherniss‟ important work Aristotle’s Criticism of the 
Presocratic Philosophers.  But even here one cannot escape the suspicion that the means 
of the deconstruction is artificial and anachronistic.  More recently Jaap Mansfeld has 
taken up the question of how to understand the presocratics while avoiding the strong 
influence of Aristotle‟s colored testimony by making an explicit appeal to contemporary 
distinctions between philosophy and science (Mansfeld 1990).  Mansfeld however only 
succeeds in making explicit the a-historical approach that is common to the methods of 
the majority of contemporary accounts of the presocratics.  For while they seek to 
circumvent the Aristotelian influence, they often do so without justifying why this is 
better than, and not essentially equivalent to in principle, Aristotle‟s interpretation.  Our 
approach accepts a certain inevitability of reading Aristotle into the predecessors while 
being conscious of the difficulties it entails.  However, the difficulty affects us less as it is 
ultimately Aristotle that we are hoping to understand. 
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have anticipated an account positing a single material substrate underlying 
nature (983b29)16, 2) claims that the earth was the first of the bodies to come into 
being (989a10)17, 3) may have been the first to catch a glimpse of final causes 
(984b24).  With regard to at least two of the four Aristotelian causes (material 
and final), Aristotle entertains the idea that Hesiod may have some right to the 
claim of discovery.  With regard to material cause, Hesiod loses out to Thales who 
is called the originator of “this sort of philosophy,” the sort, I take it, that gives an 
account grounded in ordinary experience of nature which prioritizes the 
constituents of natural things as their most real attribute. 
For Aristotle, what distinguishes Thales from Hesiod and other “ancient 
theologians” is also the way he speaks: “But whether this opinion about nature is 
something archaic and ancient might perhaps be unclear, but Thales as least is 
said to have spoken in this way [ou(/twj] about the first cause” (984a2).  
Aristotle‟s reconstruction of Thales‟ reasoning that the source and primary 
constituent of nature is water shows what it is that distinguishes his way of 
thinking from Hesiod and the poets.18  Namely, there is in Thales a reasoned 
                                                 
16 The reference is general enough to refer also to Homer or perhaps other poets or 
„ancient theologians‟ as he sometimes calls them as a group.  The important distinction 
here is whether a certain type of thinking represented by Thales and a type represented 
by those who make Ocean and Tethys the origin of things were the first to posit water as 
the original source. 
 
17 Cf. also (Aristotle‟s representation of) Hesiod‟s claim that “first of all things chaos came 
into being, but then broad-breasted earth” (Physics IV 209b30).  Aristotle considers 
Hesiod‟s statement among those of natural philosophers who investigate the nature of 
place. 
 
18 Namely, from Thales‟ supposed experience that for living things and heat in general, 
fluid both sustains and is the origin of these, he must have, according to Aristotle, 
reasoned further that the source of these things is water because water “is in turn the 
nature of fluid things” (984a22 ff.). 
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account which makes a direct appeal to something of which we can have 
firsthand experience.  This employment of experience and reasoned account 
mark the decisive difference between Thales and the poets.  The underlying 
supposition is that Thales believes that mundane experience and reasoning 
constitute a legitimate source of knowledge about nature.  The authority of 
Hesiod‟s account does not come from direct experience of nature but rather from 
the claim of inspiration from a divine source and therefore a privileged 
experience.19  Even if both the poets and the first natural scientists are interested 
in what constitutes the cosmos and from whence it came, they approach the 
subject with different presuppositions about humankind‟s capacity to have 
genuine understanding of the world he inhabits. 
Hesiod‟s rival for the claim to the discovery of the final cause in nature is, 
surprisingly, Parmenides.  Both of them are seemingly the first to posit love 
(e)/roj, 984b24) as a cause and this Aristotle takes to be a forerunner of his notion 
of final cause: “as though there needed to be present among beings some sort of 
cause that would move things and draw them together” (984b30).  Curiously, 
Aristotle postpones deciding between Parmenides and Hesiod making a promise 
he appears never to make good on (cf. 984b31).20  The fact that Aristotle makes 
no immediate decision as to who originated the notion of final cause suggests that 
as far as the subject matter which concerns the philosopher and the poet there 
                                                 
19 After a lengthy 24 line catalogue of divinities, Hesiod begins the substance of his poem 
with this invocation: “And one day they taught Hesiod glorious song while he was 
shepherding his lambs under holy Helicon, and this word first the goddesses said to me -
- the Muses of Olympus, daughters of Zeus who holds the aegis” (H.G. Evelyn-White 
1914, line 25). 
 
20 Cf. J. Mansfeld 1990, 206. 
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are areas of overlap such that making a definitive distinction proves to be 
difficult.  Further, because Aristotle does not distinguish between Parmenides 
and Hesiod on the grounds of their approach to understanding nature which 
would parallel the distinction between Hesiod and Thales, we can infer that 
Parmenides and Hesiod may be in some sense more akin than Hesiod and 
Thales.  Even the manner in which Parmenides articulates the notion of final 
cause is more poetic than scientific or philosophical in that the final cause takes 
the form of the goddess herself.21  This is less puzzling once we consider that 
Parmenides‟ physical theories are presented as if they were revealed to him by the 
goddess he invokes in his poem.22  Even if the content of Parmenides‟ physical 
theories closely resembles the kind of account one typically finds in natural 
philosophy of the age (employing the notion of oppositions, material principles, 
etc.), one cannot overlook the significance of the fact that Parmenides does not 
claim to have derived these insights from a study of nature but rather from 
inspiration of his muse the goddess. 
Aristotle accentuates the difficulty of distinguishing mythical and rational 
accounts of nature when he tells us that there is even something „philosophic‟ 
about the poetic type: “But someone who wonders and is at an impasse considers 
himself to be ignorant (for which reason the lover of myth is in a certain way 
                                                 
21 Cf. Parmenides‟ fragment 12: “for she [the goddess] governs the hateful birth and 
mingling of all things, sending female to mix with male, and again conversely male with 
female” (KRS 1983, 258).  Cf. also KRS (1983, 260): “It is unclear whether Parmenides‟ 
divine first cause is anything more than a metaphor for the mutual attraction exercised 
by opposite forms, although there is no room for such a cause in the ontology of 
fragment 8, 53-61.” 
 
22 Cf. Parmenides‟ fragment 1: “And the goddess received me kindly, and took my right 
hand with her hand, and uttered speech and thus addressed me” (Parmenides 1991). 
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philosophic, since a myth is composed of wonders)” (982b19).  The same sense of 
ignorance which drives the philosopher in his journey from wonder to 
understanding is also present in the poets who in turn manifest that wonder in 
others by means of his or her art.  The poets seem to be engaged in an activity 
that causes men to wonder and in this way is „philosophic‟.  But not only are the 
works of the poets the causes of wonder, their works are narratives which 
describe things about the world itself that make men wonder. 
Yet the poets, according to Aristotle, are misguided at least in this: they 
regard the highest knowledge concerning the mysteries of nature as appropriate 
only to the gods.  From the point of view of the poets who believe that “the nature 
of the divine power is to be jealous” the philosophical project of the attainment of 
„divine‟ knowledge about the world appears to be impious (982b29 ff.).  And 
indeed there must be some hubris in supposing that even the wisest human being 
could have absolute knowledge about the whole which could in principle belong 
only to a non-finite being or a being that was not a part of the whole which is 
supposed to be the object of knowledge.  If the poet makes claims about nature or 
anything else, he or she generally does so under the authority of a divinity or 
muse.  From the point of view of the poet, it is an act of impiety for the natural 
scientist to make such claims on the grounds of human reason and experience 
alone.   
Even if the philosopher acknowledges certain limits to what he or she can 
genuinely know about nature and from this attains to a certain (Socratic) 
humility, it is better to advance beyond the position of the poets who believe that 
human beings with their limited capacities cannot attain to genuine knowledge of 
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the world without the aid of the divine.23  For the poets, the only cure for human 
ignorance is the divine grace of a muse or other divinity.  From this point of view, 
what distinguishes the philosopher from the „ancient theologians‟ is not reducible 
to the use of rational argument, a non-anthropomorphic perspective about the 
gods, or even the subject matter of their discourses.  Rather, it is what they 
understand to be the limits of the human capacity to experience and understand 
as well the attitude towards the human striving to genuine knowledge that is 
ultimately the distinguishing feature between the poets and the early natural 
philosophers. 
 
i Philosophy and Science 
There has been a growing trend to make the further distinction between 
philosophy and science though traditionally these have been held to be 
inseparable in early Greek thought.  Jaap Mansfeld epitomizes this trend in an 
explicit rejection of the Aristotelian account of the origins of philosophical 
thought, a rejection which deserves critical appraisal: 
Although my (far from wholly original) approach may perhaps be 
dubbed anachronistic, I believe that the best way of tackling the 
solution, and of rephrasing Aristotle‟s question [as to the origins of 
philosophy], is the drab, pragmatic one of taking as one‟s basis 
those activities and procedures which, at the moment, are assumed 
to be philosophical by the large majority of professionals, and to 
exclude from consideration what is outside the field worked by 
                                                 
23 This whole line of reasoning could be seen as the poetic precursor to the Eleatic 
critique of natural science.  The result of Eleatic skepticism, especially visible in 
Parmenides, is that the authority of our opinions about the natural world rests ultimately 
on an appeal to the divine, in his case the goddess he invokes and is guided by 
throughout the poem. 
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these professionals.  […]  Philosophers, however, do not study the 
things that are studied by the scientists, but contemplate the 
activities and theories of the scientists themselves.  Modern 
epistemology and philosophy of science are remote descendants of 
Aristotle‟s “first philosophy.”  (Mansfeld 1990, 209) 
 
Mansfeld‟s view is clearly and intentionally a departure from the Aristotelian 
view in that it rejects the idea that “second philosophy” (the study of nature) 
deserves the name of philosophy at all.  What is not made clear is what the 
motivation might be for the dismissal of the Aristotelian account of the difference 
between philosophy and myth (as well as the kinship of first and second 
philosophy) in favor of the modern distinction between philosophy and science.  
Ironically, the argument loses much of its force precisely because it rests on a 
presupposition which is commonly held by “the large majority of professionals,” 
namely the questionable presuppositions that the modern distinction between 
philosophy and science is, first, in itself valid, and second, rightfully applicable to 
the analysis of the origins of ancient thought.  The basis for this proposed 
reassignment of the notion of what constitutes philosophy is found in the initial 
development of modern science from Bacon to Galileo to Descartes.  They 
collectively narrowed the scope of what could be deemed genuine science 
contrasting it with “speculative philosophy,” a term which becomes derogatory 
only from the perspective of the new meaning of science. 
Mansfeld‟s view can only be made from the point of view of the modern 
thinker who has conceded to modern science what was originally the domain of 
philosophy.  While it may be true as an historical matter of fact that the modern 
sciences have usurped the authority of philosophy in the explanation of “the 
world and man,” we should not cease to wonder if this accession is justifiable and 
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not merely on its own terms, that is, on the grounds of modern science‟s utility. 
Mansfeld claims that it is in Parmenides‟ “critical” approach to the work of the 
Milesian natural scientists that we find the first seeds of what should properly be 
called philosophy.  On his account, Parmenides‟ critical project is furthered by 
Aristotle‟s Metaphysics insofar as “modern epistemology and philosophy of 
science are remote descendants of Aristotle‟s „first philosophy‟” (Mansfeld 1990, 
209, cf. also 205-6).  Mansfeld virtually ignores the poetic, mythical or divinely 
inspired aspect of Parmenides.  The direct connection between Parmenides and 
modern philosophy of science is not only questionable because Parmenides 
seems to ground his critical claims by making an appeal to a goddess which 
speaks through him, but also in the fundamental difference in aim.  If it could be 
said that modern philosophy of science is concerned with understanding the 
conditions under which the modern sciences are possible and valid (a distinctly 
Kantian project), Parmenides is interested more in demonstrating the conditions 
for the impossibility of natural science.  In this sense they are opposed as positive 
to negative. 
 
1.2 The Beginnings of Natural Philosophy 
There is scant evidence about the reputed first natural philosopher, 
Thales.  From Aristotle, we know of his physical philosophy primarily through 
two claims regarding the principles of nature.  The first is that Thales may have 
thought that the underlying principle of the natural world was water (or more 
likely, as Aristotle reports before he begins his own conjecture, that the Earth 
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„rests‟ on water, cf. Metaphysics I.3 and De Caelo II.13).24  The second is that he 
may have said that some material things have „souls‟: “All things are full of Gods!” 
(De Anima I.5).  This latter may have been meant to highlight the mysteriousness 
of the phenomenon of self motion in natural beings rather than act as an attempt 
to explain some aspect of nature.  In addition to these, he is rumored to have 
been a top rate astronomer and mathematician.25  It is the first point that is most 
important for us as it establishes a tradition of positing one thing or another as 
the fundamental substance underlying all of nature. 
Thales is thought to be the first to posit a single material reality as the 
basis for the understanding of nature‟s origin and composition.  The effect of 
such an assertion is double: by appealing to our experience of the fluid nature of 
water, he allows us to imagine that what underlies nature is both a single thing 
and a thing that is almost unqualifiedly malleable.  Thus, in thinking of the 
primary reality of nature as a single substance, and highly plastic one, Thales 
unifies ever changing nature under a single thought.  This is a thought which, 
                                                 
24 Aristotle‟s reconstruction of Thales‟ thought in the Metaphysics is most likely 
anachronistic: “getting hold of this opinion perhaps from seeing that the nourishment of 
all things is fluid, and that heat itself comes about from it and lives by means of it (and 
that out of which things come into being is the source of them all).  So he got hold of this 
opinion by this means, and because the seeds of all things have a fluid nature, while 
water is in turn the source of the nature of fluid things” (984a21 ff.).  Gadamer believes 
Aristotle‟s interpretation is out of place with Thales‟s time: “Aristotle says with subtle 
reservation that the thesis put forward by Thales, namely, that water is the originary 
element, follows from the observation that there is no life without moisture.  That does 
not correspond to the sixth-century cosmological-cosmogonic way of thinking” (2001, 
78). 
 
25 I refer the reader to KRS (1983) for a full discussion of Thales‟ achievements and 
biography as well as for more comprehensive accounts of all of the thinkers I treat in this 
section.  For a provocative intellectual narrative of a selection of presocratics see 
Nietzsche‟s The Pre-Platonic Philosophers (Nietzsche 2001). 
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moreover, allows us to think of the constancy in nature at the same time as we 
think its changeability.26 
This is the great achievement of Thales, for it begins the quest to find 
principles that can account both for nature‟s stability as well as its variability, the 
essential paradox of nature.  This apparent contradiction in nature may in fact be 
the motivating force underlying Greek natural philosophy.  Presumably, it was 
some recognition of this strange aspect of nature as well as the inevitable 
paradoxes that arise when considering the origins of nature that made Thales 
wonder and motivated him to look for a way of understanding nature in terms 
familiar to everyday human thought.  Thales represents, according to this 
interpretation, the first attempt to present a unifying account of nature by 
positing water as a substrate in order to illustrate and explain with one concept a 
fundamental complexity of nature, i.e. the fact that nature is ever changing and 
yet exhibits some regularity and sameness.  In Hellenic philosophy this quest 
ostensibly finds its culmination in Aristotle. 
Following Thales in the early history of Greek natural philosophy is 
Anaximander who both carried on and radicalized the work of his predecessor.  
Anaximander is considered to be roughly contemporary with Thales though 
slightly his junior.  Unfortunately, we have almost as little textual evidence about 
Anaximander as we do about Thales, though at least one fragment survives.  Even 
in this very brief passage we find collected themes that are central throughout the 
                                                 
26 Perhaps both in the sense that water in its liquid form can take on a shape given by a 
container and in virtue of the fact that we find water in three states: gas, liquid, and 
solid.  (Of course, this latter observation may stem from a more modern concern.)   
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tradition of natural science and which will be systematically explored by Aristotle 
in his Physics, namely: time, the infinite, necessity, and the theme of the 
generation and destruction of the cosmos and of all beings. 
… some other infinite [indefinite, a)/peiron] nature, from which comes into 
being all the heavens and the worlds in them.  And the source of coming-
to-be [genesij] for existing things is that into which destruction, too, 
happens according to necessity; for they pay penalty and retribution to 
each other for their injustice according to the assessment of Time.27 (KRS 
118) 
 
Anaximander inherits from Thales the notion of a substrate underlying nature.  
However, he rejects Thales‟ the idea that water is the fundamental substrate of 
                                                 
27 The actual length of the fragment thought to belong to Anaximander has been a subject 
of much debate because of the peculiarly Aristotelian language of the text paired with the 
fact that the text is preserved through the intermediaries of Simplicius who often 
paraphrased passages cited from ancient sources, as was common practice for 
commentators.  This coupled with the fact that there is no absolutely clear way in ancient 
Greek to determine where commentary ends and quotation begins makes the 
determination of what properly belongs to Anaximander difficult and ultimately a 
subject of speculation.  What strikes the ear as most Peripetic is the employment of what 
became for Aristotle and his followers technical terms: ge/nesij and fqora/.  For this 
reason, it is often thought that only the end of the fragment is an authentic phrase of 
Anaximander, the introductory lines being the paraphrase of Theophrastus (cf. KRS 
1983, 118).  However, there is even something distinctly Aristotelian about the sense 
paying retribution “to each other” (a)llh/lwj) for injustices which brings to mind the 
Aristotle‟s characterization of change as the exchange of contraries.  In the 19th century, 
Aldine “inadvertently omitted” the phrase which was eventually “restored from the MSS 
by Usener and Diels” (Heidel 1980, 233-4; see Kahn 1960, 194-5 and Nietzsche 2001, 
191-3).  The absence of the phrase allowed for an interpretation that is interesting in its 
own right but was probably more obscure than helpful.  Without the “to each other”, the 
fragment was interpreted by Nietzsche as saying that recompense for injustices 
committed is paid by beings in the realm of becoming to the eternal a)/peiron (the realm 
of being) for the crime of emancipating themselves from being.  Thus we are given an 
image of a sort of cosmic cycle in which the entire cosmos is born from and returns to its 
source in the cycle of crime and requital.  Once the “to each other” phrase is included in 
the fragment, it allows an interpretation more in line with Peripatetic doctrine.  In this 
case it would be the things that coming into being and pass away (which is general 
enough to include qualities, substances, etc. in the Aristotelian framework) that pay 
mutual retribution.  Despite the difficulties of attribution, we will risk erring on the side 
of generosity and take the longest reasonable portion of text as genuinely belonging to 
Anaximander.  For a more extensive discussion of the problem of the length of what is 
supposed to be genuinely Anaximander‟s see G.S. Kirk 1970, 340-7. 
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nature.  It is the a)/peiron from which beings come to be and to which they pass 
back.  Thales‟ water must have seemed to Anaximander still too determinate to 
serve as the substrate for the material world.  Perhaps it did not seem fitting to 
Anaximander that the very thing that one posits as a principle for change for the 
natural world is in fact a visible part of that world.28  According to Aristotle, 
Anaximander may have been concerned that positing water as the substrate (or 
any other perceivable element) would not guarantee that the cosmos would never 
exhaust itself.29  The a)/peiron could serve as a kind of inexhaustible material 
motor of the cosmos ensuring that the cycle of changes among the world‟s 
constituents would never cease.30  
                                                 
28 This is of course taking the most literal interpretation of Thales‟ claim.  It does not 
seem unlikely however that a reasonable thinker might use a metaphor in trying to 
explain as abstract as the principle of the cosmos. 
 
29 Physics III 203b13 and consider 208a10.  Cf. Kirk 1970, 330.  Aetius and Theophrastus 
confirm this as well (KRS 1983, 330). 
 
30 It is difficult to grasp in what sense Anaximander‟s a)/peiron could be thought to be 
material or bodily in any normal sense.  If it is indeed the principle of the all of the 
material elements, it seems that it could not itself be a material element lest it would be a 
principle of itself.  One could argue that the a)/peiron is some other sort of body, but it 
seems to be Anaximenes‟, not Anaximander‟s, great step backward to posit air as the 
fundamental element which is fundamentally no different than Thales‟ water.  It is 
indeed odd that Aristotle considers Anaximander to be a materialist, but the difficulty of 
this classification for Aristotle is apparent when he says that some say that 
Anaximander‟s material is somewhere between air and water (cf. Physics I 187a12 and 
189b1 ff. and possibly III.4 205a17).  This is not a material in any normal sense known to 
the physicists of the era.  Further, there is some difficulty in determining that it was after 
all Anaximander that Aristotle was actually referring to in this passage.  It appears that it 
may have been the usually astute commentator Alexander (and later Themistius, 
Simplicius, Philoponus, and Asclepius; cf. Zeller 1881, 241) that attributed Aristotle‟s 
reference to Anaximander despite the telling division in Physics I.4 (187a12 ff.) where 
Aristotle divides off “those who make the substratum one, either one of the three or 
something else denser than fire and finer that air… [from] others who say that the 
opposites are separated out from the one, as Anaximander says.”  Zeller comments that 
“the words of Aristotle were only referred to Anaximander because they seemed to apply 
to no other philosopher” (Zeller 1881, 214).  Burnet (1920, 55) and Joachim (1999, 226) 
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The word a)/peiron, however, admits of several possible meanings of which 
I have been employing a sense which means primarily „indeterminate‟.31  It can 
also mean unlimited in time or spatial dimension or even number in which case 
the more common translation of „infinite‟ would be apt.  Doubtless, 
Anaximander‟s fragment would allow that a)/peiron could have any or all of these 
meanings.  It is generally agreed that Anaximander thought of the a)/peiron as 
„deathless‟ or infinite in time.  There is considerably less agreement as to whether 
or how Anaximander would have envisaged the cosmos as infinitely large or even 
infinite in number.  If there were an infinite number of worlds, it is unclear that 
the word cosmos would retain its meaning (cf. Kahn 1960, 46-53 and 188-193). 
Aristotle himself imputes to Anaximander the idea that the a)/peiron 
implies infinite extension.  Indeed, Aristotle‟s treatment of Anaximander in the 
refutation of the view that there could be an infinite body (Physics III.4-7) treats 
his a)/peiron as if it meant primarily infinite in extension.  But again, there is no 
small difficulty in understanding how Anaximander could have understood his 
a)/peiron as a body at all at least in the way Aristotle seems to understand him. 
Anaximander is also reputed to be the first to write a book entitled Peri/ 
Fusewj which is supposed to have covered the fundamentals of natural 
philosophy as well as topics in meteorology, astronomy, etc.  Thus he begins the 
                                                                                                                                                 
carry the traditional view following Alexander‟s testimony.  Cf. Kirk 1970, 328 ff. for a 
discussion of the debate. 
 
31 Kahn (1960, 194) rejects Nietzsche‟s (2001, 32-37) construal of a)/peiron as indefinite.  
KRS (1983, 109-111) in turn rejects Kahn‟s construal of a)/peiron as infinite.  On the 
controversy, see translator‟s commentary in Nietzsche 2001, 191-3. 
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tradition among the Greek natural philosophers who write treatises bearing the 
name Peri/ Fusewj which were intended as comprehensive accounts of the 
natural world and its origins.  He is also supposed to be the first to use the term 
a)rxh/ in a technical sense though again is a great deal of debate as to whether or 
not this was a Peripatetic interpolation.32  The fact that almost all of his 
fundamental concepts would resurface in the history of natural science among 
the Greeks testifies to his importance in the genealogy of natural science leading 
to Aristotle: the unlimited, nature, cosmogony and the idea of cosmos, genesis 
and destruction, necessity, and time. 
 
1.3 The Eleatic Response: Critique of Natural Philosophy 
 With the Eleatics we have the first critical reflections on the nascent 
tradition of natural science pioneered by the Milesians.  This characteristic of 
critique (in a particularly Kantian sense) leads Jaap Mansfeld to claim that 
Parmenides is in fact the first genuine philosopher and not merely a practitioner 
of „science‟.33  Xenophanes appears to be the first thinker in the Greek tradition to 
be concerned with „epistemological‟ questions concerning the justification of 
                                                 
32 The general consensus is that Simplicius‟ testimony is accurate.  For a discussion of the 
attribution and use of a)rxh/ in Anaximander see KRS 1983, 108-111.  Cf. also Heidel 
1980, 215 ff.  For an examination of the problems surrounding the attribution see G.S. 
Kirk 1970 and McDiarmid 1953, 90 and 96-98. 
 
33 Again, there may be some real distinction to be made here between philosophy and 
science, but perhaps this does not warrant such a strict division that Mansfeld proposes.  
After all, Parmenides and Xenophanes provide speculations concerning nature.  The 
essential difference being that they demote such speculations to the status of opinion and 
deny in principle what the Milesians had assumed even if implicitly: namely that nature 
was in a knowable in a way more than by mere opinion. 
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claims that both natural philosophers and poets make about nature and the gods.  
Parmenides and his successors carry on this project to a point which threatens to 
paralyze the tradition of natural philosophy.  Yet strangely, Parmenides offers 
speculations about the character of nature despite the explicit denial that these 
speculations could constitute genuine knowledge.34  This brings to the surface a 
further difficulty concerning why, given that he recognizes that Parmenides has 
opinions pertaining to nature, Aristotle does not consider him among those he 
calls fusikoi/ or natural philosophers.35  A correct understanding of the first 
difficulty should shed light on the second.  For it is precisely the claim that the 
notion of critique differentiates the Eleatics from the Milesians that can assist us 
in understanding why Parmenides can offer speculations about nature even after 
his rigorous denial that such theories can attain to the rank of demonstrable 
                                                 
34 There is considerably less evidence about the content of Xenophanes‟ theories of 
nature than there is of Parmenides‟.  This leads some commentators to believe that he 
did not take this aspect of his research seriously or that his theses on nature did not 
constitute a coherent whole but were rather “isolated observations and conjectures, 
sometimes pregnant and suggestive, but sometimes of a rudimentary and child-like 
kind” (Zeller 1881, 567).  If however, we understand Xenophanes as a figure between 
Milesian natural science and its Eleatic criticism, we take the minimal risk of giving the 
benefit of the doubt that he was serious enough about his investigations into nature to 
have at least made an attempt at coherence. 
 
35 At least he does not do so in Physics I.2-3 where he develops an argument defending 
the project of natural philosophy against Eleatic monism (even though in Physics I.5 
188a20 Aristotle imputes to Parmenides a thesis which would seem to place him among 
the fusikoi/).  In the Metaphysics, however, he speaks of Parmenides as in some loose 
sense a physicist distinguishing him from Xenophanes and Melissus (986b9 ff.).  The 
question as to what Aristotle‟s criteria for disqualifying each of the Eleatics from the rank 
of fusikoi/ is difficult, but preliminarily we can say that he does so on the grounds of an 
epistemological distinction involving the character of the criterion by which a legitimate 
claim to knowledge can be determined.  Even though some of the Eleatics espouse views 
about nature, they qualify them immediately as mere opinions.  Aristotle‟s 
disqualification of them as fusikoi/ is made on the grounds that they preempt any claims 
to knowledge for their physical opinions by taking seriously the consequences of their 
monism. 
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truth.  Further, the notion of critique also allows us to understand why Aristotle, 
while recognizing the fact that Parmenides had some physical theories, denied 
him the name fusiko/j, namely on the grounds that Parmenides‟ himself would 
not have considered these theories to constitute genuine knowledge but rather 
represent only the best possible opinions about nature.  We will see that all of this 
rests on an epistemological commitment which is first articulated by Parmenides, 
which is made famous in Plato‟s work, and which is inherited by Aristotle.  That 
is, namely, the commitment which rests on marking a fundamental distinction 
between knowledge and opinion. 
 The standard reading of Parmenides‟ poem is that he presents a 
devastating refutation of any discourse that would talk about anything except 
motionless and solitary Being.  Parmenides‟ “deduction,” as it is often called, 
demonstrates that only Being itself can be the object of knowledge: “It [Being] 
must be what is there for speaking and thinking of; for [it] is there to be, Whereas 
nothing is not; that is what I bid you consider” (1991, fr. 6 1-2).  As is well known, 
the extant fragments of the poem are divided into three parts: a proem in which 
Parmenides describes his descent to the place of a goddess and describes two 
paths of inquiry which correspond to the two parts of the poem, the Way of Truth 
which is concerned with wholly immutable Being, and the Way of Opinion which 
he is warned to steer clear of.  It is in this latter that the goddess offers the best 
possible cosmological account attainable by mere mortals.  The classic difficulty 
is that the Way of Opinion is presumably subject to the very critique that 
Parmenides‟ goddess put forward in the Way of Truth, i.e. that any speech about 
the world subject to change is rife with false claims about Being insofar as it 
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confuses what really is with what-is-not and therefore speaks of non-being 
implicitly. 
Traditionally, the great struggle has been to resolve the tension between 
the last two parts of the poem.  And there is a real puzzle here: if Parmenides 
really banishes discourses that concern the composition and origin of the world 
of motion on the grounds that they implicitly invoke the self-contradictory idea of 
non-being, why would he turn around and give such an account of nature the 
cosmos himself?  How are we to take these accounts seriously after such a 
devastating critique?  There is a sense in which the cosmology that Parmenides‟ 
goddess gives may in fact be the best possible as the poem claims, but then only a 
divinity would be able to judge the relative worth of such an account.  If this is the 
case we are in no better position with regard to knowledge of the world of change 
than we were with the poets. 
On the other hand, it does seem rash to jettison the Parmenidean 
cosmology altogether as an indulgence in absolute fiction which is perhaps the 
easiest solution and the common habit of many commentators.  Parmenides 
never indicates that the world that the cosmology describes is a world of 
“illusion” or that all accounts of it are simply false.  It is not the „Way of Truth‟ 
and the „Way of Falsehood‟ that he distinguishes.  The subject of the cosmology is 
rather the subject of the opinions of mankind.36  This distinction has strong 
enough consequences of its own.  For once theories of nature and the cosmos are 
                                                 
36 Gadamer makes the very interesting point seemingly unnoticed by the majority of 
commentators that it is opinions in the plural that pertain to the Way of Opinion while 
there is only one truth about Being in the Way of Truth (Gadamer 2001, 98). 
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confined to the domain of opinion, the question becomes one of deciding the 
relative merit of the various theories and on what grounds we may legitimately do 
so. 
The fact that the claim that the cosmology in the poem is the “best 
possible” is put forth by the goddess who illustrates the cosmology indicates that 
it is perhaps only on the grounds of an appeal to the divine that this superlative 
claim can be made.  Of course, the Goddess narrates and thus appears to attest to 
the truth of both the Way of Truth as well as the Way of Opinion.  However, the 
claims about the immutability of Being made in the way of Truth are not 
presented as if there are other options.  That is, once one is steered onto the right 
path, there are no competing ideas about the nature of Being.  There is only one 
truth about the one being.  On the other hand, there is a multiplicity of competing 
theories about nature which one must choose between if one embarks on the Way 
of Opinion.  Along this path, the only way to assure that we are not misled by 
faulty yet compelling opinions is to rely on the guidance of someone with better 
judgment.  In this case, this role is filled by Parmenides‟ goddess. 
The Parmenidean critique of the Milesian science is meant to show the 
limits of the human capacity to understand nature.  This function of the 
arguments in the Way of Truth is complemented by the presence of Parmenides‟ 
use of the figure of the Goddess.  Parmenides‟ appeal to the authority of the 
goddess reinforces the idea that the unaided human mind may not be capable of 
judging the truth of things especially when what is being considered is changing 
nature.  It is not necessary to take the role of the Goddess as literally a source of 
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divine revelation for Parmenides, but rather the figure of the Goddess may serve 
as a propaedeutic device within the context of the poem.  
Similar conclusions are available from a consideration of Xenophanes.  
Even if it is supposed that Xenophanes‟ critique is leveled primarily against 
anthropomorphizing poets (which is a common view among commentators), the 
substance of the criticism also holds against any human claim to truth including 
the Milesian cosmologies: 
No man knows, or will ever know, the truth about the Gods and 
about everything I speak of; for even if one chanced to say the 
complete truth, yet one knows it not; but seeming is wrought over 
all things [or fancy is wrought in the case of all men]” (KRS 179, Fr. 
34, italics mine) 
 
The inclusion of “everything I speak of” in addition to the Gods allows the 
possibility that Xenophanes‟ criticism is not limited to the poets but may just as 
well apply to opinions about nature.  KRS remarks that Deichgraber “thought 
that [this fragment] was intended as the proemium of the physical doctrine, not 
of constructive theology.”  This seems plausible though Schofield disagrees (KRS 
180).  Cherniss goes so far as to banish Xenophanes from the philosophical 
tradition completely characterizing him “as a poet and a rhapsode, who has 
become a figure in the history of Greek philosophy by mistake” on the grounds 
that his theology and “sporadic” remarks concerning natural phenomena and 
“were made only for the sake of denying both the mythological and the subtly 
scientific explanations of them” (Cherniss 1970, 18, italics mine).   However, what 
disqualifies Xenophanes for Cherniss is precisely what would qualify Xenophanes 
as a philosopher in the critical tradition.  Namely, Xenophanes‟ negative remarks 
concerning mythological and sophisticated explanations indicate a 
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thoughtfulness about what constitutes real knowledge of things and thus places 
him in the company of the Parmenides as a critical philosopher. 
But it is not so cut and dry with Xenophanes either for we have a similar 
problem as we had with Parmenides.  Xenophanes as well may have had theories 
about the physical world.  Again, the difficulty occurs when we consider that 
there is (perhaps more explicitly in Parmenides) a disavowal of the possibility of 
genuine knowledge about certain subjects accompanied by a discourse on those 
very things which seemed to be repudiated.  Why offer an opinion about the 
origins and composition of the world if you have relegated it in advance to 
domain of opinions for which there is no way to gauge the relative truth except by 
an appeal to divine authority?  There is the further interesting point that 
distinguishes Xenophanes from Parmenides: nowhere in the fragments of 
Xenophanes do we have an indication that he made some claim to revelation or 
inspiration by any sort of muse or divinity.  It is generally held that Xenophanes 
repudiated these types of claims altogether.  He was in this sense more radical 
than Parmenides in that his critique of the poets, beliefs in anthropomorphic 
Gods, and natural science were not made on the grounds or with the help of 
divine authority.37 
Aristotle treats Melissus as belonging to the same category of thinking not 
only for the obvious fact that they share monistic views, but also on the grounds 
that this results in their sharing similar epistemological views with regard to 
                                                 
37 On the relation of Xenophanes‟ skepticism to his attack on divination see Lesher 1983, 
20-41.  “Later writers tell us that Xenophanes coupled the distinction between 
knowledge and mere belief with a contrast between divine and human capacities: god 
knows the truth, but belief is allotted to men” (Lesher 1983, 22). 
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nature.  However, Melissus‟ brand of monism is peculiar in that, unlike 
Parmenides at least, he holds that the principle of monism should apply to nature 
itself.  In the Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes Parmenides, Xenophanes, and 
Melissus on the following grounds: 
Parmenides seems to take hold of is one according to reason [kata\ 
to\n lo/gon], Melissus of what is one in material [kata\ th\n u/(lhn] 
(on account of which one says that it is finite, the other infinite).  
But Xenophanes, the first of these who made things one (for 
Parmenides is said to have become a student of his) made nothing 
clear, nor does he seem to have made contact with nature in either 
of these two ways, but gazing off into the whole heaven, he said that 
divinity was one. (Metaphysics 986b19-24) 
  
Contrary to ordinary experience these thinkers hold in common that what really 
is is one and motionless.  Interestingly, Parmenides is the only one of the three 
that Aristotle thinks even has a shot at being considered a natural philosopher 
despite the fact that Melissus is supposed to be the one who says that the one 
Being is a material principle (Metaphysics 986b20).  What disqualifies Melissus 
from being associated those “writers about nature who set down being as one but 
generate things out of the one as from material” (i.e. the material monists such as 
Thales) is that Melissus denies that the one material Being is in any way 
changeable and much less can anything be generated from it as the material 
monists believe (986b16).  Melissus seems to have thought that because being is 
everywhere and infinite that it could have no place to move to.  However, as 
Aristotle points out in his arguments against void in the Physics, Melissus failed 
to realize that even if being is everywhere with nowhere to move into, there can 
still be motion within itself, “for even what is full admits of alteration” (Physics 
IV.7 214a28 ff.). 
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Melissus appears to be more radical in his denial of multiplicity and 
motion than even Parmenides in that he makes the one Being infinite in 
extension in order to prevent the thought that Being would be surrounded by 
empty space into which it might be able to move.  We can see that if Parmenides 
is understood by way of Melissus‟ interpretation of the one Being as material, 
there would indeed be some implicit fault in Parmenides‟ reasoning that Being is 
one, “well-rounded,” and spatially finite.  Despite Aristotle‟s characterization, 
some commentators think Parmenides held that in some sense the whole of being 
was, if not corporeal, extended in a literal sense.38  This allows at least one avenue 
of reconciliation of the way of Truth with the cosmology in the Way of Opinion.  
However, this strategy is based on a fundamental misconstrual of Parmenides 
and an ultimately disastrous conflation of Parmenides and Melissus.  This 
mistake can be avoided if one takes notice of the fact that, at least in Aristotle‟s 
reading, Melissus identifies the physical with the nature of the One while 
Parmenides can consider them separately allowing that even though there may be 
truth about Being alone, this does not mean we cannot speak without some sense 
about that which changes and associates with non-being.  Aristotle‟s reports in 
Metaphysics I and Physics I make clear that Parmenides‟ physical speculations 
remain in some way separate from his doctrine of the one immutable being 
unlike Melissus for whom the physical and the metaphysical appear to be 
inseparable.  
                                                 
38 Burnet exemplifies the most extreme of this interpretation: “What is is, therefore a 
finite, spherical, motionless, continuous plenum, and there is nothing beyond it. […]  
Such is the conclusion to which the view of the real as a single body inevitably leads, and 
there is no escape from it.  The „matter‟ of our physical text-books is just the real of 
Parmenides” (Burnet 1932, 68). 
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A careful reading of Aristotle‟s report in Metaphysics I can assist us in 
avoiding this unwanted consequence.  Although the monism of Parmenides and 
Melissus are often treated as equivalent it is important to distinguish them in 
order that we see clearly how Aristotle understands the challenge of Parmenides‟ 
critique of natural science.  If Melissus conflates the metaphysical and the 
physical, the Eleatic critique of claims to knowledge about the world of motion 
becomes even more severe than it was with Parmenides.  For if the one Being is 
infinite because it is material, even the things we experience as material and in 
motion will not only be banished from the domain of genuine knowledge, but the 
motion we experience must be considered a complete hallucination and not 
merely epistemologically unintelligible.  Not only are we restricted from being 
able to judge the relative truth of a given set of opinions about the changing 
natural world (as was the mild outcome of the Parmenidean critique), but now 
our experience as such is deceptive.  Because for Melissus the material world is 
equated with motionless being and because we experience the world as in motion 
as well as the subject of our opinions, our opinions are in a much more radical 
way simply false and illusory.  Not merely deceptive in their claims to a higher 
truth or to greater authority than other such claims but simply false in that they 
correspond only to that hallucination in which there appears to be motion where 
in reality there is only motionlessness.  For Melissus, but not Parmenides, the 
world we experience and the statements we make about it are hopelessly 
unintelligible.  
 Aristotle, however, does not take Melissus to be the serious threat.  
Melissus‟ critique is absurd to any half-way thoughtful person.  It is rather 
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Parmenides that he must contend with.  And thus he need not contend with 
Parmenides on the ground that he makes the world of appearance simply 
nonsense and illusion (this is Melissus‟ position, not Parmenides‟), but on the 
grounds that Parmenides would prohibit Aristotle from making the claim to 
genuine knowledge for his natural philosophy.  Thus in the beginning of the 
Physics, the intention is not simply to establish that the object of the proposed 
science really is something (properly this would be the refutation of Melissus 
only), but also to establish that there can be more than mere opinion about 
nature.  The latter would constitute the proper refutation of Parmenides.  This we 
will see is the goal of the first book of the Physics which in seeking to establish 
that there are principles involved in the study of nature, supplies a refutation of 
Eleatic skepticism concerning the knowability of nature. 
However, Aristotle‟s treatment of Parmenides is complex.  For even 
though Aristotle rejects him as deserving the name fusiko/j, he credits 
Parmenides with at least some sort of insight into nature insofar as he grants 
some importance to “appearances” and the perspective of “perception” which in 
turn led Parmenides to posit “two causes and two sources, a hot one and a cold 
one, as though speaking of something like fire and earth, and of these he ranks 
the hot one under being and the other of non-being” (986b28, cf. also Physics 
I.5).  How then do we account for Aristotle‟s varying treatment of Parmenides?  If 
Aristotle grants that Parmenides had opinions about nature while denying the 
possibility of knowledge about nature, his exclusion of Parmenides from the 
group called fusiko/j makes sense on the grounds that the fusiko/j claim to have 
knowledge about nature (again in contra-position to the poets who claim that 
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their opinions are authorized by a divine source and in some sense are more 
worthy opinions).  And despite the fact that Aristotle refutes even those of his 
predecessors who make a claim to truth, this would not preclude the fact that 
Aristotle thought that they were attempting to speak the truth about nature and 
thought this was in fact possible. 
 
Conclusion 
 What we have seen in the relationship between the Milesians, who offer 
the first attempts to understand nature, and the Eleatics, who deny in principle 
that such knowledge is possible, is the genesis of an epistemological tension 
between the reality of changing nature and the ideal of human knowledge.  With 
the Eleatics, it is the paradoxes that arise with the examination of the idea of 
change that yield the prohibition of the claim to knowledge regarding nature.  It 
is these difficulties to which Aristotle is compelled to reply in the opening 
chapters of his Physics.  Whether he replies adequately will have to be seen in 
subsequent chapters, but we can already see the issue: If Aristotle intends to put 
forward an account of nature that is not meant to be a “likely story” or even a best 
possible opinion, he must overcome the Parmenidean injunction not to speak 
about non-being in a way that renders the concept of motion and its application 
to nature intelligible.   
Overcoming the Eleatic obstacles to the study of nature is at the same time 
a rehabilitation of the earlier Milesian attempts to come to grips with nature.  The 
crucial difference is that Aristotle prioritizes a notion of form over the appeal to 
material causes which is characteristic of the Milesians.  And it is precisely 
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change of form in its most proper sense, change in substance, which will prove to 
be of greatest difficulty in establishing the study of nature as a rigorous science.  
In terms of the characterizations and sets of problems outlined above, Aristotle‟s 
project in the initial chapters of the Physics are formulated as a direct response to 
the Milesian and Eleatic traditions. 
Aristotle is not the first to formulate such a response.  Democritus‟ and 
Leucippus‟ atomism, Anaxagoras‟ panspermism, and Empedocles‟ doctrine of the 
elements can all be read as responses to the Eleatic critique which in some sense 
seek to rehabilitate the Milesian project.  In Physics I, Aristotle shows to what 
extent these attempts are unsuccessful in accounting for all the phenomena of 
change and offers his own solutions to the two-fold paradox offered by 
Parmenides.  We will see in the next chapter that Aristotle is the first (though 
following the lead of Plato) to really square off with Parmenides and attempt to 
actually overcome him.39 
                                                 
39 Plato as well might be thought of in the same light as Aristotle here, especially in the 
Sophist.  It remains unclear whether Plato actually succeeds in overcoming Parmenides 
or if he is ultimately also bound to accept the Parmenidean conclusion as to what 
humans can have genuine knowledge of.  It is at least common Platonic orthodoxy that 
Plato is like Parmenides in that they both deny knowledge of the sensible world.  But 
whether Plato thinks that knowledge of the Forms is possible for the unaided human 
intellect is another much more difficult question. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Argument of Physics I:  
Legitimating the Science of Nature 
 
 
In the previous chapter I provided a sketch of the context of presocratic 
philosophy out of which Aristotelian physics was born.  This chapter shows how 
the arguments of Physics I respond to this presocratic context in its attempt to 
legitimate the study of nature.  I argue that the primary goal of book one is to 
demonstrate that the study of nature can yield genuine knowledge rather than 
mere opinion and that the demonstration responds to the Eleatic challenge to the 
intelligibility of nature.  My analysis discloses the polemical nature of Aristotle‟s 
discourse, and that it is not always grounded in solid argument.  Because 
Aristotle recognizes the difficulty of the epistemological problems the Eleatics 
pose, he finds it necessary to supplement his arguments with rhetorical strategies 
that obfuscate important deficiencies in his own defense of the science of nature.  
This becomes most apparent in his explicit refutation of the views of Parmenides 
and Melissus in I.2-3 and in the interpretation of Aristotle‟s account of change in 
I.7-8. 
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We must proceed with a critical attitude (perhaps even a suspension of 
disbelief, depending on how convinced we are of the validity of natural science) in 
order to understand the force and the importance of the arguments and their 
order as Aristotle presents them in Physics I.  If we assume in advance the 
legitimacy of natural science, we risk missing what might provoke genuine 
concern for what is at stake for Aristotle here. 
In the first book of the Physics, Aristotle seeks to accomplish three 
interrelated goals: to establish the legitimacy of natural science, to delimit the 
field of inquiry of that science, and to begin to give a rational account of the 
phenomenon of change.  The argument is presented in three stages.  He engages 
the views of his predecessors in a dialectical and critical way (184b23).  Second, 
he formulates the problem of understanding change by deriving a generalized 
account of change from the common views of his predecessors.  This in turn 
generates a set of difficulties which must be solved if there is to be a coherent 
theory of change.  Third, he establishes a preliminary account of the phenomenon 
of coming-to-be which attempts to resolve these difficulties. 
The opening lines of the Physics lay out the guidelines for understanding 
and knowledge (to\ ei)de/nai kai\ to\ e)pi/stasqai, 184a10) of things that are ruled 
by principles, that is, we should move from what is better known to us to what is 
better known „by nature‟.  This strategy is followed throughout the course of the 
argument of Physics I.  Physics I.2-6 reviews the doctrines of the predecessors.  
This review can be further divided into discussions of those who, in Aristotle‟s 
estimation, were not primarily concerned with the study of nature on 
philosophical grounds (Parmenides and Melissus) in chapters two and three and 
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those Aristotle identifies as fusikoi/ or natural scientists in chapters four 
through six.40 
The last three chapters of book one constitute Aristotle‟s own attempt at 
an explanation of the phenomenon of change or coming-to-be and the putting to 
rest of the Eleatic injunction to the study of nature.  This explanation both 
corrects the theories of his predecessors and, by doing so, means to overcome the 
Eleatic injunction to the study of nature (I.8 191a23 ff.).  That this is the intention 
of these arguments is for the most part a matter of consensus; the interpretation 
and estimation of the success of these arguments is widely disputed.  As Aristotle 
presents them, the arguments in these chapters are at best terse and ambiguous 
and at worst abstruse and equivocal.  The abundance of scholarship on I.7 
testifies to this as does the paucity of scholarship on I.8, a chapter which is often 
glossed and rarely given the effort of a critical interpretation.41  I will attempt to 
remedy this by offering an interpretation which demonstrates that it is as much 
                                                 
40 In fact it is only chapter four which provides a direct refutation of a doctrine of a 
thinker Aristotle considers one of the fusikoi/ (i.e. Anaxagoras).  For while chapters five 
and six mention physical theories which are readily associated with certain presocratic 
physicists, the discussion here is drawn in quite general terms and not meant to provide 
specific refutations but to extract positive contributions to the understanding of change 
by bringing together commonalities from diverse thinkers. 
There are also, more or less indirect (they are not explicitly named), references to 
Plato and the Academy in these chapters though it is unclear whether we should consider 
Plato himself in the category of fusikoi/.  It may be the case that although he has a 
detailed account of the natural world, in the Timeaus for example, he may not consider 
the natural world and the beings in it as proper objects of genuine knowledge instead 
thinking that all that is possible is to provide “likely stories.”  Compare also the 
disparaging remarks in the Phaedrus made by Socrates at 230d ff. concerning his little 
interest in the phenomenon of nature.  Gadamer believes that the whole of the criticisms 
Aristotle launches against his predecessors are really meant to be addressed to the 
Academy (Gadamer 2001, 75-76).  Cf. Nussbaum (1982, 269-271) on Aristotle‟s 
epistemological association of Plato with Parmenides.   
 
41 The significant exception is Loux (1992). 
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Aristotle‟s task to bring to light the difficulties and paradoxes of motion as it is to 
resolve the impasses of his predecessors.  Aristotle does of course offer a way out, 
but this resolution leads to even deeper questions about the nature of change 
than that which it was meant to answer.  The stakes are very high here.  For if we 
find that Aristotle‟s solution to the paradoxes of change actually raises more 
difficulties than it alleviates, then the force of the argument which is meant to 
legitimate his natural science diminishes and perhaps even becomes suspect. 
 
2.1 Approaching Nature 
 
Aristotle begins the Physics with the claim that “in all pursuits in which 
there are sources or causes or elements [a)rxai\\ h)\ ai)/tia h)\ stoixei=a], it is by way 
of our acquaintance with these that knowing and understanding come to us” 
(184a10).42  If only by exclusion, Aristotle implies that there are investigations the 
subject matter of which does not involve principles or causes or elements.43  He 
                                                 
42 All translations, unless otherwise indicated, are taken from Joe Sachs‟ translation of 
the Physics (Sachs 1995).  Where I have supplied my own translations or modifications, I 
have done so using Ross‟s Oxford Classical Text as a source (Ross 1936). 
 
43 Aristotle‟s investigations that may be classified as i(stori/a are of this sort.  Consider 
the place of the History of Animals in relation to a science of causes in Parts of Animals 
and Generation of Animals.  History of Animals collects observations about particular 
animals with very little devoted to accounts in terms of causes, it is the work of Parts of 
Animals and Generation of Animals to investigate the principles and causes that govern 
the phenomena.  On this distinction see Lennox (2001, 46-8 and 51-3; and 1987, 92 and 
97).  A helpful illustration of the difference can be drawn from the Gorgias.  Here 
Socrates famously shows that rhetoric is not an art (te/xnh) but a knack (e)mpeiri/a).  If 
rhetoric is merely routine it may not admit of principles which account for its 
effectiveness.  Cf. 463b-466a and especially 465a: “And I assert that it [rhetoric] is not 
art but experience, because it has no reasoned account.”  However, consider in contrast 
Aristotle‟s justification of rhetoric as an art in Rhetoric I.1.  Also consider the 
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thus gives us an indication in the very opening of the treatise that he will have to 
do some work to establish that physics is a field of study among the ones that do 
admit of explanatory principles.  That is, in the opening lines Aristotle tells us 
that he must begin by convincing us that there are principles in the inquiry into 
nature before the claim can be made that nature can be known and understood.44 
It is not so much that Aristotle needs to convince anyone that there is such 
a thing as motion or change, but rather what he needs to establish is that there 
are principles underlying motion and change which make it intelligible.  To 
establish that there is change one may simply appeal to our ordinary experience, 
the common perception that some things are in motion.  Even the Eleatics who 
deny the intelligibility of motion do not claim that no one experiences motion.  
Aristotle asks us to assume at least minimally that “things that are by nature, 
either all or some of them, are in motion, which is obvious from examples 
[e)pagogh=j45]” (185a14).  It is apparent in perception that some things change 
                                                                                                                                                 
characterization of an art in Metaphysics I.1 as something which, because it admits of 
principles, can be taught. 
 
44 Consider the last lines of Physics I: “That, then, there are starting points [a)rxh/] and 
what they are, and how many in number, let it have been marked out in this way for us” 
(I.9 192b2).  Compare also Posterior Analytics I.1-2 for the importance in any inquiry of 
establishing that there is a subject to be investigated. 
 
45 Aristotle‟s method is not necessarily “inductive” in the modern sense that we begin 
with perceptual experience and extract universals which develop into understanding (cf. 
Bolton 1991).  This was the traditionally dominant interpretation of Aristotle‟s scientific 
method until the last quarter of the twentieth century.  G.E.L. Owen‟s influential article 
“Tithenai ta phenomena” published in 1961 (reprinted and cited as Owen 1975) opened 
the door to interpretations of Aristotle‟s starting points and methods of inquiry free from 
the imposition of modern empirical prejudices of what constitutes good science (Cf. 
G.E.L. Owen 1975).  Namely that for Aristotle what can count as starting points for 
inquiry into any subject can include e)/ndoca, opinions of the wise and what is generally 
accepted (cf. Topics 100b12 and 104a8 ff.) in addition to experience and perception.  
This means that the phenomena which lie at the beginning of scientific investigation are 
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locations, characteristics, and even change into other things and we speak this 
way without trouble about it.  So he is justified in supposing that reasonable 
people can accept that at least some things in nature are in motion. 
Saying that there are intelligible principles underlying our experience of 
change is a bolder claim, and it is precisely this that is not yet evident to us and 
which Aristotle is compelled to establish.46  Aristotle is asking a very radical 
question: is nature inherently intelligible and how can we show that this is so if it 
is the case?  Timaeus in Plato‟s dialogue of the same name establishes principles 
of nature in a similar vein but with the important caveat that the account he gives 
                                                                                                                                                 
not restricted to what can be obtained only through the senses.  Martha Nussbaum 
radicalizes Owen‟s point claiming that, “there is, in fact, no case for crediting Aristotle 
with anything like the Baconian picture of science based on theory-neutral observation” 
(Nusbaum 1982, 274).  The consequence of Nussbaum‟s view (in her own words) is that 
natural science becomes a matter of “saving the phenomena” where this phrase means 
only preserving the sense of the e)/ndoca by means of investigation (cf. Nussbaum 1982, 
274, 276-7, and 291).  By focusing on those places where Aristotle draws his evidence 
from common opinion, testimony of experts, and from linguistic usage, Owen and 
Nussbaum are able to show that Aristotle did not restrict what he considered to be 
legitimate evidence to sensory data.  But however liberating these interpretations are, 
they also risk approaching the extreme position of understanding Aristotle as operating 
on a purely linguistic level such as we find in Wieland: “The task of inquiry is to raise to 
an explicit level and to encapsulate in conceptual terms this implicit knowledge about 
those linguistic structures which are initially far too obvious for us to have objective 
knowledge of them” (Wieland 1975, 133).  Both the radically inductive and linguistic 
positions miss the mark in their extremity.  In practice, Aristotle employs both inductive 
and linguistic analysis as can be seen throughout the Physics.  An exemplary instance of 
his using both can be found of his account of change in I.7. 
 
46 That there is nature is “self-evident”, or that Aristotle thought so, may be inferred from 
Physics II.1 though even there one might question his level of his commitment.  That 
nature is governed by principles is however part of the question at hand here as can be 
seen in his discussion of Parmenides whose theories do not belong to the study of nature 
(184b25 ff.) and who presumably, owing to the belief that nature or the movable as such 
is unknowable in the strictest sense, does not believe there are principles of nature.  We 
should not yet assume that Aristotle takes for granted that nature is governed by 
principles but that this is part of what is to be established in book one.  The extent of 
what he assumes at this early stage is that there are some things in motion (185a12).  At 
this basic level, even Parmenides was compelled by experience to admit some existence 
to plurality and motion (Metaphysics I.5 986b27 ff.). 
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should only be taken as a “likely story” (Timaeus 29d).  Aristotle would like to 
remove this caveat. 
The “natural way” to proceed, Aristotle tells us, is to move from “what is 
more familiar and clearer to us to what is clearer and better known by nature” 
(184a16) which means to move “from what is less clear by nature but clearer to us 
to what is clearer or better known by nature” (184a19).  The investigation to 
establish what the principles of nature are, and even if there even are any, 
proceeds from our familiar and naïve understanding of change to the principles 
that govern change in nature.  These are at first hidden from us, latent in our 
everyday talk and ordinary experience of the world to the extent that Aristotle can 
ask us to inquire whether they even exist. 
This progression of the inquiry into nature, Aristotle says, follows “from 
what is general to what is particular” and begins with perception for “it is the 
whole that is better known by perceiving, and what is general is a kind of whole 
since it embraces many things as though they were parts” (184a25).  Aristotle 
illustrates this with an analogy from language.  Names “in relation to their 
meanings” exhibit the same relation of the general and confused to the particular 
and better known: “for a name too signifies some whole indistinctly, such as 
circle, but the definition takes it apart into particulars” (184b1).47  These lines 
foreshadow the progress of the argument of book one. 
                                                 
47 This section of text has been a source of great difficulty for commentators in that 
Aristotle seems to reverse his usage of universal and particular in relation to perception 
and thinking when compared with other passages in the corpus.  The most striking of 
these is Post Analytics I.2: “Things are prior in two ways; for it is not the same to be 
prior by nature and prior in relation to us, nor to be more knowable and more knowable 
to us.  I call prior and more knowable in relation to us items which are nearer to 
perception, prior and more knowable items which are further away.  What is most 
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As Aristotle typically does, he prefaces his arguments with an examination 
of the doctrines of his predecessors.  These he often takes as confused 
anticipations of his own developed theories.  In book one of the Physics, the 
central theme concerns establishing whether or not there are principles 
governing change and if so how many they might be.  The review of the 
predecessors‟ views about change shows how they articulated primitive versions 
of the three principles Aristotle employs in his own explanation of change.  For 
example, he thinks that some of the presocratic physicists had varying notions of 
an “underlying thing” (or “the underlying body,” to\ [o)\n] sw=ma to\ u(pokei/menon,  
187a12) and that they almost universally employed opposites in their accounts of 
change.  Even though they may not ever explicitly name their principles 
“contraries” [e)nanti/a], they all designate particular concrete oppositions as the 
principles of change: “For some set down as causes of coming into being the hot 
and the cold, others the wet and the dry, and others the odd and the even or strife 
and friendship” (188b34).  Aristotle‟s advance is the generalization of the various 
particular oppositions bringing out what was common and necessary in the 
observations of his predecessors.48 
                                                                                                                                                 
universal is furthest away, and the particulars are nearest” (71b31-72a5, Barnes 
translation).  Compare the very similar remarks in the Topics VI.4 141b3 ff. and De 
Anima 417b2.  For a compelling account of how to resolve the problem see Heidegger‟s 
lectures on Plato‟s Sophist (Heidegger 1997, 57-62).  For a recent solution which does not 
employ chronological or phenomenological interpretation, see Angioni (2001).  Also, see 
Bolton (1991, 2-4) who ties the problem to the famous passages on how knowledge arises 
in Posterior Analytics II.19. 
 
48 Aristotle is infamous for his attitude towards the views of his predecessors in this 
regard especially in the first book of the Metaphysics where he claims that the 
presocratics were all in one way or another aiming to articulate his own causes (see 
especially I.7 988a19 ff.).  Aristotle could be accused of the same thing in book one of the 
Physics especially when he imputes a doctrine of contraries to his predecessors as if they 
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What is not clear yet from what we see and what we say is what are the 
principles that underlie what we perceive and speaking about.  So the 
investigation must proceed from what is clearer to us (that some things change) 
to what makes the phenomenon knowable, namely to the principles of the 
phenomenon which are more knowable in their own right.  We move from our 
general and confused (sugkexume/na, 184a22) understanding of “coming-to-be”, 
for which we have a name and some idea, to an account or definition which 
breaks up the whole into principles which are its parts or elements.  This is 
especially apparent in chapter seven, the culmination of the investigation into 
principles, where Aristotle seeks to make the general notion of coming-to-be 
intelligible by analyzing it into three principles. 
Paradoxically, we both begin and end with a)rxai/.  As starting points, we 
have nowhere else to begin except from a)rxai/ understood either as how we speak 
about change or how we perceive it.  But from a)rxai/ in this sense, we move to 
a)rxai/ in the more proper sense, namely, to the principles that underlie our 
experiences of change.  As Wieland remarks with great emphasis “The principles 
stand at the end, not at the beginning of the investigation” (Wieland 1975, 135).  
But as he also reminds us, we do not begin from nothing: there is “not a path 
from not knowing to knowing, but a movement from one form of knowing to 
                                                                                                                                                 
were “compelled by the truth itself” (188b29).  Cherniss‟ indispensable work Aristotle’s 
Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (Cherniss 1964) is in its relentless argument to 
expose Aristotle on this count.  Even though his point is well taken, the major difficulty 
in supposing that Aristotle is sometimes simply wrong or misguided in his 
interpretations is that it supposes that somehow we can understand the presocratics 
better than Aristotle did.  For Cherniss‟ discussion of this problem see Cherniss (1964, ix-
xiv). 
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another” (Wieland 1975, 129).  The a)rxai/ from which we begin are the confused 
appearances of things as they are given to us at first.  The a)rxai/ with which we 
end are those that underlie that initially confused experience of the world and 
allows us to grasp its coherence in a rational way.  As Joe Sachs articulates the 
situation: “Chapter 1 is highly ironic; one can hardly do other than start with 
what comes first, but what is inherently first must be discovered last” (Aristotle 
1991, 12n10). 
 
2.2 The Eleatic Obstacle 
Of the predecessors that Aristotle reviews in book one, only Parmenides 
and Melissus in Aristotle‟s estimation have made no progress toward a scientific 
study of nature (185a1 ff.).  This is in fact a strange claim despite the received 
opinion that the Eleatics „denied‟ motion.  For even though very little of their 
thought survives in writing, Parmenides at least does provide rather detailed and 
complex accounts of the cosmological, meteorological, biological, and otherwise 
„physical‟ subjects.49  Aristotle remarks in Physics I.5 that “even Parmenides 
makes the hot and the cold original beings, though he calls them fire and earth” 
which should indicate some minimal affinity between him and the fusikoi/.50 
Nonetheless, Aristotle emphatically excludes both Parmenides and 
Melissus from the class of those who study nature.  The reason for this, as was 
                                                 
49 Cf. Parmenides‟ fragments 8, 10, 11, 12, 16 and 18 in Diels (1922). 
 
50 Compare the similar passage about Parmenides in Metaphysics I.5 986b26 ff.  On the 
relation between the Eleatics and the Ionians with respect to a distinction between 
knowledge and opinion, see the previous chapter. 
 
59 
 
brought out in the previous chapter, is that while Aristotle recognizes that some 
of the Eleatics may offer some account of the changeable world, in principle they 
deny that this world is knowable in the most rigorous sense.  In other words, 
when the Eleatics say things about nature, they do so with the caveat that what is 
said can at best attain to the rank of opinion.  Aristotle‟s imperative is clear.  He 
must refute this view which rejects the genuine intelligibility of change if he is to 
legitimate his claim that the study of nature is a science. 
Aristotle masks the importance of this task when he coyly capitulates to a 
discussion of the Eleatics: 
But even though they do not speak about nature, they incidentally 
speak [sumbai/nei le/gein] of things that are impasses for the study 
of nature.  It is perhaps just as well to discuss them a little bit, for 
the examination is a philosophic one. (185a17) 
 
The Eleatics did not just happen to speak about the impasses in the study of 
nature; there are rather good grounds to think that they were responding 
precisely to Ionian science and its (implicit) claims to knowledge.  Second, it is 
not merely a “little bit” of book one that is occupied with a discussion of the 
Eleatics.  The portions of chapters two and three which discuss them constitute 
four full Bekker pages, almost a quarter of book one.  The entirety of chapter 
eight (another full Bekker page) is devoted to unraveling the a)pori/a of the 
apparent unintelligibility of coming to be from what-is-not which gave rise to 
Eleatic monism (191a25 ff.). 
Further, key points of the discussion of the fusikoi/ are premised by a 
reference to Eleatic difficulties.  For example, the introduction of Anaxagoras‟ 
doctrine: “It is likely that Anaxagoras supposed things thus to be infinite because 
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he assumed the common opinion of those who study nature to be true, that 
nothing comes into being from what is not” (187a28).  We find similar references 
in the discussion of the Academics in chapter nine:  “For, first of all, they allow 
some thing to come into being out of what is not, on which point Parmenides 
speaks rightly” (192a1).  It is clear that Aristotle is being more than a little ironic 
by downplaying the importance of the engagement with the Eleatic impasses to 
the science of nature. 
Aristotle offers in chapters two and three what appear at first glance to be 
powerful refutations of both the positions of Parmenides and Melissus.  He 
prefaces these arguments with an analogy which is meant to show us the manner 
in which one ought to deal with interlocutors that do not share one‟s own starting 
points: 
Now, to consider whether being is one and motionless is not to be 
examining nature.  For just as it no longer belongs to the geometer 
to give an account to someone who rejects his starting points 
[a)rxai/], but either to a different science or to one common to all 
knowledge, so is it with the one considering origins. (185a1) 
 
It is not the business of one already engaged in a science to have to justify that 
science to someone who does not accept its basic principles.  However, it is not as 
if there is no recourse by which to do so.  One can appeal to another, higher 
science or to a method common to all knowledge.  The obvious alternatives are 
either first philosophy or dialectic.51  However, it is not necessary to go beyond 
                                                 
51 Philoponus distinguishes these succinctly: “Dialectic differs from the first philosophy 
in that the latter constructs its proofs from self-evident premises and common notions, 
whereas dialectic works from established opinions” (Philoponus 2006, 47).  Neither of 
these seem to me entirely adequate.  First, Aristotle does not mention “first philosophy” 
by name even though the present topic of whether being is meant in one way is a topic 
that belongs to it.  But, especially in the latter where we would have the further difficulty 
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the text of the Physics in order to establish the character of his treatment of the 
Eleatics, even if there is no technical term for it.  There are at least a few hints 
that Aristotle disparages these opponents and may not treat them fairly. 
Aristotle first gives us a sense of the range of problems that are 
appropriately dealt with by a science: “it is inappropriate to resolve all errors, but 
only as many as someone falsely concludes, demonstrating from first principles” 
(185a15).  He gives more detail to his analogy from geometry to illustrate the 
point: “for instance, the squaring by means of portions belongs to the geometer to 
analyze, but that of Antiphon does not” (185a17).  Antiphon thought that if one 
inscribed increasingly many sided polygons inside of a circle, one would 
eventually reach a polygon which was coincident with the circle.  And because 
any polygon can be squared, one could square the circle which coincided with its 
polygon as well.  Antiphon‟s error cannot be corrected within geometry because it 
undermines principles on which Euclidean geometry is based, for one, the 
principle of continuity.52  It is not incidental that Antiphon was a well-known 
                                                                                                                                                 
in distinguishing the dialectic Aristotle uses when engaging the fusikoi/ and that which 
he uses when refuting the Eleatics.  Further, all of Aristotle‟s works seems to be 
dialectical if this is meant to distinguish this method from syllogistic demonstration 
based on the geometrical model.  For a discussion of the problem, see Spangler (1979, 
95), Owen (1975, 125), and Ross (1936, 461).  For a discussion of a way in which 
demonstrative argument can have a wider meaning than what is generally recognized as 
akin to geometrical reasoning, see Lennox (1987) and Gotthelf (1987). 
 
52 Antiphon‟s mistake lies in thinking that he had squared the circle by means of 
polygons.  Hippocrates of Chios, on the other hand, found the solution to the quadrature 
of the lune and thought that by extension he had squared the circle.  (Hippocrates 
presumably thought that lunes could compose a circle which is impossible.)  The latter 
case is a mistake operating under the same principles (i.e. making the analogy between 
one curvilinear figure with another), while the former makes, as it were, an a priori 
mistake thinking that all shapes are in principle commensurable in area.  Cf. Heath 
(1981, 221-3), Ross (1936, 463-5), and Sachs (1995, 47). 
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sophist,53 and I would suggest that Aristotle is hinting that the best way to deal 
with a sophist is sophistically (or in more cordial terms, dialectically, though one 
still needs some way to distinguish the dialectical treatment Aristotle employs 
with the other fusikoi/ from that which he uses against the Eleatics). 
This is the way Aristotle in fact deals with Parmenides and Melissus twice 
calling them debaters or eristic types (185a9 and 186a10).  He likens their 
conclusions to the absurdist positions of Heraclitus such as “being is one man” 
(185a9) and “being-good and being-bad” are the same (185b21) which amounts to 
the criticism that “their account would not be about the being-one of all things 
but about the being-nothing of all things” (185b24).54  This is at least a rhetorical 
flourish by Aristotle if not a sophism in return for a sophism.  Aristotle‟s final 
attack is that both Parmenides and Melissus are incompetent logicians (186a6).  
Aristotle is hardly fair to his adversaries here, and this attack could easily be 
taken as an overt insult.55  After all, Parmenides is considered to have been first 
of the great logicians and would have considered himself to be a master of 
argument if we are to take seriously the testimony of Plato in the Parmenides for 
example.  Gershenson and Greenberg confirm this assessment of Aristotle‟s 
treatment of the Parmenides and Melissus, “The critique of the Eleatics begins 
with a mounting crescendo of abuse, designed to destroy their reputation as 
                                                 
53 See also Physics II.1 183a12 ff. for another reference to Antiphon which articulates the 
sophistic distinction between no/moj and fu/sij. 
 
54 For a connection with this interpretation of the consequence of the Eleatic position 
and the Sophists, see Gorgias‟ fragment 3 in Diels. 
 
55 Philoponus notes in several places in his commentary on chapters 2 and 3 of Physics I.  
One example: “Aristotle says this in the middle by way of mockery of them” (Philoponus 
2006, 70). 
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philosophers. There is no argument here, only condemnation” (Gershenson and 
Greenberg 1962, 138). 
After the initial abuse, Aristotle confronts the Eleatic objection to the 
intelligibility of change obliquely under the pretext of an investigation into the 
number of principles or realities that constitute the changeable world (184b14).56  
By forcing them into a discussion of how many principles there are and 
supposing they hold in common that there is only one, Aristotle is able to treat 
Parmenides and Melissus on his own terms.  Aristotle‟s preliminary and highly 
abbreviated refutation of the Eleatic position follows: “For it is not any longer an 
a)rxh/ if it is one only and there is therefore only one thing, for the a)rxh/ is of 
something or some things” (185a4).  Once Aristotle compels the absent 
interlocutor to admit that there is a being on the one hand and a principle of a 
being on the other, it follows that there will be at least two things and not one.57  
It is crucial to his subsequent refutations of both Parmenides and Melissus that 
he challenges them in his own terms even when he poses as if he is arguing from 
premises that they are supposed to have accepted.58 
                                                 
56 In chapter eight Aristotle will argue directly and from grounds presumably within the 
domain of physical inquiry. 
 
57 This move puzzles Philoponus: “But if their discourse was not about the principles, 
why does Aristotle criticize these men on the grounds that they were mistakenly 
suggesting that the principle was one?  My reply is that, even if they were not talking 
about the principles, nevertheless Aristotle criticizes the argument as if someone had 
been suggesting that the principle of physical things was one, because he wants to 
demolish such a theory” (Philoponus 2006, 43). 
 
58 Pace Gershenshon and Greenberg (1962, 143 ff.) and Spangler (1979, 98).  See also 
Charlton (1970, 53). 
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The arguments he offers against Parmenides and Melissus are therefore 
made from two positions.  In chapter two, Aristotle argues overtly from his own 
doctrine that “things are said to be in many ways” (185a20) and in chapter three 
he takes up the Eleatics on their own terms in order to show their internal 
inconsistencies.59  In both cases Aristotle attacks them on the grounds that “they 
reason invalidly from false premises” (186a6).   Melissus‟ premises are that 
“whatever comes to be has a beginning [a)rxh/]” and the false conversion that 
“whatever does not come to be has no beginning [a)rxh/]” (186a11 ff.).  Because the 
whole is thought to have no beginning, it must not have come to be and hence 
must be a motionless One.60  Aristotle questions the idea that if the whole is one 
that it follows that it must be motionless for some of the fusikoi/ (Thales and 
Anaximenes for instance) believe the whole to be one in respect of its material 
                                                 
59 First he argues by replacing the premises with premises of his own and second by 
showing the absurd consequences of their own premises.  I follow Charlton‟s division of 
the argument (Charlton 1970, 53) rather than Gershenston and Greenberg‟s (1962).  
They are in agreement on the essential point that there are two separable lines of 
arguments against the Parmenidean position here differing only in where to make the 
division between the two in the text.  They both agree that Aristotle argues first from his 
own position and then from terms granted by his opponents. 
 
60 Aristotle criticizes Melissus here for the faulty logic of reasoning that “ if p then q, not-
p, therefore not-q.”  We should note that even though the conversion is illicit, this does 
not mean that the conclusion is false.  In fact, the conclusion that whatever does not 
come into being does not have a beginning is self evident if we read this to say that 
something that does not exist and does not come into be does not have a beginning (for 
how could what does not exist have a beginning?).  David Sedley defends Melissus on the 
grounds that he and his audience would have shared the implicit premise, not at all 
foreign to Ionian cosmology, that “the universe will be infinite unless it can be shown to 
be otherwise” (Sedley 1999, 126-7).  Bolton (2005, 105) points out that the illicit 
conversion is Aristotle‟s “standard objection to Melissus, he repeats it three times during 
his discussion of the fallacies in the Sophistici Elenchi (167b12-20, 168b35-40, 181a27-
30).” 
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but to contain many different kinds of things which may change in relation  to 
one another (186a20). 
Parmenides‟ thesis in turn is shown to be inconsistent in that the 
supposition of the univocity of being does not imply the singularity of the whole 
(186a21 ff.).  For, 
the refutation is that it is false and in another that it does not 
follow: false in that he takes being to be meant simply when it is 
meant in more than one way, but not a necessary conclusion 
anyway because, supposing only white things were taken, white 
meaning one thing, nonetheless white things are many and not one. 
(186a26) 
 
Aristotle claims that this argument does not follow even according to its own 
premises, but it may be objected that he has inserted a claim that Parmenides 
would not accept, namely, that “the white” is different from a white “thing” or 
“things” for either already admits a plurality.  This strategy is also apparent in the 
intrusion into the argument of the particularly Aristotelian concept of the 
underlying thing which is separable from its predicate: “For the attribute is 
predicated of some underlying thing [kaq‟ u(pokeime/nou], so that to which being 
is attributed would not be (since it is other than being), and there would therefore 
be something which is not” (186a34). 
These refutations consist of arguments outside of the range of natural 
science, and, as we can see, they are in many ways sophistical.  In the first set, 
Aristotle argues from his own assumption that being and one are meant in 
several ways (which his interlocutors would in all likelihood not accept).  In the 
second, he argues from premises which his opponents accept in order to generate 
inconsistencies out of the premises themselves and show the flaws in their 
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reasoning.  In both cases he does this by means of inserting a characteristically 
Aristotelian concept.  Whether he does this in a way that is fair to his opponent is 
questionable.  But he has prepared us for the possibility of an unjust treatment in 
his characterization of Parmenides and Melissus as practitioners of eristic debate 
and by comparing them with the sophist Antiphon.  Whether or not we think of 
Aristotle‟s rhetorical assault on the Eleatics as in some way dishonest, one has to 
consider the possibility that there is perhaps no alternative means to confront 
them.  Aristotle may have thought that the ends are important enough to justify 
the means in this case. 
Aristotle returns in chapter eight to unravel the paradox that he says is at 
the root of the Eleatic monism (191a30 ff.).  One wonders why, if we are meant to 
believe that the arguments of chapters two and three are definitive, Aristotle 
would feel the need to return in chapter eight to present an argument which 
would undermine the Eleatic position for a second time.  If the means were 
available, would not the better strategy be to unravel the a)poria which generated 
the position which one wanted to refute than to refute the conclusions and leave 
the a)poria intact?  Aristotle will attempt to do the former in chapter eight but 
this time within the register of arguments proper to physics. 
Aristotle prepares us for this second refutation of the Eleatics in the 
intervening chapters.  Here he highlights the points in the theories of his 
predecessors where they failed to overcome the Eleatic objection.  Finally 
Aristotle offers an analysis of change which purportedly resolves the impasses of 
the Eleatics.  This final argument culminates in what he claims is the “only” 
possible solution to the central Eleatic objection to the intelligibility of change 
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which none of the subsequent fusikoi/ could overcome, namely, that nothing can 
come into being from what is not or from what is. 
 
2.3 Examination of the Doctrines of the Fusikoi/ 
The second stage in the argument of Physics I is the review of the 
predecessors whom Aristotle considers to be genuine inquirers into nature, that 
is, those who already accept that nature is knowable in some way by means of 
principles.  The point of the review beginning in I.4 and carried through I.6 is not 
only to correct what is wrong with previous theories but also to salvage whatever 
might be already correct in them.  Aristotle begins by dividing the fusikoi/ into 
two classes: those who make the underlying body one and account for the 
differentiation of things by means of the density and rarity of the material 
substrate and those who “make the one stuff already contain in it oppositions” 
(187a21 ff.).  The bulk of the argument is against Anaxagoras who holds the most 
extreme position that the elements or principles are unlimited in number and 
mixed.  The reason for the extended and detailed treatment that Anaxagoras 
receives in comparison to the other fusikoi/ is that even though he is considered 
to be an inquirer into nature, his understanding of the principles of change 
threaten to undermine the legitimacy of natural inquiry as genuine knowledge.  
In Aristotle‟s eyes, Anaxagoras risks leaving us in much the same position as the 
Eleatics had:  
If the limitless as limitless is unknowable, the infinite in multitude 
or magnitude is unknowable as to how much it is, and the unlimited 
in form is unknowable as to what kind of thing it is. But since [for 
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Anaxagoras] the original beings are infinite both in multitude and 
in kind, it is impossible to know the things made of them [viz. 
natural beings].  For we assume we know a composite in this way: 
whenever we know how many things it is made and what they are. 
(187b9) 
 
Making the number of principles infinite yields the same result as the Eleatic 
denial of the intelligibility of change.  Aristotle is thus compelled to give a 
detailed refutation, this time though considerations proper to physics, in order to 
maintain that the objects of natural science are in a genuine sense knowable.61 
Anaxagoras supposes unlimited principles probably, Aristotle claims, 
“because he assumed the common opinion of those who study nature to be true, 
that nothing comes into being from what is not” (187a28).62  So in order to avoid 
this consequence, Anaxagoras made generation a kind of alteration by means of a 
process of “coming together and dissolution” of infinite elements in different 
mixtures (187a30). 
What motivates Anaxagoras‟ thought is the same insight that motivated 
the Eleatic denial of the plurality of beings and the knowability of motion.  
However, instead of denying the possibility of understanding change, Anaxagoras 
                                                 
61 Arguably, Aristotle ought to offer similar refutations of the position of Democritus.  At 
203a18 Aristotle equates the positions of Anaxagoras and Democritus on the grounds 
that they both say that there are an infinite number of elements: “…but as many as make 
the elements finite, which Anaxagoras and Democritus do.”  However, compare the more 
proximate passage concerning Democritus at 188a19 ff. where he is grouped with those 
who call the contraries principles on the grounds both that he posits the full and the void 
as well as position, shape, and arrangement which are “classes to which contraries 
belong.”  In this latter sense Democritus would appear to have a finite number of 
principles. 
 
62 This is a thesis which ultimately was only a partial concession to Parmenides in that 
they still allow what comes to be to come from what already is. 
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– and Empedocles‟ doctrine of change is similar in this regard – seeks to work 
around the Eleatic difficulty rather than submit to it or to confront it head on: 
If everything that comes into being must come either out of what is 
or what is not, and of these, the coming out of what is not is 
impossible (for about this opinion, all those who concern 
themselves with nature think alike), they regarded the remaining 
choice as following immediately by necessity, that coming into 
being is from what is already present all along. (187a34) 
 
Thus Anaxagoras holds that in order for what-is to come to be from what-is all 
things must already be present in all things.  In any of these mixtures we call the 
whole of it by whatever happens to predominate.  All of the other things that we 
might call it if they predominated are nonetheless present in it imperceptibly.  
And through the gathering of these parts together by separating them out from 
the whole, we have it that what was something can come to be something else.  
The advantage of Anaxagoras‟ theory is that it does away with non-being.  He 
solves the problem of coming into being from what-is-not by supposing that there 
are only beings.  By making them infinite however, Anaxagoras makes them 
unknowable to a finite being. 
 If nothing comes to be from what is not, what comes to be must have 
already been there, hidden by the small quantity present which “cannot be 
perceived by us because they are extremely tiny” (187a35 ff.).  Aristotle refutes 
the basic claim that all things are mixed and that things come to be by being 
separated out and becoming preponderate by showing a number of fallacies that 
arise out of this compositional model.63 
                                                 
63 Aristotle‟s refutation of Anaxagoras is the most detailed and sustained examination of 
a predecessor in Physics I.  This fact alone at the very least indicates some level of 
importance.  Aristotle must confront Anaxagoras because, like the Eleatics, he is a threat 
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 Anaxagoras has not succeeded any more than the Eleatics had in making 
the phenomena of nature and change more knowable.  In his attempt to explain 
how things can come to be, he has ended up claiming that what was intelligible to 
us from the beginning, our basic knowledge of what sort of a thing something is, 
can be explained by what is less intelligible (namely, an unlimited number of 
principles).  Though similar in many ways, Empedocles at least fares better by 
                                                                                                                                                 
to the project of natural science, but to explore the specific arguments against him at this 
point would be too much of a digression.  In outline, the analysis of Anaxagoras is 
divisible into five parts in the passage from 187b9-188a18: 
An epistemological argument:  
if the original beings are infinite, the composites which they constitute are 
unknowable to a finite being (187b9-13).  It might be objected that this is not 
properly an argument for rejecting Anaxagoras‟ theory in that it seems to beg the 
question assuming in advance that the phenomena should be intelligible which is 
precisely what Aristotle wants to show.  As an argument, it does, in a sense, beg 
the question, but it need not function to bear the weight of the entire refutation.  
Rather, it lets us know what is at stake in the four refutations that follow. 
An argument from composition:  
if part of a compound is capable of being as large or as small as we like, so then is 
the compound capable of being as large or as small as we like.  But an animal or 
plant cannot be any size whatever; therefore there cannot be an infinite amount 
of any single element (187b13-22).  
An argument from separation: 
if everything is mixed with everything, one could pick out one element to separate 
out and by taking a definite amount, of say flesh, out of the compound repeatedly 
one would eventually exhaust the supply of flesh in the compound.  Hence, there 
would be no flesh left in the compound and not everything would be mixed with 
everything (187b22-188a5). 
An argument against Anaxagoras‟ “Mind”: 
“For attributes are inseparable.  So if colors and states are mixed, if they were to 
be separated out there would be something white or healthy which was not 
anything else and did not belong to any underlying thing.  So the intelligence 
[nou=j] is absurd, since it seeks what is impossible, if indeed is wants to separate 
them; and this is to do the impossible both in the case of the how-much and in 
that of the of-what-kind, the former because there is no least magnitude and the 
latter because attributes are inseparable [from and underlying thing]” (188a5-13). 
An argument against the coming to be of homogeneous things: 
Anaxagoras takes it that what comes to be must come from what is already.  
Aristotle thinks that Anaxagoras is thus forced to conflate change of arrangement 
with substantial generation.  For Anaxagoras “it is in the same manner as bricks 
come from a house and a house from bricks that water and air both are and come 
to be one another” (188a13-19). 
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making his principles limited (188a18) and hence at least leaves open the 
possibility that the phenomenon is comprehensible by a finite intellect. 
 
2.4 Generalizing from the Predecessors 
Aristotle ends his critical remarks of his predecessors (directed primarily 
at the Eleatics and Anaxagoras) by the beginning of chapter five and here begins 
to salvage what he can from previous theories.  We need to be cautious to 
distinguish what Aristotle says in chapters five and six from what is properly his 
own account of the conditions of the intelligibility of change which properly 
begins in chapter seven.64  In chapter five, Aristotle begins with a consideration of 
starting points or principles which in his estimation are common to all natural 
philosophers: “Everyone makes contraries the principles” (188a19).  This, 
Aristotle tells us, has some reason to it (188a26) and what follows are arguments 
which to some extent justify the claim (cf. also 189a10).65 
                                                 
64 Pace Ross (1936, 487): “189a19:  Aristotle begins here his positive account of the first 
principles.”  The vast majority of commentators follow Ross.  Charlton is more sensitive 
to the progression of the arguments from Physics I.4-8.  See Charlton (1970, 67 ff.) for 
the view that what is properly Aristotle‟s account begins only in chapter seven. 
 
65 For Aristotle, the sense of “contrary” (e)nanti/on) is more specific or refined that it 
would have been for his predecessors.  Many of the presocratics may have thought of 
contraries as “stuffs”, not making a distinction between the contrary as an attribute and 
that in which it inheres. For example, the hot and the cold may have been thought of as 
fire and water or some other hot or cold stuffs (cf. Heidel 1980, 333-79).  Aristotle 
alludes to this in chapter six with reference to Parmenides (188a20).  Cf. Heidel (1980, 
337 and 343) and Cherniss (1964, 50-1).  For Aristotle, the sense of “contrary” (e)nanti/on) 
is more specific or refined than it would have been for his predecessors.  But there is 
another sense in which Aristotle understands the notion of contraries, or more generally 
opposition (a)ntikeime/na).  In Categories 10, Aristotle distinguishes four different kinds 
of oppositions (a)ntikeime/na): contraries (e)nanti/a), contradictories (kata/fasij kai\ 
a)pofasij), privations (ste/rhsij), and relations (ta\ pro/j ti).  It is contraries in the 
narrow sense that Aristotle wants to impute to his predecessors as principles and which 
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The discussion of contraries in chapter five divides into three parts: 1) an 
appeal to the authority of the predecessors who all, in one way or another, posit 
contraries as principles, 2) an appeal to reason or argument (lo/goj) that would 
establish that contraries are in fact principles, and 3) a clarification as to the way 
in which those who posit contraries as principles differ by supposing different 
oppositions to be the more fundamental. 
In the first part, Aristotle deals primarily with Democritus presumably 
because his atomism does not obviously fit the scheme of contrariety.  Aristotle 
shows that even Democritus‟ doctrine implies the use of contraries in that the 
“full” (plh=rej) and the “void” (keno/n) are contraries and even those attributes 
that characterize the relations of atoms (position, shape, arrangement) “are 
classes to which contraries belong: to position, up and down, before and behind, 
[etc.]” (188a25).  Aristotle concludes by clarifying the reason, and hence also the 
criterion which validates the supposition of contraries as principles, why his 
predecessors called the contraries principles:  
For the original beings must not be from one another nor from 
anything else, and all things must be from them, but this belongs to 
the first contraries: since they are first they are not from anything 
else, and since they are contraries they are not from one another. 
(188a28) 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
will carry through in his own view in chapter seven.  There are important limits to the 
scope with which this analysis can be employed.  As we will see, difficulties arise from the 
consideration of the fact that substantial beings do not properly have contraries (cf. 
189a33).  Aristotle‟s careful use of the more general term “oppositions” (a)ntikeime/na) 
when discussing the way in which compounds arise out of things that are only in some 
derivative sense contraries indicates some sensitivity to his own distinctions from the 
Categories (188b9 ff.). 
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It is at this point still unclear whether the predecessors were correct in what they 
named the “first contraries,” but the fact that they identified the contraries as 
principles receives Aristotle‟s blessing.  Aristotle will return to the question of 
“first contraries” later in the argument.  At this point he assigns himself the more 
limited task of finding some concept general enough to encompass all the sorts of 
oppositions that his predecessors might have posited and thus to arrive at some 
opposition that is not subject to the specificity implied by supposing that the 
principles are perceptible qualities or bodies.66  This allows him to subsume the 
doctrines of the majority of his predecessors in a way that renders them all in 
some sense true, but which allows him in a single stroke to improve on all of 
them. 
Aristotle‟s own position will come closer to those of his predecessors that 
posited the oppositions according to distinctions which he says “better known by 
reason” (the examples he gives of these are odd-even and love-strife, 188b34) by 
positing form, an enduring material, and privation as principles where form and 
privation represent a generalized version the specific contraries his predecessors 
had posited.  These latter are held by the majority of commentators to stand as 
Aristotle‟s final word as to the number and character of principles, but we will see 
there are some difficulties involved in supposing that this preliminary 
articulation constitutes Aristotle‟s last word on the number and character of 
                                                 
66 In this way Aristotle moves from identifying the principles as beings as many of the 
presocratics did (184b22) to seeking the principles of beings.  Charlton argues that it is 
this move which brings Aristotle from “empirical” considerations of his predecessors to 
his own “philosophical” considerations (Charlton 1970, 66).  There is something like this 
going on in the move to more general concepts as principles, but I would hesitate it to 
call it a move from the “empirical” (some other commentators might call this “scientific,” 
Mansfeld for example (Mansfeld 1990) to the “philosophical.” 
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principles.67  For now, what is important is that Aristotle affirms the “plausibility” 
(eu)lo/goj, 188a27) of what the predecessors “in some way” (pwj, 188a26) agree 
about, namely, the positing contraries as the principles of nature even if this need 
not be his own final word.    
Aristotle begins the second stage of the argument concerning contraries 
with a premise crucial not only to the present argument but also to the arguments 
in chapters seven and eight:  
It must be understood [lepte/on] about all beings that nothing 
whatever is by nature such as to do [poiei=n] or undergo [pa/skein] 
change any chance thing through the agency of any chance thing, 
nor does anything come to be out of just anything, unless you take a 
case of concurrence [sumbebhko/j]. (188a31-5) 
 
He says that he is “seeking by means of logical argument [e)pi\ tou= lo/gou 
ske/yasqai]” (188a30) though perhaps this only tells us that he is no longer 
speaking dialectically or addressing the predecessors directly.68  Does this give us 
license to exclude altogether the possibility that things come to be from things 
outside of the range of a given set of contraries?69  The use of lepte/on does not 
                                                 
67 Cf. Gill (1989, 90-108), Wieland (1975, 134), Solmsen (1960, 74-91), Broadie (1982, 1-
47). 
 
68 Cf. Ross (1936, 488-9).  G.E.L Owen describes the difficulty of untangling the different 
types of arguments succinctly:  “[Aristotle], and his commentators on his behalf, have 
insisted on the distinction between „physical‟ and „dialectical‟, or „logical‟, or „universal‟ 
arguments; and no doubt some of the reasoning in the Physics falls within this first class. 
… The „logical‟ arguments can hardly be marked by their generality… nor the „physical‟ by 
their reliance on the special theorems of physics (the „logical‟ may also do this, 264a24)” 
(Owen 1975, 125). 
 
69 Bolton argues that in the arguments of chapter five there is no appeal to „a priori‟ 
argument and is forced to conclude that if it were the case that “If it always did happen 
that what is white came to be from what is musical, that is, if all and only musical things 
became white owing to something about musicality, which is not conceptually 
impossible, then Aristotle could not say that white comes to be by nature only from a 
contrary and otherwise accidentally” (Bolton 1991, 25).  If this is the case, as he points 
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necessarily imply that we should expect a solid argument to establish the 
conclusion follows.  It must, in this case, be closer to “one must suppose.”  If we 
suppose it to be the case that nothing does or suffers anything by chance, 
arguments and experience may be able to confirm this.  It is unclear whether 
such a proposition could ever be demonstrated in a rigorous way or that Aristotle 
thought it could be. 
There is in fact precedent in Greek literature for the view of change that 
Aristotle is attacking here.  In Homer‟s Odyssey, Proteus is said to be able to 
“take the form of all creatures that come forth and move on the earth, he will be 
water and magical fire” (Lattimore 1965, IV 417-8).  When Odysseus and his 
companions confront the wily god it is said of him that, “First he turned into a 
great bearded lion, and then to a great serpent, then to a leopard, then to a great 
boar, and he turned into fluid water, to a tree with towering branches [etc.]” 
(Lattimore 1965, IV 456-8).  While it is true that Homer is not one we would 
immediately consider as a predecessor of Aristotle, it is conceivable that he might 
have had some such image in mind if in fact the idea that things come from 
contraries and not any random thing really needs justification.70  In this regard 
(as we tried to show in a previous chapter), Aristotle is just as much competing 
against rival claims of the poets as he is of his more philosophical predecessors.  
                                                                                                                                                 
out, Aristotle is not justified in making any such universal claim about the principles of 
change which could not be invalidated by further experience.  Charlton argues that 
Aristotle is arguing from a priori grounds that at 188a30 he calls the argument “logical” 
(1970, 65-66).  On the difficulty of determining the sense of “logical” in this context see 
previous note.  Cf. also Broadie (1982, 6-8). 
 
70 It is interesting to note that the earliest known occurrence of the term nature (fu/sij) 
in Greek literature is Homer‟s Iliad.  Cf. Liddell and Scott (1996, 1964).  The significance 
of this was pointed out to me by James Carey at lecture at St. John‟s College in 1998. 
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If the poets are more persuasive and it is conceivable that things change at 
random with no rational cause (other than by a god‟s whimsy), we are left in a 
position equivalent to admitting that change as such might not be scientifically 
knowable. 
Establishing that change does not happen at random is crucial in 
establishing an alternate view to that of Parmenides which denies the knowability 
of the movable as such.  The thesis that nothing can come from nothing is closely 
related to the possibility that things can come to be from other things by chance, 
that is, without rational connection.71  What would be the difference in saying 
that one thing replaced another by chance72 (one way of saying that one thing 
became another) and that the first thing became nothing and the second arose 
from nothing in its place?  By establishing that the opposites are connected in the 
phenomena in an essential way is also to establish that things do not come to be 
out of nothing or pass away into nothing. 
Aristotle extends the general argument to clarify that even changes among 
composite beings are changes between contraries.  In the case of composite 
beings, it is more difficult to see that the termini of change are oppositions 
because often the privative state of affairs which stands in as a contrary has no 
name (188b10).  A house comes to be from “what is not put together but from 
                                                 
71 For a discussion of the connection between random changes and change ex nihilo and 
the implications such a possibility holds, see Bolotin (1998, 26) and Broadie (1982, 5-9).  
It is peculiar to say the least that it is precisely this idea of something happening by 
concurrence (kata\ sumbebhko/j) that allows Aristotle, in chapter eight, that is the basis 
of the refutation of the Parmenidean objection that something cannot come to be from 
what-is or what-is-not. 
 
72 For the problem of “sheer replacement” see Broadie (1982) and Gill (1989). 
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these things separated in this way” (tou= mh\ sugkei=sqai a)lla\ dih|rh=sqai tadi\ 
w(di/, 188b18).  This very complicated locution for the “not-house” from which a 
house comes to be is meant to indicate what must be read into the notion of the 
“not-house” if it is to express the actual and accurate state of affairs from which 
houses actually come to be.  The most important phrase in the would-be name is 
the “in this way” for if it the not-house were not situated in some particular way, 
we would have no way of distinguishing it from any random state of affairs that 
might be construed as preceding the existence of the house.  That is, we could not 
distinguish what ordered arrangement a house actually comes from the 
contradictory of a house or the non-house. 
Aristotle can now draw the general conclusion that all changes take place 
between contraries: “So if this is true, everything that comes into being would 
come from, and everything that is destroyed would be destroyed into, either its 
opposite or what is between them” (188b22).  That is, the case is plausible that 
both simples and composites come to be out of contraries (or at least somewhat 
determinate oppositions in the case of composites), we should be satisfied that in 
all cases the things that come into being come from their contraries.73  
In chapter six Aristotle returns, having answered at least preliminarily the 
question of the nature of the principles, to the question of the number of 
principles with which he began.  He takes it that the options that the opposites 
could be one or infinite were justifiably rejected on the grounds that they make 
                                                 
73 Aristotle has left out the possibility that something simple could come to be out of a 
compound or that a compound out of something simple.  Whether this has any major 
consequence will depend on whether Aristotle would admit such changes actually occur. 
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nature unintelligible vis a vis what has already been said about the Eleatics and 
Anaxagoras: “They cannot be one, since the opposites are not one and the same; 
and they cannot be unlimited, since if they were, what is would be unknowable” 
(189a13).74  Eleatic monism does not permit opposites to be principles because 
necessarily they are not the same as each other (189a12).  Thus, if we suppose, 
against the Eleatic thesis, that the movable world is knowable by means of 
principles, it is necessary that the principles are two, three, or a greater finite 
number.   
Aristotle suggests that a principle of economy should govern how many 
principles one ought to posit (189b16-28, cf. 189a15-16).  He never rules out the 
possibility that the principles may be more than three on any other grounds.  
Traditional interpretations often suggest that the result of the present argument 
that the principles must be three represents Aristotle‟s final word on the subject.  
Yet the text which closes the section indicates that he seems to think that this is 
still “a very difficult question” (189b28). Though Aristotle does not at this point 
explicitly say why the question of the number of principles is still a matter of 
difficulty, he will in chapters seven and eight give arguments that indicate what is 
at stake in claiming that the principles are two or three. 
We need to remember that even at this point in the argument of book one, 
Aristotle has not begun to speak entirely in his name.  He has been, and is 
throughout chapter six, engaging his predecessors for the most part on their own 
terms and considering the consequences of their positions.  In chapter six this is 
                                                 
74 It is worth noting that he reiterates his rejection of Anaxagoras‟ position on the 
grounds that “what is would not be knowable” (189a12). 
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indicated by the fact that it is primarily aporetic in approach.75  What are almost 
universally held to be Aristotle‟s views are actually resolutions to aporiai that 
Aristotle does not explicitly, at least not immediately, endorse as his own.  
Aristotle‟s solutions to these difficulties are reserved until chapter seven where 
there is still some question as to what extent he endorses the point of view he 
proposes.76 
After it has been supposed that the principles must in some way be 
contraries, it is plausible (tina\ lo/gon, 189a21-22) that oppositions “both must 
act on a third thing distinct from them” (189a26).  The contraries themselves 
cannot act on each other because they destroy each other (Physics 188a28, cf. 
also Phaedo 69e-72e and 103b-104c).  Since it cannot be the case that one 
contrary actually becomes the other or that the other comes from it or that they 
even act on each other (cf. 188a28), it becomes necessary to posit some third 
thing which is not a contrary but something in which both contraries reside at 
different times during a change.   Aristotle intimates that Empedocles and others 
must have had this insight.  Empedocles posited elements in addition to the 
contrary principles Love and Strife: “For Love does not bring Strife together or 
make anything out of it, nor strife out of it, but both act on some other third 
thing.  And some assume even more things out of which they construct the nature 
of things” (189a25). 
                                                 
75 This is also Charlton‟s reading of the chapter (1970, 67-9). 
 
76 In the following line Aristotle refines the basic view of his predecessors to arrive at his 
own: “It was said earlier that only the contraries were starting points, but later that 
something must also underlie them and that they be three; but from what is being said 
now, it is clear what the difference between the contraries is, how the starting points 
stand to one another, and what the underlying thing is” (191a15). 
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Aristotle does not initially put forward the idea that some substrate is 
necessary to underlie the contraries as his own.  Rather, he raises difficulties that 
might arise from not supposing some third thing as well as from supposing there 
is some third thing: “But on top of these things one produces the further impasse 
if someone were not to set down some nature different from the contraries, since 
of no thing do we say the contraries constitute what it is” (189a28).  He does not, 
at least yet, positively affirm the necessity of some underlying thing.  If there was 
perhaps some other way of understanding motion, perhaps it would not require 
the kind of underlying thing that supports contraries as a continuant. 
What then, he asks, is the relation of the contraries to this third, 
underlying thing if we posit it?  This question concerns the priority of the 
contraries and the substrate and this could generate a problem since we are 
looking for first principles: “but the starting point should not be predicated of any 
underlying thing, for it would be a principle of a principle” (189a30).77  That is, 
the contraries will no longer meet the criterion of “primary oppositions” which 
“do not come from anything else” (188a27) and should not be predicated of 
anything else.  That is, the opposites will not be primary if they are predicated of 
that in which they inhere (189a31).  The question is whether there is a conflict 
between the criterion for establishing that something is a first principle (i.e. that 
they “not be from each other or from anything else” (188a28 ff.) and the current 
problem that if we posit a third thing there seems to be something prior in the 
sense that something is predicated of it.  The crux of the a)pori/a is that what is 
                                                 
77 Sachs translates a)rxh/ as “source” here.  I have modified the translation to read 
“principle” instead in order to maintain consistency. 
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predicated of is prior to what is being predicated: “For the underlying things is a 
source, and seems to be prior to that which is predicated of it [pro/teron dokei= 
tou= kathgoroume/nou]” (189a31).  Once again, Aristotle does not explicitly 
endorse a positive resolution.78 
There is a further problem from the point of view of Aristotle and his 
followers.  Since “we” do not admit that “one reality [ou)si/a] is the opposite of 
another,” and opposites are in fact principles, how can opposites constitute the 
reality of things (189a33)?79  That is, “how could an ou)si/a be derived from what 
are not ou)si/aj” (189a34).  Aristotle‟s response to this puzzle is that it is 
necessary, in the end, to posit some third thing if we are to hold as true “both the 
earlier argument and this one” (189b1).  The two arguments he seems to refer to 
here are 1) that the first principles are contraries and 2) that ou)si/a cannot be 
constituted simply from contraries.  As for what this third thing is, he entertains 
the ideas of the predecessors that it could be earth, air, fire, or water rejecting 
them on the grounds that they are already bound up with contraries.  What is 
required at this point to solve the a)pori/a of the generation of substances out of 
                                                 
78 Aristotle seems to have skirted the problem of the priority of the principles unless the 
underlying thing also requires that the opposites be prior and cannot be thought of as 
separate.  We then have a strange case of mutual priority.  Characteristic of the 
underlying thing is that it should have “the least perceptible differentiating feature” and 
least “tangled up with opposites” (189b9). 
 
79 But contrast 186a21 for a way in which substances are contraries: “For a human being 
is different in form [ei)/dei] from a horse and are contraries [ta)nanti/a] to one another.”  
This is indeed a very strange use of the term “contraries,” but if we give Aristotle the 
benefit of the doubt that he was not just being sloppy we should assume this use is 
deliberate.  At this early stage of book one, this employment of “contraries” foreshadows 
the difficulties that emerge from trying to reconcile the general account of generation in 
I.7 with the phenomenon of substantial generation. 
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contraries is some substrate that is “between” (metacu\, 189b2 and cf. 188b23), 
something that is as much as possible devoid of “sensible differences” (diafora\j 
ai)sqhta/j, 189b7). 
Although Aristotle appears to have rejected the possibility that the 
principles can be two, he has not yet addressed another sense in which the 
principles may be thought of as two.  Later he mentions briefly that the 
oppositions themselves may be considered as one which is either present or 
absent (191a7).  That he still holds open for question that it is possible to posit 
only two principles is evident also from the last lines of chapter seven where even 
though he indicates that it has been argued that they are three he qualifies this 
with the caveat that it has been said “in what way” they are three (pw=j, 191a21).  
Another sense in which the principles may be thought of as two is in number.  
The principles may be three in speech but Aristotle considers them as two in 
number (190b25).  But this raises difficulties we will address further on when we 
determine what Aristotle himself thinks are the best candidates for the principles 
of change.  Aristotle ends the chapter with the confidence that he has ruled out 
the possibility that the principles are one, unlimited, or a finite number more 
than three.  But whether they are two or three, he says, “is a great impasse” 
(189b29). 
 
 
2.5 Aristotle’s Analysis of the Coming-to-be in General 
In chapter 7 of Physics I, Aristotle lays out what appears to be his 
considered view of how to characterize and enumerate the principles of change 
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(what “we say” about the subject, h)mei=j le/gwmen, 189b30).  This account, 
moreover, is purported to be the basis of the solution to the Eleatic paradoxes his 
predecessors faced in establishing the study of nature as a legitimate science.  
Most commentators believe wrongly that the analysis of “coming-to-be generally” 
(peri\ pa/shj gene/sewj, 189b3o)80 in I.7 is meant to apply universally to all types 
of change.  Despite differences on other issues in this chapter, commentators 
almost universally agree that Aristotle‟s intention was to provide a single 
comprehensive account of change.  Aristotle of course has led us to this 
expectation through the progression of Physics I.  However, closer inspection 
reveals that Aristotle did not mean the general account of I.7 to apply all types of 
change.  There are in fact two stages to the argument in I.7, the first of which 
applies to change “in general” and the second of which applies to a special case of 
change, i.e. substantial generation.   
In addition to the rhetorical clues that indicate this division, the main 
support for this interpretation is Aristotle‟s use of the term u(pokei/menon 
(underlying-thing or substrate).  It is not often recognized that in these passages 
Aristotle varies the meaning of u(pokei/menon depending on whether he is talking 
                                                 
80 The usual translation of pa/shj is “all” which implies that the account that follows 
applies to every case and genre of change.  This is the reading of the majority of 
commentators, and I argue against it in what follows.  The sense of pa/shj can also be 
translated as “generally” and in this case should be.  This translation exempts substantial 
generation from the restriction of the preliminary account of coming-into-being that it 
necessarily require a persisting substrate.  Further, the case of the generation of 
substances is introduced with the phrase “But becoming is meant in more than one 
way…” (190a31) which indicates something other than a strictly univocal universal 
account.  Cf. translator‟s note to Philoponus (1994, 160n39): “On Phys. 189b30 (pp. 151-
2 Vitelli) Philoponus explains that one cannot give a generic account of „coming-to-be‟ 
(genesis), and that the „general‟ (katholou) treatment of it will deal in fact with what is 
„specific but applicable to many things‟ (pleiosi epharmattonta).” 
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about substantial change or change in general.  Because Aristotle employs the 
idea of u(pokei/menon in the case of change in general as both “that-from-which” a 
change takes place and a constituent and in the case of substantial generation as 
the terminus only we should expect the analysis of change to differ according to 
each sense of u(pokei/menon.  If we try to read all cases of change according to a 
single meaning of u(pokei/menon, we will find that we run into all sorts of 
interpretative pitfalls the most troublesome of which is supposing Aristotle 
accepts prime matter. 
Were Aristotle‟s goal in I.7 to establish a comprehensive account of 
change, he could not do this by recourse to the general account position usually 
assumed by commentators to be universally valid for all types of change.  An 
analysis of I.8 will show that Aristotle‟s attempt to bring the results of the general 
account of change from I.7 to bear on the Eleatic problem that no thing can come 
to be from what-is or from what-is-not does not result in an adequate solution to 
the Eleatic injunction prohibiting the science of nature.  We have illustrated that 
throughout the course of book one this problem is the fundamental obstacle that 
Aristotle feels he must overcome if he is to set a firm foundation for his physics.  
The application of the general three-principled analysis of change in I.7 to this 
problem provides only a partial and problematic solution to the Eleatic paradox 
of motion.  This is especially noteworthy considering that Aristotle at one point 
claims that this is the only solution to the Eleatic dilemma concerning the 
intelligibility of change (191a23). 
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i The Division of the Argument of Physics I.7 
Aristotle‟s discussion of generation is divided into two parts in accordance 
with the methodical guidelines Aristotle set out in Physics I.1.  First he discusses 
“coming-to-be in general [peri\ pa/shj gene/sewj], since the natural procedure is 
first to say what is common [ta\ koina\] to all cases, and only then to consider 
what is peculiar [or proper] concerning each [ta\ peri\ e(/kaston i/)dia]” (189b31).81  
The analysis begins with observations of the way change reveals itself in ordinary 
speech and perception (what is more familiar to us), then moves to what is more 
knowable by nature (to the more proper, guiding meaning which reveals the 
deeper meaning of the general, naïve view).82  This method is reflected in the 
transition from the discussion of coming-into-being in terms of alteration (the 
examples of the educated man and of the statue) to the discussion of simple 
coming-into-being or coming-into-being simply.  Aristotle‟s discussion divides 
along these lines from 189b30 to 190a31 where we find the general discussion of 
coming-into-being and from 190a31 to 190b16 where he discusses the special 
                                                 
81 Liddell and Scott (1996): “i)dioj II.3 peculiar, appropriate, i)dia o)no/mata proper name, 
[…] IV characteristic property of a species” (1996, 818).  Compare “only realities are said 
to come to be properly [a)plw=j]” (190a33).  Many translators translate a)plw=j as if it 
meant to signify that this coming-to-be is the coming-to-be of simple beings, but it could 
just as easily be signifying the type of coming-to-be that is being dealt with, i.e. 
generation in its „simplest‟ sense.  Spangler accepts the same translation of a)plw=j: “Yet it 
is substance alone which, in the Physics, Aristotle claims can be properly be said to come 
to be (190a33)” (Spangler 1979, 102). 
 
82 This procedure follows closely the method outlined in Physics I.1.  Often 
commentators take ta\ koina\ at 189b31 to indicate that the treatment following is 
universal.  This neglects the reference to the methodological statements in I.1 that 
investigation into nature should move from the common and confused to the particular 
and more knowable.  
 
86 
 
case that reveals the underlying meaning of the rest.83  This first part of the 
argument applies as a general analysis of change as we experience and speak 
about it while the second portion addresses the proper meaning of coming-to-be 
which is initially less accessible to us.  The rest of the chapter derives from these 
considerations an apparent resolution to the question of the number of principles 
which was posited as the objective of book one in chapter 2. 
 
ii Traditional Interpretations 
One of the basic premises of the traditional interpretation is that Aristotle 
employs the conclusions from chapters five and six in an analysis of the way that 
we generally speak about all coming-to-be.84  On this interpretation, Aristotle 
                                                 
83 This division of the chapter corresponds formally with the division made by 
Barrington Jones:  “He begins by considering coming-to-be in general… The inquiry into 
coming-to-be falls into two parts.  The first 189b32-190a31, concerns alteration, 
nonsubstantial change; the second, 190a31-b17, substantial change, the coming into 
existence of substances” (Jones 1974, 478).  Dancy objects: “I do not understand what 
Jones makes of the structure of this chapter” arguing that “the first part of the chapter 
[according to Jones‟ division], which immediately follows, is not restricted to alteration” 
(Dancy 1978, 385n35).  Dancy conflates alteration and generation seeing generation 
simpliciter as a more “drastic” coming-to-be.  Though I agree with Jones‟ division of the 
argument, we are nonetheless at cross purposes.  For, making the opposite mistake of 
Dancy, Jones dissolves the distinction between alteration and simple generation by 
eliminating from the meaning of underlying thing in alteration the characteristic that the 
substrate remains: “there is no reason why the animal should not come to be from the 
embryo in just the same way that the statue comes to be from what is in fact said to come 
from – the unshaped piece of bronze.  Just as that piece does not remain throughout the 
change, so neither does the embryo survive the birth of the animal that it comes to be” 
(Jones 1974, 490). 
 
84 Representatives of the traditional view include Aquinas, Owens (1981, 122-136), Ross 
(1936, 345-6), and Joachim (1999, xxxi-xxxiii and 92-94).  Even many of the opponents 
of the traditional view hold that the three-principled account is universal despite 
differing from the traditional interpretation in other ways (especially on the question of 
Aristotle‟s commitment to a view of prime matter).  Ultimately Alan Code shares the 
traditional view (“the discussion of the musical man at 189b32-190a31 is meant to 
demonstrate the relationships which hold between the three elements of change even in 
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accounts for the possibility of change by showing how contraries must replace 
one another in an underlying substrate which remains throughout the change.  
The “uneducated-man” becomes an “educated-man;” the contraries are 
uneducated and educated and what persists as substrate is the substance or 
subject man.  The traditional interpretation holds that the three-principled 
account of change applies equally for all cases of coming-to-be whatsoever.  
Aristotle answers the question of the nature and number of principles necessary 
to account for the possibility of change, the task which he set for himself at the 
beginning of book one. 
A wealth of scholarship has shown that the traditional interpretation is 
more problematic than it might initially seem.85  The traditional interpretation 
begins to find trouble when it tries to account for a special case of change, that of 
simple generation or substantial change (a(plw=j de\ gi/gnesqai tw=n ou)siw=n 
mo/non, 190a32).  The standard three principle approach stumbles when it tries to 
                                                                                                                                                 
substantial generations” (Code 1976, 363)).  He does this, however, guided by a principle 
of a perspectivism which allows him to avoid an appeal to prime matter which most of 
the traditional interpretations accept: “Thus as our interests dictate our choice as to 
which entity we consider the substratum [the persisting matter or the privation which is 
destroyed], so also will we vary our decision as to whether the change in question should 
be considered an alteration or a generation” (Code 1976, 365).  Also, Gill accepts the 
three-principled approach but in a way so qualified as to not require a doctrine of prime 
matter: “Physics I.7 demonstrates that all processes involve three principles.” (Gill 1989, 
98).  Traditional interpretations often but not exclusively overemphasize Aristotle‟s 
preoccupation with ordinary language as a means of investigation.  Wieland: “In the 
whole investigation he never quits the realm of the analysis of the way we speak” (1975, 
133); “What finally results from the comparative analysis of these linguistic structures 
(which I do not pursue here in detail) is simply the familiar triad of principles – matter, 
shape (or form), and privation – in terms of which all examples can be interpreted” 
(1975, 134, my italics).  See also Owen (1975), Jones (1974, 476-8), and Bostock (1982, 
179-96). 
 
85 Cf. especially Charlton (1970, 83-4 and appendix: 129-145), Gill (1989 38-40 and 42-
6), Code (1976, 362-65), and Bolotin (1998, 17-24). 
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identify what persists as an enduring substrate in substantial generation.  The 
seed, Aristotle‟s central example of simple generation, which he says is the 
substrate from which a plant or an animal comes-to-be (oi=(on ta\ futa\ kai\ ta\ 
zw=|a e)k spe/rmatoj, 190b5), does not appear to survive the transformation into 
what it becomes (unlike the man who presumably survives his education).  The 
solution that the traditional interpretation often offers is that even if the seed 
does not, something must and does in fact survive the transformation into 
substance, namely an amorphous and unknowable (except by analogy, cf. 191a8) 
prime matter.86 
The greatest risk involved with the idea of prime matter is that it threatens 
to dissolve the distinction between alteration and the generation of substances, a 
distinction that is at work in Physics I but explained in detail elsewhere.87  The 
                                                 
86 Kathleen Cook has argued compellingly against the views that it is prime matter that is 
made knowable by the analogy as well the alternate interpretations of this passage given 
by Charlton (1970, 78-9) and Barrington Jones (1974, 494-7), cf. Cook (1989, 105-119 
and (against Charlton and Jones) 110-112).  The contemporary debate over Aristotle‟s 
views about prime matter begins with a paper by Hugh King (1956) which was in turn 
criticized by Solmsen (1958) and A.R. Lacey (1965).  William Charlton wrote two 
influential papers on the subject, the first an appendix to his translation of Physics I & II 
and the second in 1983.  H.M. Robinson in turn replies to Charlton‟s first article in 1983.  
Between these articles, the evidence both for and against prime matter has virtually been 
exhausted, and yet there is still no consensus on the matter.  I am not able to do justice 
to this debate with my brief remarks on the subject.  I would refer the reader to the 
mentioned articles for further study.  I also cannot in this context present a defense of 
my view (that prime matter is unnecessary and even misleading for the interpretation of 
Aristotle‟s considered view) which would do justice to the arguments to the contrary in 
this debate.  The reasons I have adduced here are at least adequate to the present 
argument.  Suffice it to say that I am in agreement with the arguments of King and 
Charlton. 
 
87 Aristotle‟s most terse discussion of the distinction between alteration and generation 
simpliciter is found in On Generation and Corruption: “We must now explain the 
difference between generation and alteration, since we say that these changes are 
different from one another.  The substratum is one thing and the affection whose nature 
is to be predicated of the substratum another, and either of them can change.  So it is 
alteration when the substratum remains, being something perceptible, but change occurs 
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issue of prime matter in effect becomes a non-starter once we recognize that the 
three-principled account is not meant to be universal in scope but to encompass 
only those types of change other than the special case of substantial generation.  
This is the position I argue for in the following.88 
In order to oppose the view that Aristotle employs a concept of prime 
matter, one of two strategies must be utilized: one must either 1) deny that there 
is a persistent underlying thing in any kind of change as Barrington Jones does,89 
or 2) deny that Aristotle claims that there is a persisting substrate in the case of 
substantial generation.  Jones is led to the first view by relying too heavily on the 
role of linguistic analysis in Aristotle‟s account.  In a reversal of the traditional 
interpretation, he reads the model of substantial generation, which in his analysis 
does not require a persisting substrate, back into the other varieties of change.  
He supports this with a detailed analysis of Aristotle‟s appeal to the way we speak 
about change.  From the point of view of method, Jones has mistakenly taken 
Aristotle‟s analysis of common linguistic usage as his final word.  Aristotle‟s 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the affections to it, whether these are contraries or intermediates.  For example, the 
body is well then ill, but remains the same body; the bronze is now round, now a thing 
with corners, but remains the same [bronze].  When, however, the whole changes 
without anything perceptible remaining and the same substratum, but the way the seed 
changes entirely into blood, water into air, or air entirely into water, then, when we have 
this sort of thing, it is a case of generation (and corruption of something else)” (319b6-
18, Williams translation). 
 
88 It is not as if Aristotle emphatically steers us clear of considering the consequences of 
positing or not positing an of idea prime matter.  Bolotin criticizes Charlton on the 
grounds that: “Charlton fails to recognize, however, how much Aristotle himself 
contributed to the traditional misinterpretation of his text, and thus he also fails to 
wonder why Aristotle might have chosen to do so” (Bolotin 1998, 28n21).  He at the very 
least allows the reader room to speculate about prime matter as a possible solution to the 
problem of substantial generation even if he does not ultimately endorse this position. 
 
89 Cf. Jones (1974, 486-8 and 490). 
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employment of common linguistic usage usually constitutes his initial word on a 
given subject investigated.  The conclusions Jones draws borders on the bizarre.  
He thinks that even in the coming-to-be of an artifact like a statue, the bronze 
which is the substrate does not remain as the same bronze from the beginning to 
the end of the process of composition. 
Both Jones and the traditional interpretation committed to prime matter 
are misled by the density of the passage which quickly moves from the account of 
substantial change to those changes that are its necessary concomitant changes: 
For always there is something that underlies, out of which the thing 
comes into being, as do plants and animals from seed.  The things 
which simply come to be some of them do so by change of shape, 
like a statue, some by addition, like the things which grow, some by 
subtraction, as a Hermes comes to be out of stone, some by 
composition, like a house, some by alteration, like things which 
change in respect of their material. (190b5)90 
 
Commentators often identify these illustrations as cases of substantial 
generation.91  Change of shape, addition, growth, subtraction, composition, and 
alteration each have a more or less easily identifiable persisting substrate.  If 
these illustrations are meant to be examples of substantial generation, then we 
could not avoid the conclusion that substantial generation as well must have a 
                                                 
90 Compare with the discussion of Anaxagoras who conflates change by composition with 
substantial generation (188a9 ff.) 
 
91 Commentators often take it that, for example, the coming-to-be of a statue is a case of 
substantial generation (Code 1976, 357-8; Jones 1974, 483-9 and especially 487).  And 
even though substantial generation is in some sense a paradigm for the other sorts of 
change, this should not lead us to believe that other species of change are reducible or 
equivalent to it.  Code‟s conflation is most evident in statements like the following: “In 
exactly the same way that we can say that when a round piece of bronze is changed into 
an angular piece, this is an alteration of the bronze, but a genesis of the angular and a 
corruption of the round; and when an unshaped piece of bronze is changed into a brazen 
statue, this is an alteration of the bronze, but a genesis of the statue and the corruption of 
the shapeless” (Code 1976, 358). 
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substrate that remains even if there is great difficulty in identifying it.  This view 
also brings with it the implication that instances of substantial generation are 
reducible or even identical to other kinds of coming-to-be which involve an 
underlying substrate that survives the change.  This is misleading.   
Aristotle uses a dative of instrument (indicated by the “by” in the 
translation above) to show that it is by means of these other types of changes that 
substantial change can take place.  The change of shape which the bronze 
undergoes is not itself a change of substance or substantial generation.  It is by 
the change of shape of the bronze that the statue comes into being.  It is not the 
growth of flesh, bone, and blood that is a generation of substance, but a plant or 
animal comes into being by growing flesh, bone and blood, among other things.  
Substantial generation is not the same as alteration or growth or diminution 
though it may be that these other kinds of changes must accompany and be 
present if substantial generation is to occur.  For these, the changes instrumental 
to substantial change, it is manifest (fanero\n, 190b10) that something comes-to-
be out of some underlying thing which also endures. 
This is significantly different from claiming that these illustrations are 
examples of substantial generation and that, because there is an identifiable 
persisting substrate in these cases, there must also be such in the case of 
substantial generation.  It would remain unclear what the persisting substrate in 
the example of a seed becoming a mature living thing would be unless one 
supposed that the substrate of the instrumental change was also unequivocally 
the substrate of the substantial generation.  Even if this seems plausible in the 
case of a statue where we can identify the bronze at the beginning of the process 
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as at least minimally similar to the constituent bronze at the end, it is much less 
plausible in the case of a seed whose substrate is some lower level substance or 
“this” like earth and water and an animal whose proximate matter is flesh, bones 
and blood.  In the latter case, it is precisely because it is the underlying thing 
itself that changes that we cannot identify the same substrate at the beginning 
and the end of the process.   
This difference could also be accounted for on the grounds that artifacts 
such as bronze statues are not for Aristotle, strictly speaking, really substances at 
all.92  Nonetheless, Jones takes it that in fact changes in substance and the 
coming into being of artifacts are analytically the same on the grounds that: 
there is no reason why an animal should not come to be from an 
embryo in just the same way that the statue comes to be from what 
it is in fact said to come to be from – the unshaped piece of bronze.  
Just as that piece [of bronze] does not remain throughout the 
change, so neither does the embryo survive the birth of the animal 
that it comes to be. (Jones 1974, 490) 
 
What Jones says of course is true of substantial generation, but to derive that 
conclusion from (or to project it back on) the general analysis whose primary 
example is that of the statue risks conflating the notions of alteration and 
substantial generation and thereby conflating the general account of coming-
into-being with the account of coming-into-being simply.  
 We ought to conclude that I.7 is divided into two separate but closely 
related accounts of change.  If we neglect this division, we run into difficulties 
                                                 
92 In the Metaphysics Aristotle uses artifacts to illustrate points about natural processes 
but notes explicitly that artifacts are not substances (Metaphysics 1043a4-5; cf. Kostman 
(1987)). 
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associated with the extreme versions of the views that either affirm or deny 
Aristotle‟s commitment to prime matter in the account of substantial generation. 
 
iii Coming-to-be in General 
The first part of the discussion of coming-to-be begins with a linguistic 
analysis.93  Aristotle begins by noticing that we typically speak about coming into 
being in two ways by which we distinguish between the generation of “simples” 
(ta\ a(pla=) and that of “composites” (ta\ sugkei/mena, 189b34).  In the example of 
human being becoming educated, we can speak of the terminus a quo from two 
points of view.  In one sense it is the human being that becomes educated and in 
another it is the uneducated that becomes educated.  In each case the terminus a 
quo is simple.  And likewise the terminus ad quem, the final state of being 
educated, is also simple when considered in a similar way.  But we also speak of 
the termini as compounds: the “uneducated-man” becomes an “educated-man”.94  
                                                 
93 Another common interpretative strategy employed by both traditionalists and non-
traditionalists focuses on Aristotle‟s appeal to common linguistic usage (cf. Wieland, 
Jones, and Owen).  As Jones puts it strongly: “We may dismiss any suggestion that we 
are dealing here with an empirical inquiry into change.  Rather, [Aristotle] is considering 
linguistic phenomena” (Jones 1974, 478).  Such an over-emphasis on Aristotle‟s appeal 
to common speech in his investigations often obscures the fact that he means to be 
dealing with the „things themselves‟ even if common opinion can give us preliminary 
insight into the phenomena.  Even though Aristotle employs considerations of the way 
we speak in the investigation of coming-to-be, if we restrict his conclusions to claims 
about language we risk violating the method of moving from what is better known by us 
to what is better known by nature set out in Physics I.1.  Aristotle‟s account in I.7 follows 
closely these guidelines by moving from the way we speak about the phenomenon of 
coming-to-be generally to a deeper understanding of the more specific phenomenon of 
coming-to-be simply. 
 
94 We should note that the terminus a quo and terminus ad quem are interchangeable in 
that it makes no difference whether we say that the man becomes educated from 
uneducated or becomes uneducated from being educated (compare 188b1 and 188b7: 
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Further, when we say not only that such and such comes-to-be but that “this 
comes-to-be out of this” (190a5), we do not apply this to both of the simple 
things.  Aristotle will say that properly speaking the “educated” comes-to-be out 
of the “uneducated” but not out of “man” (190a23-31). 
Aristotle claims that one of the simple things remains throughout the 
process of becoming while the other does not (190a9).  The man stands at the end 
of the process as he was in the beginning, but the predicate “uneducated” is 
replaced by the “educated”.95  If both terms had remained the same there would 
have been no change.  If neither had remained the same we would have difficulty 
identifying exactly what had changed.96 
                                                                                                                                                 
“being educated comes to be out of not being educated…  Similarly, being educated 
passes away into not being educated, and not into any chance thing other than being 
educated” (Charlton translation, modified)).  It is not however clear that they are 
exchangeable in all cases of coming-to-be.  A difficulty arises if we try to apply this 
principle of the reversibility of process to substantial change.  It is not the case that we 
can simply switch what we designate the terminus ad quem with the terminus a quo.  A 
seed indeed becomes a plant, but a plant, at least as an individual being, cannot become 
a seed.  Because the plant perishes into non-being, the process is not reversible.  Even if 
we consider the fact that plants yield seeds, this is not a reversal of the process that 
brought the plant into being. 
 
95 He says that the terminus a quo which does not remain, either as “not being educated” 
[mh\ mousiko\n] or “uneducated” [a)/mouson], does not persist “either by themselves or as 
components” (190a12).  This means that the terminus a quo that does not remain is not 
separable in that it does not remain off somewhere by itself or in the resultant of the 
change. 
 
96 Generally speaking, what this analysis allows is that something may be the same as 
itself and become different from itself while remaining what it is.  Both conditions must 
be met if motion is to be intelligible.  If only one condition is met we are left with either a 
Heraclitean dilemma (if nothing persists through the change) or with a Parmenidean 
dilemma (if nothing can be different from itself in any way) either of which renders the 
phenomenon of change unintelligible.  If the substrate can be considered as a continuant 
between opposites which replace one another, there is no apparent difficulty in saying 
that what changes both becomes other than itself and remains what it is.  That is, we 
have reconciled two apparently contradictory positions into a single coherent position 
which can account for the possibility and intelligibility of coming-to-be by viewing the 
phenomenon of change from two independent perspectives.  Cf. Code (1976). 
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Aristotle then claims that all cases (a)pa/nton) of coming-to-be will exhibit 
a common characteristic: “that there must always be [o(/ti dei= ti a)ei\] something 
underlying which is the coming-to-be thing” (190a14).97  He goes on to note that 
the underlying thing can be understood in two ways: 
for it is not the same thing to be a human and to be educated.  And 
one thing persists but another does not persist; what is not opposite 
persists (for the human being persists), but the not-educated or the 
uneducated does not persist, nor what is composed of both, such as 
the uneducated human being. (190a17) 
 
The question that arises is whether this statement is meant to apply to all cases of 
change including substantial generation or whether it is meant to be a general 
analysis about how we commonly speak about change.98  The prime matter 
                                                 
97 The language of “always necessary” and “all cases” is too strong for Aristotle to claim at 
this point since he has only addressed coming-to-be and change in a general sense.  In 
the case of change as coming-to-be simply, the sense of “underlying thing” will have to be 
reoriented from the sense that it has had in the initial analysis of change in general.  If 
however we take the collection of phrases which include words like pa/shj and a(plwj in 
a less absolute sense, we avoid the problems we run into when we expect an account of 
generation which univocally applies to all types of change.  Translating the sense of “all” 
and “always necessary” more softly seems the reasonable route in order to avoid these 
difficulties.  It is clearly important for Aristotle to establish that, at least as the 
phenomena are first known to us, something remains the same in a transformation 
between contraries.  Further, it would be too difficult to remove the characteristic of 
persistence from the underlying thing as it is understood in the general account coming-
to-be without significantly conflicting with our common experience (cf. 190a17).  At this 
stage of the argument Aristotle has done nothing more than articulate how the 
phenomenon of change presents itself to us in a general and confused way in speech.  It 
is only the sequel to this argument that describes generation in an absolute and the 
proper sense.  A majority of commentators believe that Aristotle‟s initial analysis of 
change ought to apply absolutely to all kinds of change and so take “all” and “always 
necessary” in the strongest possible sense.  It is only then that the problem arises of 
trying to determine what remains as an underlying thing in the case of substantial 
change.  This interpretation is one of the sources which often leads to the conviction that 
there must be some idea of prime matter playing a role in the account of substantial 
change. 
 
98 For example, Code: “So even though the example of the musical man had traditionally 
been taken to be a case of alteration, it seems […] that the general points made there are 
intended to apply universally to all cases whatsoever of coming to be” (1976, 358). 
 
96 
 
interpretation finds good evidence for its interpretation here but only on the 
hypothesis that this analysis is paradigmatic for all types of change including 
substantial generation.  
Gill offers an interpretation that follows a middle road between appealing 
to a concept of prime matter and dismissing the possibility that there is any 
persisting substrate in the case of substantial generation.  Gill submits that even 
in substantial generation there is always an identifiable continuant in each case 
as the “proximate matter” of a given change or form.  The proximate matter lacks 
form in relation to the thing for which it serves as the matter, but considered in 
its own right it has its own form.99  The claim is that when a seed becomes a plant 
what remains throughout the process as the proximate matter would be either 
one or more of the elements or some mixture or even something as developed as 
flesh and bone all of which have some form independently of the final product of 
the process. 
While Gill‟s interpretation is compelling insofar as it makes sense of some 
cases of identifying a persisting substrate, she is unable to identify what remains 
in the specific example of the seed becoming a plant. 100  She is unable to address 
                                                 
99 This view makes sense of Aristotle‟s claim that the matter can be a substance in some 
way (ou)si/an pwj, 192a6). 
 
100 Several commentators note that Aristotle does not explicitly rule out that there could 
be one but none of them are able to give an adequate example of what the substrate 
might be (e.g. Gill: “This omission need not indicate that nothing survives” (Gill 1989, 
103)).  Code gestures toward Generation of Animals but only succeeds in redirecting the 
same problem to transitions between specific stages of growth: “At each stage of 
development the lack is less a perfect embryo which becomes a more perfect embryo (the 
form) utilizing the flesh (and eventually flesh and bone) as the matter of each transition” 
(Code 1976, 364-5).  I would press him to say how initially the flesh or the bone came to 
be out of the seed if he is going to respond adequately to Charlton‟s problem which he is 
addressing 
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Charlton‟s concern that the attempt to find a constituent substrate in the final 
product of the change does not necessarily identify the terminus ad quem as the 
substrate from-which the final product comes to be (e.g. flesh or blood or 
something analogous in plants is the constituent material of the final product). 
Proximate matter solves the problem of the missing continuant by finding 
it in another context: if the seed and the plant are the termini of a process, 
instead of considering the seed itself as the substrate of the plant, we look for 
some „third thing‟ common to them both and consider that the substrate of the 
process.  The problem with this is that one can easily imagine that whatever is 
found to be common among the termini may not in fact be relevant to the process 
that is under consideration.  Suppose that we find that earth and water are found 
in both the seed and the animal.  While it is true to say that in some derivative 
sense that earth and water have the capacity to become a plant, this is clearly less 
relevant than the potentiality of the seed to do so.  The mere fact that the seed 
and the plant have some features in common is not enough to qualify these 
features as the substrate(s) relevant to the process.  Even Code‟s more 
sophisticated version of the proximate matter thesis makes the same difficulty 
clear: 
Though men do come from embryos, we have seen that that from 
which a thing comes to be perishes upon the generation of the 
product, and hence is not the matter [sic. continuant] of the change.  
It is for this reason that men are not made of embryos.  What a man 
is made of is flesh and bones since the primary nutrient (the 
menstrual fluid) is converted into flesh upon fertilization, the flesh 
is converted into a heart, and then through successive stages in the 
development and growth explained in the second book of the 
Generation of Animals a human being finally comes be.  At each 
stage of the development the lack is a less perfect embryo which 
becomes a more perfect embryo (the form) utilizing the flesh (and 
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eventually flesh and bone) as the matter of each transition.  The end 
product – the man – is made of not semen or embryos, but of flesh 
and bone.  Since this is also his matter, we are able to solve 
Charlton‟s problem without adopting the extreme position of 
denying the persistence of matter through substantial change just 
so we can say that matter is that of which a thing is made. (Code 
1976, 364-5; italics mine) 
 
The issue between Code and Charlton is whether Aristotle‟s idea of substrate 
should be understood primarily as a constituent which makes up the being which 
is subject to generation or whether it should be viewed as an identifying a 
continuant which gives the subject of generation what Gill calls „horizontal unity.”  
Code‟s example is meant to show how a constituent can also be seen as a 
continuant without generating the problem that when one of the termini comes 
to be the other necessarily passes away, e.g. the seed no longer remains when the 
plant has come to be.  He has merely succeeded in pushing the same problem 
back to another level. 
When he claims that the flesh serves as both terminus and continuant, he 
does so on the basis that menstrual fluid is “converted” into flesh upon 
conception.  Likewise, flesh is “converted” into the heart and the other organs.  It 
is especially clear in the first case that we are going to find the same difficulty of 
finding a single identifiable substrate that serves as constituent and continuant.  
Again, what is the relevant common material between menstrual fluid and flesh?  
Code cannot get around this problem without begging the question, i.e. without 
reference to an unaccounted for “conversion” at some level of the larger process 
of biological substantial generation.  Aristotle even uses the example of the seed 
transforming into blood specifically as an example of substantial generation 
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when in the Generation and Corruption he distinguishes it from alteration 
precisely on the grounds that the substrate does not remain: 
When the whole changes without anything perceptible remaining as 
the same substratum, the way the seed changes entirely into blood, 
water into air, or air entirely into water, then, when we have this 
sort of thing, it is a case of [substantial] generation. (Generation 
and Corruption 319b16, Williams translation) 
 
Even if the general account of change exemplified by the man becoming educated 
can account for many varieties of change and even manages to be a good 
description of the principles involved in change in general, it is not necessarily 
appropriate for understanding substantial generation.  The prime matter 
interpretation as well as the proximate matter interpretation rely this example as 
the paradigm for all types of change.  Now that some of the interpretative 
limitations of both these views have been shown, it is necessary to offer an 
alternative interpretation of the second part of Aristotle‟s argument which 
concentrates on coming-into-being simply. 
 
iv Generation Proper 
The second part of Aristotle‟s argument makes a fresh start with a familiar 
turn of phrase: 
Things are said to come to be in many ways, and some things are 
said, not to come-to-be, but to come to be something.  In the case of 
other things it is plain that there must be something underlying 
which is the coming-to-be thing. (190a32)101 
 
                                                 
101 There is a strong reminiscence of the Metaphysics‟ search for a focal meaning of 
ou)sia to which all other senses of being point (cf. Owens 1951, 116-35).  Here we are in a 
sense looking for the guiding meaning of “coming-to-be”. 
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That there is an underlying thing in cases of substantial change is, however, not 
yet clear from the explicated familiar understanding of change.  What is the 
underlying thing in the case of simple coming-to-be?  For while it is evident in the 
cases of the more familiar senses of coming-to-be that there is something which 
underlies (insofar as it survives the coming-to-be), it is less apparent in what 
sense there is an underlying thing in cases where nothing appears to survive the 
change.  An aporia arises when we consider examples of the generation of full-
fledged substances, for what is it that is present at the beginning that remains at 
the end of the change from seed to mature plant or animal (190b4)?  Aristotle 
claims only that in the case of substances or independent things there is a 
substrate as “that from which” a being comes to be:  
But that independent things [ai( ou)si/ai] too, as well as whatever 
else simply is [o (/sa a(plw=j o)/nta], comes-into-being from some 
underlying thing, would become clear to those who examine them.  
For always there is something that underlies, out of which the thing 
comes into being, as do plants and animals from seed. (190b1-5) 
 
Aristotle does not claim that in the case of substantial generation anything 
remains.  Rather he says only that it will become clear that there is an underlying 
thing in the sense of that from which something comes to be.  He in no way 
indicates that the underlying thing in substantial generations must be thought of 
as in some way remaining.  By designating the seed as the substrate he calls 
attention to this fact.  Charlton (1970, 76-77) rightly remarks that if there were to 
be an underlying thing in this sense, in the generation of an animal for instance, 
it would be flesh and bones, not the seed which Aristotle clearly identifies as the 
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substrate in simple coming-into-being.102  What an animal is composed of when 
it has come to be is an underlying thing in a different sense than the underlying 
thing as that from which an animal comes to be.  When the mature living being is 
fully formed the underlying thing as material is not a substrate for change (or at 
least not for substantial change) in the way that the seed was a source or principle 
of generation. 
In the course of this transition, Aristotle is attempting to clarify an 
ambiguity in the meaning of underlying thing (u(pokei/menon, 190a15 ff.) which he 
introduced in the general analysis of coming-to-be.  This is that the underlying 
thing can be thought of as both what is an opposition as well as what persists 
through the change (190a13 ff.).103  This ambiguity is necessary if it is to play 
double duty with respect to the ordinary understanding of change and in 
substantial generation.  In the former the underlying thing remains and is the 
                                                 
102 While Charlton accepts that something persists through a qualitative change as in the 
case of the man becoming educated, he is forced to conclude that there is a “serious gap” 
in Aristotle‟s argument when it comes to identifying something analogous to an enduring 
substrate in the case of substantial change.  Because he thinks that Aristotle holds that 
the underlying thing is primarily the constituent out of which something is made, 
Aristotle appears to be guilty of inconsistently using the example of the seed as the 
primary example of substantial change.  For the seed is not properly a constituent out of 
which an animal is made (as are flesh and bone), but only that from which an animal 
begins to grow.  Lennox finds the same problem in the field of biology: “If one holds that 
Aristotle‟s theory of change requires some continuity between what constitutes the 
terminus a quo of a change and what constitutes the terminus ad quem of that change, 
biological generation presents a problem, since the matter itself undergoes radical 
transformations in development.  What constitutes the adult is quite unlike that out of 
which it developed whatever description one gives of the pre-existing entity.  [nt.] Unless 
one gives a teleological description: see Broadie (1982, 47)” (Lennox 1984, 70). 
 
103 As we have argued, Arisotle uses u(pokei/menon when talking about generation in general 
referring to the subject which is present at the beginning of the change and at the end.  However, 
when talking about substantial generation in particular, u(pokei/menon cannot mean this but 
must mean something which underlies out of which something comes to be. 
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terminus a quo from which something comes to be.  In cases where the 
underlying thing is thought of only as a terminus a quo, namely, in cases of 
substantial generation, the u(pokei/menon does not signify something that survives 
the transformation.  According to our initial grasp of change, the underlying 
thing appears as what persists through change.  But on closer inspection of the 
case of substantial change we find that in Aristotle‟s account it is only necessary 
that the underlying thing be thought of as that from which coming-to-be 
originates but not necessarily something which remains throughout the 
transformation (cf. 190b3).104  The procedure here, in line with that set out in I.1, 
is to refine the meaning of u(pokei/menon that was employed in the initial account 
of coming-to-be to the narrower meaning more properly relevant to the case of 
substantial generation. 
Charlton (1970, 75) and others note that even when Aristotle claims that it 
is manifest that there is a substrate, he mentions only a substrate from which 
these come to be without mentioning that that substrate must endure: “All the 
things that come into being in these ways obviously come from underlying things 
[pa/nta de\ ta\ ou)/tw gigno/mena fanero\n o(/ti e)c u(pokeime/nwn gi/gnetai]” (190b9).  
It could easily be inferred that since these cases also exhibit enduring substrates 
which are easily recognizable, that Aristotle‟s elision of the phrase need not void 
its implication for substantial generation. If we do not distinguish substantial 
change from changes instrumental to substantial change, we cannot be certain 
                                                 
104 Charlton: “Aristotle does not say that anything remains, but only that something 
underlies, in cases of coming into existence, and that according to De gen. et corr. I 
319b21-31… if anything did remain in all cases, there would be no such things as coming 
into existence, but only alteration” (1970, 77; cf. also 131-2). 
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that he does or does not intend to imply the necessity of a persisting substrate in 
substantial change.  Unless one thinks that the substrate of the concomitant 
instrumental changes was also univocally the substrate of the substantial 
generation, it would still not be clear in the least what the persisting substrate in 
the example of a seed becoming a mature living thing would be.105 
There is possible objection to this interpretation in Aristotle‟s preliminary 
summation of his accounts of coming-to-be.  Here he says that, 
it is clear that that which comes-to-be [to\ gigno/menon] is always 
composite [sunqeto/n106], and there is [kai\ e)/sti me/n] one thing 
which comes to be, and another [e)/sti de/] which comes to be this, 
and the latter is twofold [kai\ tou=to ditto/n]: for [it is] either the 
underlying thing or the thing which is opposed [h)/ ga\r to\ 
u(pokei/menon h)/ to\ a)ntikei/menon]. (190b10-13) 
 
What is the composite [sunqeto/n] being referred to here?  The pairing of “that 
which comes to be” and “that which comes to be this” or the latter which is itself 
twofold as “underlying thing” and “that which is opposed”?  The context alone 
allows either reading.  The grammar of the me/n… de/… construction, however, 
                                                 
105 Several commentators say that Aristotle does not explicitly rule out that there could 
be a persisting substrate (he does not in fact deny it) but none are able to give an 
adequate example of what the substrate might actually be; for example in Gill: “This 
omission need not indicate that nothing survives” (Gill 1989, 103).  Code gestures toward 
Generation of Animals but only succeeds in redirecting the same problem to transitions 
between specific stages of growth: “At each stage of development the lack is less a perfect 
embryo which becomes a more perfect embryo (the form) utilizing the flesh (and 
eventually flesh and bone) as the matter of each transition” (Code 1976, 364-5).  I would 
press him to say how initially the flesh or the bone came to be out of the seed if he is 
going to respond adequately to Charlton‟s problem which he is addressing explicitly. 
 
106 Contrast the use of sunqeto/n here with sugkei/mena at 189b34 and 190a3.  I take it 
that the difference here (at least on the prevalent interpretation of the sunqeto/n in this 
passage as the compound of form and matter in substance) is the source of Gill‟s 
“Paradox of Unity”.  For an elaboration of the paradox (with respect to the current 
passage) that motivates her inquiry, see Gill (1989, 6-7). 
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suggests that the compound referred to as the pair which designates the terminus 
ad quem and the terminus a quo.  If what was intended to be described as 
composite was either the substance (terminus a quo) or the substrate (terminus 
ad quem), that is if we were meant to consider the source or the product as a 
composite, this would contradict the idea that what differentiates generation 
a)plw=j from the general account is that the beings involved in former are simple 
or have a stronger internal unity than those which can be described as the 
replacement of accidents in a subject. 
It is tempting to mistake the “compound” (sunqeto/n) that Aristotle refers 
to here for the “compound” or “composite” (sugkei/mena, 189b34) that he had 
referred to at the beginning of the chapter: “For we say one thing comes into 
being from another or something from something different when we are speaking 
either of simple things or composite ones [ta\ a(pla=… ta sugkei/mena]” (189b33).  
There the compound was understood to be present both in that from which 
(uneducated-man) and that to which (educated-man) as a compound of the 
underlying thing and a contrary.  This would be consistent with the distinction of 
the twofold character of the terminus a quo as underlying thing and opposition.  
In the passage cited previously this is not, however, what Aristotle is pointing out 
as compound.107  Rather, it appears to be the “process” of coming-to-be which is 
                                                 
107 Aristotle seems to use the notion of compound (either sunqeto/n or sugkei/mena) in 
three different ways in Physics I: 1) as the composite of materials where the terminus a 
quo itself is considered as a compound of constituents (188b10), 2) as the composite of 
subject and predicate (189b33 ff.), and 3) as the composite of terminus ad quem and 
terminus a quo (190b10-14).  Thus we have the 1) “what is not put together, separated in 
this way” (e.g. the material out of which a house is built) as a multitude of constituents 
understood as a compound; 2) the educated-man or uneducated-man as understood as a 
compound of subject and predicate; and 3) the compound of seed and plant understood 
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compound in that it involves both that-from-which as well as what this comes to 
be.108 
It is precisely this misconstrual of sunqeto/n on which Bostock bases his 
argument against Charlton: 
The only ground Aristotle could have for saying that whatever 
comes into being is a composite (sunqeto/j) is that we can 
distinguish in it two „elements‟, one the persisting element (what 
underlies) and the other the acquired element (the form). […]  So he 
must hold contrary to Charlton‟s view [that the underlying 
substrate need not remain], that any substance which comes into 
being contains both a persisting element and a form. (Bostock 1982, 
189) 
 
Contra Bostock, the two elements are the thing that comes to be (substance, e.g. 
plant) and what it came to be from (underlying thing, e.g. seed).  If the compound 
must be understood as that of the opposition and subject taken together, we are 
forced to the further conclusions a) that the products (and sources) of things that 
                                                                                                                                                 
as the compound of terminus ad quem and terminus a quo, all spoken about as 
compounds.  Sorting these out in an adequate way would be a project of its own. 
 
108 Jones reads this the same way: “It is reasonable to take Aristotle as making the claim 
that whenever there is something which comes to be, be this a “transitive” case [as in 
alteration] or an “intransitive” case [as in the generation of genuine substances], there is 
something which comes to be and there is something which this comes to be.  Since there 
is always something from which what-comes-to-be comes to be, it must be that what-
comes-to-be is always analyzable into two factors” (Jones 1974, 491).  Bostock‟s analysis 
of Aristotle‟s „inconsistencies‟ between oppositions and form / privation‟ are justified to 
an extent, although he is wrong to think this is attributable to Aristotle‟s carelessness.  
Bringing the inconsistencies between chapters six and seven into relief, he writes, “Our 
principles must somehow include (a) substance, which they would not do if they 
consisted just of opposites: the required „third principle‟ must apparently be (a) 
substance.  But it is not very clear what happens to this argument when we generalize the 
notion of a pair of opposites to that of form and its privation” (Bostock 1982, 193).  We 
need to keep in mind that in chapter six Aristotle is working from the theories left to him 
by his predecessors and will only salvage what is salvageable.  Chapter six does not 
necessarily reflect Aristotle‟s considered view. 
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come to be simply must be composites,109 and b) that there must be some 
underlying thing (which is one member of the compound) that survives from 
beginning to end even in substantial generation.  By doing this we lose the 
distinction which, on my interpretation, Aristotle was trying to illustrate by 
distinguishing the general way we speak of coming-to-be and the account of 
coming-to-be simply.  At the same time we risk conflating the unity of a 
substance and its accident with the internal unity of a substance. 
 
v Number of Principles 
 Aristotle ends the chapter by drawing conclusions concerning the number 
of principles we must accept if we accept the analysis of coming-to-be he has just 
outlined.  In one sense we ought to conclude that the principles are two insofar as 
the contraries or oppositions are two (190b29 ff.).  But insofar as opposites 
cannot act on one another it is necessary to posit an underlying thing and in this 
sense the principles ought to be considered three (190b33 ff.).110  This is not to 
say that the principles are really two or three (i.e. two or three in number), but 
that only insofar as we consider one of the principles (the underlying thing) to be 
                                                 
109 That is, substances themselves are composites of an underlying thing and a contrary 
whereas before the compound [sugkei/mena, complex] was made up of substance and 
accident. 
 
110 The references to I.6 are obvious.  However, it was argued earlier that the views of I.5 
and I.6 are likely not to be Aristotle‟s own, so we need not conclude here that the appeal 
to similar ideas reflects Aristotle‟s considered view (cf. Charlton 1970, 66-9). 
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diverse in nature can we consider the principles to be three.111  We know only that 
the principles are three in articulation but perhaps only two in number (cf. 
190a15 and 190b24).  Aristotle makes a preliminary conclusion concerning the 
number of principles reiterating the sense in which they are either two or three 
“and in what way they are so”:  
It is clear that there must be something to underlie the opposites, 
and the opposites must be two in number [so that the principles 
must be three].  Yet in another way that is not necessary.  One of the 
opposites, by its absence and presence [th|= a)pousi/a| kai\ 
parousi/a|], will suffice to effect the change. (191a4-7) 
 
Aristotle then surprises us when in the last line of the chapter he will tell us “that 
the principles are three, and how, and what the manner of them is, is clear” (a)ll) 
o(/ti ai( a)rxai\ trei=j kai\ pw=j trei=j, kai\ ti/ o( tro/poj au)tw=n, dh=lon, 191a21).  The 
“manner” in which they are three is in virtue of there being three articulations 
relevant to the analysis of change in general, but in number we must reserve the 
possibility that the principles are only two. 
This is surprising in that he seems still to have provided no decisive 
evidence to choose three principles over two especially in the case of substantial 
generation.  In fact, if we hold him to his word that the underlying thing is one in 
number even though it is two in meaning (190a15 and 190b23)112 with his further 
                                                 
111 From one perspective the underlying nature is the same as what is opposed, but from 
another they are different in essence, i.e. “the being of a man is different from the being 
ignorant of music, and the being of shapeless from the being of bronze” though they are 
one in number (191a2, cf. 190a15 and 190b23). 
 
112 Aristotle‟s assertion of numerical identity is explicit: “something must always underlie 
the coming into being, and even though this is one in number, in form it is not one [kai\ 
tou=to ei) a)riqmw|= e)stin e(n, a)ll )ei)/dei ge oux e(/n]” (190a15); and, “but while the 
underlying thing is one in number, it is two in kind [e)/sti de\ to\ me\n u(pokei/menon 
a)riqmw|= me\n e(n, ei)/dei de\ du/o] (since the human being or the gold or in general the 
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claim that one opposite may suffice as a principle change (191a6), it would appear 
that the principles are more truly only two in number.  For even though the 
underlying thing may be diverse in meaning the fact that it is one in number casts 
greater weight on the argument that the principles are only two. 
Indeed, in the case of substantial generation the two principled scheme 
squares better.  For one of our three principles is that which survives the change.  
In changes exemplified by the uneducated-man becoming educated and the 
coming-to-be of the statue, all three principles are more clearly present.  We have 
the underlying thing, both as the terminus a quo (uneducated) and as persisting 
substrate (the man), and the opposition which comes to be (educated) in the 
substrate.  Since there is no clear contrary of a substantial being, in the case of 
the generation of a substance we can only identify the underlying thing in one of 
its senses (i.e. as an opposition of privation), so we are left with only two 
principles: the underlying thing as privation (seed) and the terminus ad quem as 
that which is opposed.113  The only thing that is clear about this resolution to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
material is countable, for it is rather a this, and not incidentally from it does the thing 
that comes into being come; but the deprivation or opposition is incidental)” (190b23). 
 
113 See 189a32 for the difficulty of identifying substances as oppositions (cf. also 
Categories 3b24-27 and Simplicius 1997, 35-7).  However, contrast 186a21: […] “for a 
human is different from a horse, and opposites from one another [a)/nqrwpoj ga\r i/(ppou 
e)/teron tw=| ei)/dei kai\ ta\nanti/a a)llh/lwn].”  The claim that there must be a third 
principle in every case of change on the grounds that two principles cannot act on one 
another is not an objection at all in the case of substantial generation.  For if we imagine 
that the principles are an underlying thing from which something comes to be and some 
single opposition (i.e. the form which by its mere absence and presence may be sufficient 
to account for the change, 191a6), we are not compelled to say that the contraries are 
acting on each other (which generates the aporia from I.6), but only that the form acts on 
the substrate. 
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question as to the nature and number of principles is that it must heavily 
qualified if we demand a definitive answer. 
The example of a seed‟s development into a full grown plant or animal 
illustrates this nicely.  For in the coming-to-be of a plant or an animal we need 
two principles: 1) the seed as the underlying thing (as terminus a quo) and 2) the 
form of the mature plant.  The seed, though one in number, acts as both the 
underlying thing and the opposition (u(pokei/menon as a)ntikei/menon) while the 
mature plant is the fully developed form.  The only requirements that the seed 
and the full grown plant have to meet in order to qualify as the principles of the 
change are that the seed be something “from which” something else comes-to-be 
(which in a certain sense is opposed, i.e. as the absence of form to its presence) 
and that the form be present as that to which what comes-to-be comes to be. 
 
2.6 Solution to the Eleatic Paradox 
The Eleatic opposition to the intelligibility of change has, as I hope to have 
shown, been the guiding theme throughout the argument of Physics I.  Now in 
chapter eight, Aristotle returns to a discussion which explicitly deals with the 
Eleatic obstacles to founding a legitimate science of nature.  Why, we should ask, 
does Aristotle bother to return to a consideration of the Eleatic position this late 
in the discussion of change?  We are compelled to ask the question as to whether 
the discussion of chapter eight is meant to supplement, replace, or reinforce the 
refutations of the Eleatics at the beginning of book one.  If Parmenides and 
Melissus had been adequately dealt with earlier in the book, it seems strange to 
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return to them now.  The treatment of the paradox of generation from nothing in 
chapter eight is not, however, addressed only to the Eleatics but also to the 
fusikoi/ that were forced to concede the Eleatic principle that something could 
come into being from what-is-not.  Aristotle is not simply returning to the 
Eleatics but also resolving an a)poria that compelled the fusikoi/ to claim that 
something could only come into being from what-is and thus reduce the 
phenomenon of substantial generation to alteration (187a30, cf. Generation and 
Corruption I.3-4). 
What is remarkable is how the strategy of this refutation differs from those 
of chapters two and three.  The earlier refutations, Aristotle told us, were outside 
of the scope of natural philosophy (185a1).  In a certain sense they were 
dialectical and even sophistic or perhaps belonged more to first philosophy.  The 
discussion in chapter eight however is explicitly based on the physical 
considerations of chapter seven.  Thus this second round of refutations is made 
from within the domain of physics. 
Also in chapter eight we have no indication that Aristotle is arguing from 
premises that he would claim that his predecessors would have accepted as he did 
in the earlier chapters.  Here we do not have the sort of refutation that assumes 
the premises of the interlocutor in order to generate contradictions from them.  
In his confrontation with the Eleatics in chapters 2 and 3, Aristotle attempted to 
refute Parmenides and Melissus on their own terms.  In chapter eight he is 
willing to employ his own ideas of accidental attributes and even potency and act.  
The strategy appears to be more straightforward here.  Aristotle wants to strike at 
the root of the problem which yielded the Eleatic monism that denies not only 
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that reality is any kind of multiplicity but also in turn that change as such is 
intelligible (191a31 ff.).  In chapters 2 and 3, Aristotle addresses and attempts to 
refute the consequences of Eleatic monism by pointing out the absurdities that 
follow from it.  Chapter 8 employs the different strategy of undermining the 
premise upon which the monism is based, namely the principle that something 
cannot come into being from what-is-not. 
It is clear that in I.8 he is not only addressing the Eleatics but that the 
arguments are also directed toward the fusikoi/ who fell prey to the Eleatic 
paradox of motion.  Aristotle returns to the problem presented in chapter four 
which he thinks must have motivated Anaxagoras and other post-Eleatic 
physicists to suppose that “the coming-to-be of a thing is a certain alteration” by 
means of rarification and condensation (187a30).  Anaxagoras shared the 
“general opinion of the fusikoi/ that nothing comes to be out of what is not” 
(187a27).  The fusikoi/ were led by the apparent unintelligibility of something 
coming from nothing to suppose that what-is must come from what already exists 
in some way.114  But the Eleatic paradox as Aristotle understands it is twofold.  
For not only does it show the apparent unintelligibility of the claim that what 
comes to be comes to be from what-is-not but also that it seems to be impossible 
for what comes to be to come from what-is.  Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and other 
physicists rejected the former but were led by this rejection to embrace the idea 
                                                 
114 Anaxagoras by supposing that all things are already present in everything, 
Empedocles since his elements themselves never come into or go out of existence.  
Rejecting one horn of the Parmenidean paradox they are led to embrace the other, 
namely, that what comes to be must be some form that already is.  Thus they do away 
with generation in the strong sense by reducing it to alteration. 
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that what comes to be must come to be from what already is.  They thus leave one 
horn of the Eleatic dilemma intact.115 
The Eleatic paradox of change as Aristotle relates it in Physics I.8 is not 
found verbatim in any of the extant presocratic texts.  There are early versions of 
the paradox found in Parmenides and Melissus (Empedocles as well, but Aristotle 
does not mention him in this context).116  Because Aristotle attributes the 
                                                 
115 Aristotle only explicitly answers the Eleatic paradox with respect to one side of the full 
process of coming-into-being and perishing.  Presumably we are meant to fill in the 
argument for the possibility of passing away into what-is-not by parity of reasoning (cf. 
Loux 1992, 282).  It is likely not a coincidence that Parmenides‟ text also omits a parallel 
argument against the possibility that what passes away perishes into what-is-not or 
what-is.  Cf. Gallop on Parmenides‟ fragment 8: “Finally, it is important to note that 
although this section purports to disprove not only genesis but also perishing (8.14, 
8.21), the text, as just interpreted, deals explicitly only with the former.  Presumably, an 
isomorphic argument against perishing has to be assumed: perishing would entail the 
subject‟s subsequent non-existence, or its dissolution into nothing; and this would be as 
inconceivable as its emergence from nothing.  But such an argument is nowhere 
expressly stated, and has to be supplied from the context” (Parmenides 1991, 15-6 and cf. 
35n44). 
 
116 For the sake of comparison, here are the versions of Parmenides, Melissus, and 
Empedocles.  Parmenides:  
 
For what coming-to-be will of it will you seek?  In what way, whence, did [it] 
grow?  Neither from what-is-not shall I allow you to say or think; for it is not to 
be said or thought that [it] is not.  And indeed what need could have impelled it 
to grow later or sooner, if it began from nothing?  Thus [it] must either be 
completely or not at all.  Nor will the strength of trust ever allow anything to 
come-to-be from what-is besides it; therefore neither [its] coming-to-be nor [its] 
perishing has Justice allowed, relaxing her shackles. (Parmenides 1991, fr. 8.7-14) 
Melissus: 
That which was, was and always will be.  For if it had come into being, it 
necessarily follows that before it came into being, Nothing existed.  If however 
Nothing existed, in no way could anything come into being out of nothing.  Since 
therefore it did not come into being, it Is and always was and always will be, and 
has no beginning or end, but it is eternal.  For if it had come into being at some 
time, it would have a beginning (for it would have come into being at some time, 
and so begun), and an end (for since it had come into being, it would have 
ended).  But since it has neither begun nor ended it always was and always will be 
and has no beginning nor end. (Freeman 1971, fr. 2 & 3) 
Empedocles:  
Fools! – for they have no long-sighted thoughts, since they imagine that what 
previously did not exist comes into being, or that a thing dies and is utterly 
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problem to a somewhat ambiguous group of “the first to seek the truth and the 
nature of beings” (191a24) rather than to a specific author, it is fair to say that 
Aristotle‟s retelling likely represents a conglomerate of the views of several 
distinct thinkers.117  His reformulation runs thus: 
They say that none of the beings either comes into being or is 
destroyed, since it is necessary that what comes into being come 
either out of what-is or what-is-not, and out of both of these it is 
impossible; for a being would not come into being (since it already 
is), and from what-is-not, nothing could come into being, since 
something must underlie.  And building up the result successively 
in this way, they say that there are not even many things, but only 
being itself. (191a27-33) 
 
The first horn of the dilemma and its reason are fairly straightforward: If 
something already exists, there is no reason why it should need to come to be.   
Therefore, if something comes to be, it will not be from what already is.  The 
reason behind the second horn is that “something must underlie” which is likely 
                                                                                                                                                 
destroyed.  For what in no wise exists, it is impossible for anything to come into 
being; and for Being to perish completely is incapable of fulfillment and 
unthinkable; for it will always be there, wherever anyone may place it on any 
occasion. (Freeman 1971, fr. 11 & 12) 
 
117 Aquinas thinks that Aristotle is referring to the material monists, but the general 
consensus among modern commentators is that the monism Aristotle is more directly 
confronting here is Eleatic (Aquinas 1999, 64-65).  The history of the problem likely goes 
back to the very beginnings of Ionian physical philosophy and of course extends beyond 
the explicit Eleatic formulation.  Aristotle interprets Anaximander‟s supposition of the 
a/)peiron as motivated by the worry that if things were allowed to perish completely, 
beings might eventually „run out‟ (Cf. Generation and Corruption II.10).  For an 
interesting account of Empedocles‟ role in the history of the problem of coming-to-be 
from what-is-not, see Mourelatos (1981, 658-664).  Madigan (1992, 322-3) in response 
to Loux shares the view that Aristotle is referencing “the Pre-Socratics across the board” 
and perhaps the contemporary school of the Megarians.  Little is known about the 
Megarians, but it does not seem a far stretch to relate the brief but crucial confrontation 
with them in Metaphysics IX in the context of the investigation concerning the 
difference between potentiality and actuality.  For an interesting account of Aristotle‟s 
confrontation with the Megarians, see Heidegger‟s lecture course on Metaphysics IX 
(1995, 148-65). 
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an interpolation by Aristotle given that such language is more Aristotelian than 
presocratic. 
The particularly peripatetic turn of phrase (u(pokei=sqai ga/r ti dei=n) with 
which the formulation ends troubles commentators who worry that Aristotle 
might not be accurately representing the views of his predecessors.118  There are 
however several reasons why we should not be worried that Aristotle is loading 
the dice with the weight of his own doctrine.  Aristotle does not claim to be 
representing the view of anyone in particular but only means to illustrate a 
problem that has plagued many of his predecessors.  Second, just because 
Aristotle has used the term u(pokei=sqai and its cognates in the chapters leading 
up to the present argument, this does not mean that it should already obtain the 
rank of a rigid technical term.  Aristotle‟s use of the term would not have been far 
from common usage and would not have been foreign to the presocratics. 
Further, even though Physics I.7 relied heavily on how we understand 
u(pokei=sqai and its cognates, even there the sense of what it meant to underlie 
was found to be ambiguous at least as far as whether it meant something that 
necessarily remained throughout a change or merely what the changed thing 
came to be from.  If Aristotle is using the term in the latter sense (the sense which 
was more appropriate for the case of substantial generation and which for the 
same reasons might be more appropriate here) then the reason for thinking that 
something cannot come to be from what-is-not is that something must underlie 
                                                 
118 Mourelatos exemplifies the position: “The „because‟ clause here blatantly invokes 
Aristotle‟s own triadic ontology of matter-privation-form.  If that is why Aristotle 
declares ENN [the principle ex nihilo nihil] to be pre-Eleatic in its orgins and archaion, 
“ancient” (Metaph. I.984a27-984b1), why should we believe him?” (1981, 650). 
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only in the sense that we think that there must have been something there before 
the coming-into-being.119  Lastly, even if Aristotle is employing his own technical 
terminology, we have no real reason to fault him because he has not, like he did 
in the initial treatment of Parmenides and Melissus, claimed to be addressing his 
opponents on their own terms. 
A potential problem arises with Aristotle‟s paraphrase of the Eleatic 
paradox if one raises the question as to whether it is meant to encompasses 
“Being” as a whole or whether it is directed exclusively toward individual 
“beings.”  None of the surviving formulations of the problem available to us and 
to Aristotle formulate the problem in terms of individual beings (see the citations 
from Parmenides, Melissus, and Empedocles in the note above).  Despite this, his 
understanding of what “they say” clearly attributes to them the idea that the 
problem concerns individual “beings” among a plurality: kai fasin ou)/te 
gi/gnesqai tw=n o)/ntwn ou)/den ou)/te fqei/resqai (191a26).  It is this statement that 
leads most commentators to treat the problem (correctly) as if it were always 
about individual beings.120 
                                                 
119 Loux has the same apprehension as most commentators, but even though he thinks 
that as Aristotle‟s technical term u(pokei=sqai typically indicates that something persists 
in any change, nonetheless he realizes that Aristotle is not using it as a technical term 
here: “As used here, the term cannot express the idea of an enduring subject of 
predication; and the remark in question has to be understood to have the neutral force of 
„There must be something there beforehand‟” (Loux 1992, 285). 
 
120 This is a point where Loux (1992), Code (1976), and Lewis (1991) are all in agreement.  
Kelsey (2006, 335-8) claims to depart company from these three on this point by 
reorienting the question into terms about kinds.  But since his argument consistently 
turns on what kind of thing an individual happens to be, it does not seem to be a serious 
departure. 
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Throughout the argument, Aristotle approaches the problem of generation 
in terms of “beings” or “what-is” or “things-that-are” (to o)/n) and “not-beings” or 
“what-is-not” or “things-that-are-not” (to\ mh\ o)/n).  This need not present too 
much of a problem if we imagine that the issue might have been first conceived in 
terms of individual beings.  And here in I.8 it is this initial conception that 
Aristotle attacks in order to undermine the foundation of the monism derived 
from it rather than showing the absurdities of the consequent monism as he did 
in I.2-3.  Because Aristotle is trying to articulate the source of the resultant 
problematic monism, and because he attributes the formulation to a nebulous 
and indefinite “they,” we can safely conclude that he sees his argument as 
refuting the consequence by attacking the premise on which it is based.  The 
consequence that these thinkers were mistakenly led to is that “there is no 
plurality but only Being itself” (kai\ ou(/tw dh\ to\ e)fech=j sumbai=non au)/contej 
ou)d’ ei)=nai polla/ fasin a)lla\ mo/non a)uto\ to\ o)/n, 191a31-33).  Just because 
Parmenides, Melissus, and Empedocles formulated the position in terms of a)uto\ 
to\ o)/n, this does not mean that Aristotle is misrepresenting the issue.  They are 
formulating the dilemma in light of the general consequence of the original 
difficulty whereas Aristotle is paraphrasing the problem‟s implicit premise.  If it 
is this question surrounding individual beings that was the source of the 
unfortunate conclusion that there is only Being, it is the predecessors‟ 
misunderstanding of the quandry that is difficult and not Aristotle‟s reorientation 
of it. 
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Another aspect of the difficulty of the paradox becomes clear once we try 
to imagine what an individual to\ mh\ o)/n actually would be.  The solution to the 
question of how something can come-to-be out of what-is-not rests in large part 
on how we understand what this phrase to\ mh\ o)/n signifies.  Many commentators 
read to\ o)/n and to\ mh\ o)/n as so-called incomplete expressions in the sense that to\ 
o)/n means “what is __” and to\ mh\ o)/n means “what is not __”.121  Each blank 
represents some predicate which is the feature that comes to be or passes away, 
for example “what is musical” becomes “what is not musical.”122  So then the 
Eleatic argument against the intelligibility of motion and Aristotle‟s response to it 
are based on the incomprehensibility that “what is musical” becomes “what is not 
musical.”123  This does allow for a consistent interpretation of Aristotle‟s 
argument which employs the idea of accidental attributes but weakens the sense 
of the original problem to the extent that Aristotle‟s solutions become superficial 
and superfluous. 
 Loux (1992, 287-90) has demonstrated convincingly that this line of 
interpretation deflates the force of the Eleatic dilemma almost to the point of 
                                                 
121 For interpretations within the general bounds of this view see Ross (1936), Code 
(1976), Broadie (1982), and Lewis (1991). 
 
122 Perhaps not coincidentally Aristotle uses both the expressions mh\ mousiko\n (191a1) 
and to\ a)/mouson (191a12) in chapter seven‟s discussion of coming-into-being in general.  
This varying usage already highlights the difficulty in making sense of “what-is-not.” 
 
123 Ross remarks in his commentary on the phrase h)/ e)c o)/ntoj h)\ e)k mh\ o)/ntoj follows the 
interpretation of incomplete expressions: “It is not at first sight clear whether this means 
„either from what-is or from what-is-not” [my hyphens] or „either from what is it or from 
what is not it‟.  But the latter seems to be the meaning, for the first of the other pair of 
alternatives („from what-is‟) presents no obvious impossibility such as is referred to in 
a29” (1935, 464).  This line of interpretation is developed by Code (1976, 163 ff.) and 
Lewis (1991, 228 ff.). 
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triviality.  Of course Aristotle would likely accept the idea that to\ mh\ o)/n and to\ 
o)/n are incomplete expressions.  But Loux points out this is in fact the strategy 
that he uses against Parmenides in Physics I.2: „Parmenides, you say that Being is 
One.  Well, One what?‟124  But to suppose that the difficulty which virtually 
paralyzed Aristotle‟s predecessors is that „that which becomes musical comes to 
be from what is not musical‟ “rob[s],” in Loux‟s words, “the argument of its 
pivotal dilemma and make[s] Aristotle‟s response to it gratuitous” (1994, 288).  It 
is worth quoting at length the conclusion to Loux‟s argument: 
 
As Aristotle sees it, the Parmenidean argument calls for more than 
a vindication of our commonsense belief in the reality of change.  
The fact is that very talented and very distinguished philosophers 
had been firmly in the grips of this argument.  It had, in one way or 
another held sway over the best philosophical minds of Greece, and 
it had done so for more than one hundred years.  An account 
explaining how this could have happened is no less necessary than a 
vindication of our ordinary beliefs.  And the fact is that the 
responses I have just outlined [based on the account of I.7] do not 
provide such an account.  In providing the very direct and 
devastating responses they do to the Parmenidean argument, they 
leave us wondering how any intelligent and sane thinker could have 
been taken in by the argument.  And here the issue is not one of 
mere condescension or even dutiful respect.  Aristotle just believes 
that human reason is too good a guide to permit us to be beguiled 
by an argument with as little substance as our two responses 
suggest.  He believes that there has to be something right about 
argument if it so completely dominated the reasoning of 
generations of philosophers.  And if there is any element of truth in 
the key premises of the argument, it is lost in the responses in 
question.  So they cannot constitute the core of a response to the 
argument.  What is needed, on the contrary, is a response that not 
merely shows the argument to fail in its attempt to undermine our 
ordinary beliefs that things undergo change, but also explains how 
                                                 
124 Again, this argument does not belong to physics, but is rather a subject for 
metaphysics or perhaps dialectical disputation.  Chapter eight is introduced with the 
explicit declaration that what follows are arguments based on the physical 
considerations of chapter seven. 
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the argument could seem as intractable as it did.  And it is precisely 
the kind of response that we find dominating A.8. (1994, 293) 
 
The interesting question then becomes one of motivation.  If we want to look for 
Aristotle‟s solution to the Eleatic paradox, it must be a solution which not only 
provides a solution to a linguistic puzzle but also accounts for the effective 
difficulty that the problem posed to Aristotle and his predecessors.   
Loux (1992) and Kelsey (2006) seem to be the most sensitive to 
understanding the argument from the perspective of its motivational context.  
Both however are too narrowly concerned with the solutions to the Eleatic 
Paradox that treat it as a linguistic puzzle.  They approach it as if it were an 
isolated problem which stumped Aristotle and his predecessors when understood 
in a more sophisticated way than traditional interpretations allow (Loux 1992, 
291).  They fail to recognize that the primary philosophical motivation is the 
immediately contextual one which is to establish the legitimacy of the science of 
nature.  It is with this in mind that Aristotle addresses the Eleatic paradox more 
than a concern for solving a troubling linguistic puzzle.   
For Loux the compelling puzzle which does justice to the fact that the 
Eleatic Paradox held sway for several generations of thinkers is the puzzle of how 
the expressions “x comes to be from what is” and “x comes to be from what is 
not” can manage adequately and simultaneously to articulate the same 
phenomenon.  Aristotle‟s solution to the Eleatic paradox hinges on an ambiguity 
in its expression.  Aristotle brings this ambiguity to light by pointing out the 
difference between proper and accidental predications as in the case where, using 
Loux‟s example, “the lord of the manor takes orders from his butler”.  This 
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statement can be true when the relation being expressed here between the lord 
and the butler is not the normal or proper relation between a lord and a butler.  
When taken in the most literal sense, a lord qua lord does not take orders from 
his butler qua butler.  Thus if we restrict the proposition to what Loux calls its 
reduplicative expansion (in the form of “x qua x”), it is impossible for it to be 
true.  But if we consider that the butler also happens to be a military officer and 
the lord happens to be a private, then we can see how it might be the case that the 
lord might take orders from his butler.  This statement can then express a truth in 
its non-reduplicative sense (in the form of “x qua y”) where the lord qua private 
takes orders from his butler qua officer.  This is possible precisely because it is 
only by coincidence that the lord is a private and the butler an officer. 
Loux claims that the Eleatic paradox until Aristotle‟s analysis was 
interpreted only in the reduplicative sense for which reason it was felt to be so 
powerful.  In its reduplicative expansion even Aristotle, on Loux‟s reading, would 
concede the impossibility of coming into being.  On the reduplicative reading 
both of the following are unintelligible: 1) what-is (qua what-is) comes to be from 
what-is-not (qua what-is-not), and 2) what-is (qua what-is) comes to be from 
what-is (qua what-is).  Aristotle‟s innovation is to recognize that such statements 
are not unequivocal.  It is possible to make sense of the phrase “what-is qua 
what-is-not” by analogy with the example of the doctor building a house or a 
butler commanding his lord. The solution to the paradox that what-is cannot 
come to be from what-is-not hinges on removing the restriction that it be 
understood only in its reduplicative sense. 
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While Loux‟s interpretation is helpful in understanding how Aristotle 
employs the notion of accidental predication or accidental being, it suffers from 
some of the same pitfalls as the traditional interpretation which it was meant to 
improve upon.  The primary point of similarity is that Loux‟s, like the majority of 
interpretations, treats the Eleatic paradox as primarily a linguistic puzzle.  
Because of this several aspects of the argument remain unexplained including the 
role of the notions of action and passion in Aristotle‟s formulation.   The question 
also remains as to whether despite any linguistic incoherence Aristotle would 
claim that there is generation apart from what comes to be accidentally (cf. 
191b10, 225a27-29, Bolotin (1998, 28n25), and compare Loux (1994, 299)). 
 
i Reinterpreting the Solution 
The most prevalent deficiency in interpretations of I.8 is the absence of 
any explanation of the differences between the accounts of I.7 and I.8.  Because 
Aristotle tells us at the opening and closing of I.8 that I.7 provides the basis for 
the only solution to the Eleatic paradox, commentators devote a great deal of 
effort to finding their common thread.  What is almost universally agreed upon in 
the literature is that Aristotle‟s solution to the Eleatic paradox is based solely on 
the idea of accidental being or accidental predication.  The implication of this is 
that Aristotle must deny that any coming-into-being other than that which comes 
to be incidentally or by accident can be made intelligible in the face of the Eleatic 
paradox.  This is an obviously unsatisfactory conclusion. 
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In the following I will provide an interpretation which focuses on 
elucidating the differences in the accounts of I.7 and I.8 in order to explore the 
possibility that I.8 contains an alternate approach (which does not necessarily 
mean a solution) to the Eleatic paradox which does not require an appeal to 
accidental attributes.  This interpretation will also account for several features of 
the argument which have not been adequately addressed in the literature.  One 
detail that has been particularly troublesome for both translators and 
commentators is the role and interpretation of Aristotle‟s bizarre example of a 
dog coming to be from a horse.  Some translators go so far as to amend the text 
s0 that the example reads more palatably that dogs come to be from dogs and 
horses from horses despite the fact that there is no evidence in the surviving 
manuscripts to support the alteration. 
The central example in I.8 is that of the doctor building a house.  Aristotle 
uses this example to illustrate what he calls “coming-into-being by accident” 
(gi/gnesqai […] kata\ sumbebhko/j, 191b14) which provides the key for 
understanding how generation from what-is-not can be possible.  There is 
however more to this example than an illustration of accidental generation.  
Although Aristotle does not pursue this aspect of the example, it also provides an 
illustration of non-accidental or per se generation.  This reading of the 
doctor/house-builder example sheds light on another difficult feature of I.8, 
namely the mention of an alternate solution to the Eleatic difficulties by means of 
the concepts of potency and act (191b27).  This feature has troubled 
commentators for several reasons the foremost of which is Aristotle‟s insistence 
that the account of I.7 provides the “only” solution to the Eleatic paradox 
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(191a23).  In addition to this, the fact that Aristotle does not explicate the appeal 
to potency and act leads to speculative interpretations which stray from the 
immediate context of the passage under consideration.  I will show that 
understanding the role of these concepts in the context of solving the Eleatic 
paradox requires only that we consider their application to the example of the 
doctor/house-builder as I have reinterpreted it.  All of this will in turn show the 
significance of Aristotle‟s rephrasing of the Eleatic paradox into the terms of 
action and passion, an aspect of the argument which has been almost universally 
overlooked. 
 
ii Doctors Building Houses 
The following quotation serves as the basis for virtually all interpretations 
of I.8 
Now the doctor builds a house not as a doctor but as a house-
builder, and turns pale not as a doctor but as tanned; but he heals 
or becomes a failure at healing as a doctor.  (191b4) 
 
The traditional interpretation of the example of the doctor who builds houses 
mirrors the traditional interpretation of I.7 in which the attribute of being 
educated is taken on by the substrate man.  Aristotle had given us the tools we 
needed to solve the Eleatic paradox already in I.7 but to solve it only partially.  
Because the three-principled account of coming-into-being analyzed change into 
two contrary attributes and a persisting substrate, it showed us how what comes 
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to be can come from the contrary simply as well as from the compound.125  This 
approach forms the basis for understanding Aristotle‟s claim that the Eleatic 
paradox can only be resolved by understanding generation in terms of concurrent 
or accidental attributes. 
In order to circumvent the Parmenidean paradox that nothing can come to 
be from what-is-not or from what-is in terms of the analysis of chapter seven we 
must consider attributes as inhering in a subject only incidentally.  If the relation 
between substrate and contrary is only accidental, it is permissible to say both 
that something comes to be from what-is-not and from what-is by referring at 
one time to the substrate and at another time to the attribute.  For example, the 
uneducated (what-the-man-is-not) comes to be educated (what-the-man-is), and 
from being a man being educated comes to be per accidens.  The man stays as he 
was in the beginning qua man but becomes educated per accidens.  There is no 
change in the essence of the man, i.e. there is no generation of the man as such.  
It is not the uneducated qua uneducated that becomes educated, but the man qua 
uneducated that becomes educated per accidens.  If the relation between man 
and the attribute of being educated were essential rather than accidental we 
would not be able to claim that the uneducated-man becomes an educated-man 
without falling into the difficulty of the Parmenidean paradox which is most 
                                                 
125 Aristotle also mentions that sometimes we even speak as if some things come to be 
from the substrate alone though this is not necessarily easy to reconcile with the rest of 
the account, cf. 190a24.  Barrington Jones bases his interpretation of the account of 
generation on this difficult line and ends up concluding that in substantial generation as 
well as generation of all kinds there is technically no enduring substrate (cf. Jones 1974, 
487-8). 
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poignant where there is a change in substance (cf. Parmenides‟ fragment 8.40 
ff.). 
 However, there is more to this example than the traditional interpretation 
of this analogy reveals.  Not only is the doctor said to build a house as a doctor 
incidentally (in the same way that doctor turns pale incidentally from being a 
doctor but more properly from being non-pale), but Aristotle also points out that,  
we say most properly [e)pei\ de\ ma/lista le/gomen kuri/wj] that a 
doctor does or suffers something from a doctor when as a doctor he 
suffers or does or becomes these things, it is clear that also “this 
comes into being from what-is-not” means the latter insofar as it is 
not [dh=lon o(/ti kai\ to\ e)k mh\ o)/ntoj gi/gnesqai tou=to shmai/nei, to\ 
h|(= mh\ o)/n]. (191b5) 
 
Applying the idea of accidental being from I.8 to this paradigmatic example from 
I.7 is not difficult.  The unmusical becomes musical; the man becomes musical.  
The unmusical is only accidentally not-being insofar as the lack happens to reside 
in something that actually is, i.e. the man as a subject.  Being (musical) comes 
from being (a man) only accidentally, that is insofar as being musical or 
unmusical is incidental to being a man.  This does not seem to hold exactly in the 
case of the doctor and the medical art.  It is no accident that a doctor happens to 
have the medical art.  If the doctor ceases to possess the medical art, the subject 
ceases to be a doctor.  Of course the doctor remains when he becomes pale from 
being tan or vice versa, and it is by means of these sorts of features that Aristotle 
draws the distinction between accidental and per se attributes (kata\ sumbebhko/j 
and kaq’ au/)to).  But the doctor comes to be or passes away (or acts or is acted 
upon) per se when he becomes a healer or fails at healing. 
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Aristotle bases his explicit response to the Eleatic dilemma on the grounds 
that generation is like the doctor who becomes pale or tan per accidens.  In the 
same way an unmusical man can become a musical man from “not being” musical 
per accidens.  And thus our worry that the problem of the ancients has a strangle 
hold on us is relaxed.  We see how at least in some way, even if not in the “most 
proper” sense, coming into being from what is not can be made intelligible.  
However, as is clearly the case with the doctor, this is not the only way that 
things comes into being.126  Doctors do in fact become healers from not being 
healers. 
A doctor becomes a healer from not being actively a healer.  He moves 
from being a potential healer to being an actual healer, to put it in terms that 
Aristotle has so far avoided in this context (191b29).  In so far as the doctor is not 
healing, he comes to be healing.  What properly comes to be from being a doctor 
comes to be not by virtue of concurrence, not by accident, but precisely from 
being a doctor as such.  If we were to grant that what arises from the medical art 
(i.e. healing) were in some way a separable accident of the medical art (as was the 
compound educated-man in chapter seven was separable into the simple terms 
man and educated), Aristotle‟s conclusion would follow and the analogy between 
the illustrations in I.7 and I.8 would be seamless.  But it is difficult to imagine any 
way in which healing could be merely an accident of the medical art.  So, even if 
the doctor comes to build a house accidentally (which is a way that something can 
                                                 
126 Bolotin points out that “At Physics 225a27-29, Aristotle does not say, as it might 
appear, that there is coming to be only by concomitance from what is not.  What he says, 
rather, is that even on this supposition (a supposition which he himself has encouraged 
in book one, and which he might not wish to openly undermine), it is still that which is 
not that comes to be” (Bolotin 1998, 28n25). 
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come into being from what-is-not), the doctor heals not by accident but by that 
which follows from the doctor‟s essence.  In this way, healing comes to be from 
not-healing not by accident, but in the way proper to it. 
But if the solution to the Eleatic paradox is only relevant to accidental 
change, it does not defend per se change against the Eleatic accusation of 
unintelligibility.127  The primary sort of change that remains undefended against 
the Eleatic paradox is substantial generation.  Substantial generation is a closer 
analogue to the practicing doctor than to man becoming educated. 
 
iii Acting and Undergoing 
 One idiosyncrasy of Aristotle‟s reformulation of the Eleatic paradox almost 
completely overlooked by commentators is the fact that he puts the question of 
generation from nothing in terms of acting and undergoing in addition to being 
and not-being.  In the paraphrase Aristotle gives of the Eleatic paradox, he 
compares the coming into being of something with its acting or being acted upon: 
But we say that for something to come into being out of what is or 
what is not, or for what is not or for what is to do something or be 
acted upon [h)\ to\ mh\ o)\ toiei=n ti h)\ pa/sxein] or become anything 
whatever to which one might point […]. (191a34) 
                                                 
127 Kelsey sees the problem quite clearly: “This second solution [in terms of potency and 
act] is also essential to any full resolution of the difficulties the [Eleatic] problem raises 
for Aristotle.  Recall that Aristotle‟s first solution [in terms of accidental generation] 
concedes that the conditions which the problem places on what substances can come 
from, though they do not constrain what substances can come from incidentally, really 
do constrain what they can come from „unqualifiedly.‟  Given this, Aristotle must think 
that there is a way to reconcile these conditions; otherwise there would not be anything 
that substances come from unqualifiedly, in which case the simply would not come to be 
at all. […]  So, Aristotle must find something that meets both conditions, if he wants to 
settle fully and completely the problem he raises” (2006, 349). 
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Aristotle seems to be employing the same strategy as Plato does in the Sophist 
where the Stranger delimits the category of beings as those things capable of 
acting or being acted upon.  It is not only with a similar strategy but toward a 
similar goal that Aristotle and Plato‟s Stranger attribute this fundamental 
characteristic to beings, namely to overcome a Parmenidean difficulty.  The 
argument depends on the addition of “acting or being acted upon” or, again, that 
“that-which-is acts or is acted on”.  This paraphrase echoes the Stranger‟s 
hypothesis that „being is power‟ at 247d ff. in Plato‟s Sophist: 
I say, then, that what possesses any sort of power [du/namin] – 
whether for making [poei=n] anything at all, of whatever nature, 
other than it is or for being affected [paqei=n] even the least but by 
the meagerest thing, even if only once – I say that all this is in its 
very being.  For I set down as a boundary marking off the things 
that are, that their being is nothing else but power [du/namij]. 
(Plato 1996, 247d-e) 
 
Aristotle likewise reorients the terms of the Parmenidean paradoxes of being in 
terms of action and passion.  The significance of this other than showing a direct 
continuity of thought between Plato and Aristotle is that the language of action 
and passion takes us out of purely linguistic considerations.  The employment of 
action and passion does two things: first it leads us away from an exclusively 
linguistic interpretation of the rest of I.8, and second it foreshadows an alternate 
approach to the Eleatic dilemma in terms of potency and act which Aristotle 
alludes to near the end of the argument of I.8.  
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iv Dogs Born from Horses 
There is disarray among translators and commentators as to what to make 
of what at first glance appears to be a bizarre example that Aristotle uses in I.8.  
Both the meaning of the example and its role in the context of the solution of the 
Eleatic dilemma have been difficult to determine not only because it asks us to 
imagine the strange scenario of a dog coming into being from a horse but because 
it brings in a discussion of the relation of genus to particular which is not 
anticipated by the context.  Many of the difficulties disappear once it is realized 
that the example of a dog coming into being from a horse should be taken as part 
of a contrafactual statement in a reductio ad absurdum argument designed to 
show the shortcomings of the argument that allows it as a consequence.  More 
specifically, employing this example as a contrafactual illustrates a deficiency of 
the application of the account of I.7 and the idea of accidental attributes to the 
Eleatic paradox: 
Similarly there can be no coming to be out of what-is or of what-is-
not, except by virtue of concurrence.  In that way, however, this too 
can come about, just as if animal came to be out of animal and 
animal of a particular sort out of animal of a particular sort, for 
instance dog <out of dog or horse>128 out of horse.  The dog would 
come to be, not only out of a particular sort of animal, but out of 
[the genus] animal; not, however, as animal, for that belongs 
already.  If a particular sort of animal is to come to be, not by virtue 
of concurrence, it will not be out of animal, and if a particular thing 
which is, it will not be out of thing [a] thing which is; nor out of [a] 
thing which is not. (191b27) 
 
                                                 
128 The words in brackets are absent from the surviving manuscripts though the majority 
of translators opt to supply them because the absence seems to them to make Aristotle‟s 
meaning too strange.  Ross (1936, 495-6) and even Sachs among others do this.  
Charlton accepts the emendation but shows how the passage can make sense without it 
Charlton 1970, 80-1).  The modification appears to be accepted as early as Aquinas. 
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From this perspective the dog and the horse are homologous in genus so that 
being an animal comes to be from an animal.  In a certain way belonging to the 
genus animal is incidental to being this particular dog.  More properly, this dog 
comes to be from an embryo (or its parents) but not from the mere fact that its 
parents belong to the genus animal.  If it is sufficient that the parents are 
members of the genus animal it might in fact be possible that a horse (or any 
being of the same genus) could give birth to a dog.  If this were the case, a dog 
could indeed come to be from what-is insofar as it happens to come to be this 
particular animal from something that is also in the genus animal.  The bizarre 
example shows the accidental relation of genus to particular in the process of 
generation and illustrates how at the level of genus it is possible that what-is 
comes to be accidentally from what-is, thus accounting for one horn of the Eleatic 
dilemma.  That is, what comes to be can come to be from what-is insofar as things 
are considered not as individual beings but in terms of the genus to which they 
belong. 
At the same time this strange example demonstrates the limitations of the 
appeal to accidental attributes and hence also the limitations of the three-
principled account of generation from I.7.  For if we allow that substantial 
generation can occur by concurrence, this would allow for the logical possibility 
that dogs come to be from horses if we consider them solely from the point of 
view of their relation to the same genus animal.  This is tantamount to allowing 
that anything could come from anything as long as they happen to be in the same 
genus.  If a dog came to be from a horse, why not an apple from an orange or 
anything else?  This clearly goes against our normal experience of the world as 
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well as Aristotle‟s (as yet unsupported) claim that change does not happen at 
random (I.5 188a31).  This earlier passage even intimates that incidental changes 
may not be natural changes at all:129  
But it must be understood first about all beings that none either 
acts by nature at random or is acted upon by any random thing, nor 
does anything at all come into being by change from any chance 
thing, unless one takes what happens incidentally.  (188a31) 
 
So even if the Eleatic dilemma is solved in the case of what changes incidentally, 
this does not tell us enough to be confident that natural or any non-accidental 
change is not still subject to the Eleatic paradox. 
 
v An Alternate Solution 
Aristotle hints that there is another way of addressing the Eleatic paradox: 
“That is one way of handling the matter; another is to point out that the same 
things may be spoken of either as in potency or in act.  That, however, is dealt 
with in greater detail elsewhere” (19128-30).130  Such an analysis would 
                                                 
129 This is further supported by evidence from the arguments from Physics II that try to 
establish the priority of natural teleological changes over things that happen by chance 
(see especially Physics II.8). 
 
130 Menn takes this alternate approach to the solution of the Eleatic aporia quite 
seriously: “Indeed, Aristotle uses the actuality-potentiality distinction to secure the very 
possibility of a science of physics, by explaining the possibility of coming-to-be, and 
resolving the contradictions that Plato, following the Eleatics and Sophists, had detected 
in changeable things.  Those who think that „contradictories and contraries occur 
simultaneously‟, Aristotle says, „have come to this opinion from the sensibles, for they 
see that contraries come-to-be out of the same thing: so if it is not possible for what is 
not to come-to-be, the pre-existing thing was both‟ (Metaphysics 1009a22-26)” (Menn 
1994, 73).  Menn thinks that by maintaining the possibility that contraries can be present 
in a substance in potentiality, Aristotle is able to avert the central paradox of change.  
However, even if this can be regarded as a solution, it is only partial in that it applies 
only to changes which involve contraries and which therefore excludes substantial 
generation.  If Aristotle offers an elaborate solution to the paradox of coming into being 
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seemingly apply equally to the doctor healing (or failing to heal) or losing (or 
acquiring) the medical art and the seed becoming a mature living thing in 
addition to all sorts of accidental changes.  Potency and act may also describe 
better than the substrate/accident account what actually happens in the 
generation of a mature living thing from a seed.131  Kelsey claims that,  
[T]his second solution is also essential to any full resolution of the 
difficulties the problem [i.e. the Eleatic paradox] raises for Aristotle.  
Recall that Aristotle‟s first solution concedes that the conditions 
which the problem places on what substances come from, though 
they do not constrain what they can come from incidentally, really 
do constrain what they can come from unqualifiedly.  Given this, 
Aristotle must think that there is some way to reconcile these 
conditions; otherwise there would not be anything that substances 
come to be from unqualifiedly, in which case they simply would not 
come to be at all.  (This is the idea that what holds “incidentally” is 
parasitic on what holds “unqualifiedly” or “per se,” for which see for 
example Phys. II.3, 198a8-9).  So, Aristotle must find something 
that meets both conditions, if he wants to settle fully and 
completely the difficulties the problem raises. (Kelsey 2006, 349) 
 
But if the account in terms of potency and act is sufficient to fill the gap for non-
accidental changes (i.e. per se or substantial changes) why is it not capable of 
accounting for accidental changes as well?  If the account of generation in terms 
                                                                                                                                                 
from not-being in substantial generation, it is not in the Metaphysics passages to which 
Menn refers.  Menn appears overenthusiastic in his claim that these passages „secure the 
very possibility of a science of physics‟. 
 
131 If one is uncomfortable with the idea that Aristotle would employ his ideas of potency 
and act this early in the Physics (or in the Physics at all), it must be pointed out that 
these notions offer much more leverage than the idea of accidental attributes in 
addressing the fact that Aristotle reinterprets the Eleatic paradox about beings into a 
discussion about acting and suffering (poiei=n and pa/skein), a feature that is universally 
unaccounted for in the literature.  With this in mind we can account for the role of the 
ideas of potency and act and at the same time account for this detail of Aristotle‟s 
argument.  Potency and act are employed throughout the Physics but are never treated 
thematically.  Even though the thematic treatment of potency and act are subjects 
belonging to first philosophy, this does not inhibit Aristotle from employing these 
concepts in the service of physical inquiry. 
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of accidental change is parasitic on an understanding of per se change, why is the 
account in terms of accidental change even necessary? 
Further questions remain: first, if such an account in terms of potency and 
act would be helpful in showing how one can avoid the Parmenidean paradox as 
it relates to substantial generation, why would Aristotle not include a full version 
of it here?  Considering that the account by way of the accidental relation of 
contrary to substrate is insufficient with regard to substantial generation, why 
would he hold back from an explanation that might be more helpful?  Why not 
simply give the account of potency and act in the first place if it might hold more 
promise of resolving the problem for all of the phenomena and not just some?  
Second, why would he say at the beginning of the chapter that this is the “only 
way” (i.e. the way of the per accidens account in line with I.7) to resolve the 
paradox and less than a hundred lines later claim that there is another way 
available?132  Once a full account of generation in terms of potency and act is 
given in which generation per se could be sufficiently defended against the 
Eleatic paradox, there would be no need for a separate account of generation per 
accidens and a fortiori no need for the account found in I.7.  This is of course not 
true the other way around.  An account of per accidens generation would not be 
sufficient in itself to account for all generation. 
In I.8 Aristotle set himself the task of overcoming the Eleatic paradox of 
generation.  We have seen that his approach is not entirely straightforward.  It 
                                                 
132 This supposes that an account of generation in terms of potency and act is not just a 
trumped up version of the account in terms of contraries (Cf. Bolotin 1998, 14-15, 20, 
and 26n5). 
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should also be sufficiently clear that there is at least some doubt as to whether he 
has actually provided a comprehensive solution to the problem of the 
intelligibility of generation.  While I.8 and I.7 together can account for the 
possibility of accidental generation, per se generation does not seem to have been 
adequately addressed.  Unless we claim that all generation is of the accidental 
variety, a claim which he almost seems to admit at one point (191b17), we should 
still be expecting something more to show how substantial generation can be 
defended against the Eleatic claim of unintelligibility.  And while the account of 
generation in terms of potency and act seems to hold promise in this regard, it 
remains unclear whether it can address the Eleatic dilemma without begging the 
question.  If there is still some doubt about whether Aristotle has succeeded in 
providing an adequate argument against the Eleatics, this further calls into 
question the success of Physics I as a defense of the project of natural science.  
That Aristotle has had at least some rhetorical success in defeating the Eleatics 
and establishing the legitimacy of physical inquiry is not in doubt.  The account of 
change in I.7 explains enough and is compelling enough to provide at least some 
satisfaction that the inquiry into nature is both worthwhile and fruitful.  But 
strictly speaking we have not received a rigorous and comprehensive defense of 
natural science and the intelligibility of substantial generation.
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Chapter 3 
 
Nature loves to hide. 
-Heraclitus 
 
 
Privation and Potentiality 
 
 
3.1 Nature as Form and Privation 
There are several places where the subject of substantial change comes to 
the foreground in the Physics.  The first and most detailed, though in some sense 
still preliminary, is in the later chapters of book one.  The theme of substantial 
generation returns almost immediately in book two albeit only by its conspicuous 
absence.  The last lines of book one promised a second start in the investigation 
into the principles of nature.133  We find this second start in the opening lines of 
book two which initiates the investigation proper into nature: 
Of the things that are, some are by nature, others through other 
causes: by nature are animals and their parts, plants and the simple 
bodies such as earth, fire, air and water (for  these things and such 
things we say to be by nature), and all of them obviously differ from 
the things not put together by nature.  For each of these has in itself 
                                                 
133 “That, then, there are starting points, and what they are, and how many in number, let 
it have been marked out in this way for us, but starting over from another place, let us 
speak in a different way” (192b1-3). 
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a source of motion and rest, either in place, or by increase and 
decrease, or by alteration. (192b8-18) 
 
The first definition of nature given here limits the scope of the class of what exists 
by nature by excluding what does not exist by nature; it isolates a region of the 
things that are.  What exists by nature is divided off from what exists “through 
other causes.”  Subsequently what exists by nature is contrasted with not only 
what exists through art but also what happens through chance and necessity 
(Physics II.4-9).  Animals, their parts, plants and the simple bodies evidently 
have a principle within them that accounts for the motions they exhibit.  But what 
sorts of motions are these?  The list he gives us here appears to be incomplete if 
we are expecting the canonical four types of Aristotelian change (alteration, 
locomotion, growth, and substantial generation).  Each of these sorts of things, 
Aristotle tells us here, contains within it its own source of movement in place, 
growth and decay, and alteration.  Now if we are not to subsume substantial 
generation within the class of alteration or growth, there seems to be an 
important omission.134  This omission is conspicuous in that the examples given 
seem to be the prime examples of what might come to be simply.  Animals and 
plants are born, the parts of animals come to be in the generation of an animal, 
and the simple bodies or so-called elements are generated from one another. 
The kinds of changes Aristotle lists here as natural can all be understood 
as accidental to the essence of the thing that moves in such a way in that they do 
                                                 
134 Charlton (1970, 88) supposes that Aristotle means to include “not only movement 
[local motion], but change in general ([193]b14-15) such as, no doubt, the formation of 
the organic parts and teeth.”  If Charlton is thinking of such changes as generation in the 
simple sense, he is missing the import of the omission of substantial change from the 
list: namely that it will be the central problematic case of “what exists by nature” in the 
Physics. 
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not change the essence of the thing.  For change in place, size, or quality need not 
be changes with respect to the kind of thing it is (cf. 226a26).135  If an animal 
changes its place under its own power, this does not affect its being this particular 
kind of animal; nor would an animal (necessarily) be changed with respected to 
its essence if it gained or lost weight or became cold or a different color.  Though 
the source of any of these changes might be found within the animal, it need not 
change its essence.  Why then does Aristotle not include substantial generation 
with the kinds of motions which make evident that some beings exist by nature 
having in themselves the principle of their motion?  For having determined that 
there are such things that exist by nature (albeit only by means of an appeal to 
common sense), Aristotle seeks next to determine whether nature applies more to 
material or to form.136  Finding that nature is more properly spoken of as form 
(193a30 ff. and especially 193b8), Aristotle must consider in what way this 
applies to the generation of substances.  The result is that the determination of 
substantial generation as a natural change will depend on how we are to 
understand the meaning of “privation,” as opposite to and a “sort of” form in the 
case of substantial generation. 
 The argument meant to establish which of the two ways that nature is 
spoken of more properly characterizes nature is as follows: “In one way then, 
                                                 
135 “Now let motion with respect to of-what-kind be alteration, for it has been joined with 
this common name.  But I mean by the of-what-kind not what is present in an 
independent thing (since then even the specific difference would be a quality), but what 
is attributive, as a result of which a thing is said to be acted upon or unaffected” 
(226a26).  Compare Categories 2. 
 
136 On the evidence of the distinction between what exists by nature and what does not 
and whether there is nature at all, see Broadie (1982, 48-58 ff.). 
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nature is spoken of thus, as the first material underlying each of the things that 
have in themselves a source of motion and change, but in another way as the 
form, or the look that is disclosed in speech” (193a29-31).  The material is nature 
in a way, as Antiphon argues, in that “if someone were to bury a bed, and what 
rotted had the power to put up a sprout, it would not become a bed but wood” 
(193a13-15).137  Aristotle would seem to agree with Antiphon to the degree that we 
might say that a product of art has a nature (vis à vis the nature of the material it 
is made of).  This would mean that it contains a principle of motion in itself, not 
qua work of art, but qua that out of which it is made, e.g. something made of 
stone or earth will have in itself an impulse to move downwards (192b20 ff.).  The 
material in a way is nature since material does have in itself a source of motion. 
Material does not, however, exhaust what it means to be by nature for it is 
not merely the unorganized material that accounts for the movement of natural 
things but more specifically that toward which they move, i.e. the form or the 
“look disclosed in speech” (193a31).  The argument that establishes that form is 
more importantly nature than the material depends on the priority of what exists 
in act over what exists merely in potency (193a33 ff., cf. Metaphysics IX.1-3).  
Drawing an analogy from the realm of art, Aristotle reminds us  that we do not 
say that something exists according to art “if it is only potentially a bed and does 
not yet have the look of a bed” (193a33).  Likewise, “what is potentially flesh or 
bone does not yet have its own nature, until it takes on the look disclosed in 
speech, that by which we define when we say what flesh or bone is, and not until 
                                                 
137 For a full discussion of Aristotle‟s treatment of his “materialist” opponents in the 
present discussion of nature, see Broadie (1982, 55-59 and 66 ff.). 
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then is it by nature” (193b1-3).  Thus even the material is not properly the nature 
of a thing unless what it is the nature of is known before.  What the material is the 
nature of is more properly nature than the material is, and this is the form or the 
definition.  Nature then can be spoken of as both material and form, but nature as 
form is prior and material nature derives its determination as natural from its 
relative form. 
Aristotle asks us to consider whether there is another sense in which 
something comes to be by nature.  For not only does the human being come from 
flesh, and hence from the material, but the human being comes about from 
another human being (193b9-10).138  That is, form comes from form in such a 
way that Antiphon is misguided in thinking that from a wooden bed wood would 
sprout.  Rather, if anything were to sprout from a buried bed it would be the same 
in form as whatever the parent was.  It is not the material “wood” that would 
come to be, but rather some kind of wood, e.g. pine or oak.139  Again, the form has 
priority since the material is never undifferentiated but is of a certain kind (i.e. 
has a particular and differentiated form).  If the material of a bed were somehow 
to grow, it would not yield another bed nor would it yield undifferentiated “wood” 
as Antiphon seems to claim according to Aristotle, but rather it would yield kind 
of tree from which the wood was taken. 
                                                 
138 We will have to consider in another place the implications of the use of this „man from 
man‟ formulation in contrast to his other way of speaking about „man from seed‟ (here 
and in Parts of Animals) in a discussion of the special problem of spontaneous 
generation. 
 
139 Cf. Sachs (1995, 24) and Broadie (1982, 62-63). 
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 After Aristotle has established the priority of form and its rightful claim to 
the title of nature, he turns for the first time to an explicit consideration of nature 
that concerns substantial generation.  This consideration is not only meant to 
confirm the result of the previous arguments that nature is form but to raise an 
aporia about the character of form and that-from-which form arises.  As we have 
seen, in this chapter Aristotle uses two different models of that-from-which a 
form comes to be: (1) from the material as in the example of flesh and bone, and 
(2) from a prior form as in the example of a human being coming from a human 
being.140  The question arises as to whether, when something comes to be by 
nature, what grows is that from-which or that to-which it grows.  Namely, is that 
which grows more properly the embryo or the man, or even the flesh and bone or 
the man.  Aristotle claims that what grows is that to which the change is aimed, 
e.g. the fully formed human being, even if this seems to run contrary to common 
sense.  But in the case of substantial generation determining that-from-which a 
substance comes to be is difficult insofar as it appears to come from “what-is-
not,” “not-being” (cf. Generation and Corruption I.3).  The aporia has precisely 
do to with the way of speaking about nature as coming-to-be that he contrasts 
with the way a te/xnh relates to what it produces.  Let us look at how he contrasts 
nature and art and the aporia this presents to the correct understanding of 
nature in the sense of substantial generation: 
                                                 
140 But this phrase “man from man” may even be ambiguous, for it could either mean this 
man comes to be in virtue of parent who is also a man or this man comes to be a man 
insofar as he was already a man in potentially a man (an actual man comes to be from a 
potential man). 
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The nature spoken of as coming into being is a way into nature.  
For it is not like the process of medicine, which is meant to be a 
road not into the medical art but into health, for it is not necessary 
that the medical process be from the medical art and not into it.  
But not thus is nature related to nature, but the thing being born 
[fuo/menon], insofar as it grows [fu/etai], does proceed from 
something into something.  What then is it that grows?  Not that 
from-which, but that to-which.  Therefore nature is the form.  But 
form and nature are meant in two ways, for deprivation [ste/rhsij] 
is a sort of form.  But whether in the case of a simple coming-into-
being there is or is not a deprivation and an opposite, must be 
looked into later. (193b14) 
 
Since nature is more properly form than matter and what something changes into 
is its form, it makes more sense say that nature is that-to-which something 
changes in a natural change.  To illustrate Aristotle proposes a disanalogy 
between nature and art.  Unlike the medical art in which the application yields 
something aside from itself (the aim of the medical art is not the production of 
the medical art but rather the production of health in a patient) and since what 
results is not the medical art but what is from the medical art, i.e. health in the 
patient.  Nature differs in that it is not that-from-which something else comes to 
be but rather that to which it comes to be.  Movement to form according to nature 
in the case of “being born” [fu/etai] is not the result either of the matter or some 
external cause, like te/xnh, but the result of the form immanent in the thing 
moved.  Even more is this the case in substantial generation.  For what is born 
(fuo/menon) contains within itself the principle of what it grows into.  What comes 
to be by nature comes to be out of nature and into nature. Thus, unlike the 
medical art, nature achieves and promotes itself when coming into being.  But 
since nature comes to be from itself into itself, which is it that more properly 
should be said to grow, that-from-which or that-into-which it grows?  Following 
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the results of the previous arguments, what grows is the nature into which what 
grows grows so that nature is, again, fully developed form.141 
Yet what exactly is nature in the sense of that from-which in the case of 
substantial generation?  Is it from flesh and bone that the fully formed human 
being comes to be?  Is this nature in the sense of form or material?  It would 
appear that it is nature as material from which the fully formed substance comes 
to be, the material being the privative state of the form of that which is to come to 
be.  Yet Aristotle, in the last lines of the chapter says that form is meant in 
another way insofar as “privation is a sort of form” (193b20).  Whether or not “in 
the case of a simple coming-into-being” (193b21) there is deprivation at all 
remains questionable.  From the two ways of understanding that from which 
something comes to be (from material and from previous form), he presents us 
with the difficulty of understanding how either of these might be considered a 
deprivation in the sense of an opposite.  This is the fundamental problem in 
                                                 
141 Broadie surmises from this passage that there is some discrepancy between the sense 
of fu/sij as internal principle of change and fu/sij as what arises out of fu/etai (namely, 
form).  “Despite the close dependence just exhibited between nature as principle of 
change, and the developed structure [form], Aristotle exceeds his warrant in concluding 
that the form is  the latter, since by the very terms of the argument, the latter is the result 
of the former, and is not always actually present at the same time” (Broadie 1982, 65).  
Here she detects the principle difficulty surrounding Aristotle‟s conception of form: 
“How can what something is to be, which is necessarily not yet, be what brings about the 
present process towards what is to be?” (Broadie 1982, 65).  Cf. also Charlton, “His point 
is that fu/sij in the sense in which it is used for a process, i.e. in the sense of birth, is 
fu/sij of the form, e.g. a man, not the matter, e.g. menses.  Alternatively, as most 
commentators suppose, he is making a play with the fact that fu/sij comes from a verb 
which in the passive means „to be born‟ or „to grow‟ (cf. Latin natura).  Suggesting, then, 
that fu/sij might be used for a process, sc. growth (or perhaps simply – the text is 
ambiguous – for coming to be), he says that nature ought to be what this process is a 
process towards, not what it is a process from, and what it is a process towards is the 
form.  Exactly why the process should not proceed from nature, as doctoring proceeds 
from knowledge of medicine, is unclear” (1970, 91).  Cf. also Philoponus (1995, 29-31). 
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making intelligible the phenomenon of substantial generation; a problem the 
solution to which he again postpones. 
Since in the case of coming into being simply the from-which is the 
deprivation, it must be understood in what sense that which lacks the substantial 
form might contain in advance that form to which it will come to be.  If it is a 
“lack” or “non-being” simply it would seem to contain no nature at all. How can 
what-is-not simply have any characteristics at all?  It might be objected that for 
Aristotle, since the privation is always a determinate lack, such a determinate 
lack is precisely what contains the nature as absent.  But if he had considered the 
issue settled in the case of substantial generation there would be no reason to 
raise the aporia he raises here.  What must be understood is in what way 
deprivation as a determinate lack can be applied to the case of substantial 
generation and in what sense the privation in this case may or may not be an 
opposite.  This question he tells us “must be looked into later” and it is generally 
supposed that argument he is referring to is found in book five. 
 
3.2 Differentiation of Metabolh/ and Ki/nshj  
 The arguments in book five come to a perhaps disconcerting conclusion 
about substantial generation.  For here Aristotle concludes that of the four 
primary kinds of change (generation, alteration, locomotion, and growth), 
generation ought not be considered a motion (ki/nshj) in the strict sense of the 
word.  Aristotle makes this exclusion refining the definition of motion from book 
three.  There generation was indiscriminately included in the things contained by 
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such a definition (200b34); we will have to see if this inclusion still holds after 
the exclusion of generation in book five.  Aristotle clarifies and narrows the term 
ki/nshj which he had first formally treated in book three by distinguishing motion 
(ki/nshj) from change in the wider sense (metabolh/) according to the sorts of 
oppositions that are appropriate to them and the nature of the substrate involved. 
Any change can be described in one of four ways: there are those things 
that change (1) from a subject to another subject, (2) from what is a subject to 
what is not a subject, (3) from what is not a subject, and (4) from what is not a 
subject to what is not a subject (225a1 ff.).  As the fourth possibility does not 
correspond with any phenomenon “there being no antithesis” (for there are 
“neither contraries or contradictories” between what-is-not and what-is-not, 
225a11), it is excluded even from the class of metabolh/.  Cases (2) and (3) (as the 
corresponding concepts of destruction and generation respectively) are then 
excluded from the class of ki/nshj but retained in the class of metabolh/.  Only (1) 
properly fits in the category of ki/nshj in the proper sense.  What distinguishes (1) 
from (2) and (3) is the character of opposition present in each as well as the role 
of the substrate. 
Having distinguished the different character of the oppositions involved in 
change, Aristotle goes on to show why change between contradictories cannot be 
motion in the strict sense.  What is in motion must be in some way, and not 
incidentally (225a25), and the negative side of a pair of contradictories is not 
capable of being moved.  Aristotle first distinguishes between the generation of 
some particular thing and the generation of something simply.  What comes to be 
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some particular thing is like the change from “not-white to white” (225a17) where 
the not-white designates anything other than the white (including things like six 
feet tall or hairless or any opposition that is not a contrary or a privation within a 
single genus).  What comes to be simply, on the other hand, comes from “not-
being simply, into ousia, [and we do not mean] that it becomes something” 
(225a18).  Likewise destruction acts in the opposite way, from being white to not-
white in the way specified and from being a substance to “not-being” simply.  
What is the meaning of “not-being” in relation to substance and its contradictory, 
however, needs clarification.  Aristotle clarifies this notion by means of an 
examination of the diverse meaning of “what is not” (225a22) and here we have 
his most explicit reference to the aporia from II.1:  
If “what is not” is meant in more than one way, and that which 
results from combination or separation does not admit of being 
moved, nor does that by way of potentiality, the opposite of what 
simply is by way of activity (for the not-white or not-good 
nevertheless admits of being moved incidentally, since what-is-not 
white could be a human being, but what simply is not a this in no 
way admits of it), then it is impossible that what-is-not be moved.  
(And if this is so, it is also impossible for coming into being to be a 
motion, for what passes into being is what is not.  For however 
much it becomes incidentally, it is still true to say that not-being 
belongs to what comes into being simply.)  And it is likewise 
impossible that what-is-not be at rest.  These inconvenient results 
also follow if everything that is moved is in a place, since what-is-
not is not in a place, for then it would be somewhere. (225a22-32) 
 
Aristotle‟s argument employs the distinction he had made in I.8 between what 
comes to be out of what-is-not incidentally and what comes to be out of what is 
not as such or simply.  Here he uses the distinction to show that in neither case 
can what-is-not be in motion.  The conclusion he draws from this is that if 
generation is thought of as either coming from what-is-not accidentally (the not-
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white) or what-is-not simply (what is not a substance), such a thing could not be 
moved.  Since “what passes into being is what-is-not,” and generation is from 
what is not, such a thing is not movable and generation therefore could not be a 
motion in the proper sense. 
Only what-is can be moved, and what it is that is moved is substrate.  For 
this reason Aristotle can further refine the distinction between change and 
motion on the grounds that “every change [metabolh/] is from something to 
something” (225a1) while “motion [ki/nshj] must be of something, from 
something, to something” (226a13).  The differentiation between change and 
motion rests on the inclusion or exclusion of the substrate in the definition.  In 
the case of generation, only that from-which and that to-which are identifiable 
(from not-being simply to being a substance).  Motions in the strict sense are of 
things that already are while changes in general are from what-is-not to what-is.  
It would make no sense to say the generation is the generation of what-is-not in 
addition to contradicting the conclusion of II.1 that what comes-to-be is the end 
of the change, not the beginning. 
What then is the solution to the aporia concerning whether or not there is 
an opposition or deprivation of substance presented at the end of II.1?  Because 
substances do not have contraries but only contradictories, the privation is not a 
privation in something but privation simply.  But privation appears to be nothing 
at all or if contradictories among substances are similar to contradictories with 
respect to qualities (the not-white and the white), there would seem to be no 
identifiable connection between the contradictories (compare Physics I.5). 
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What Aristotle has achieved is to bring the aporia concerning generation 
to a higher level difficulty that begins to reveal in more detail what exactly is at 
stake in determining the sense of privation with regard to substance.  For as it 
turned out, if there is a privation or opposition involved in substantial generation, 
it is of a sort that would disqualify it from being a motion in the proper sense.  
The consequence of this could be severe.  For now we are left with the question of 
whether or not and how the phenomenon of generation is commensurable with 
the definitions of motion in book III.142  If the definition of motion cannot 
capture the essence of substantial generation, then it would appear that 
substantial change might not be in the strictest sense a subject of physics. 
 
3.3 Substrate and Potentiality in Elemental Transformation 
 Aristotle‟s doctrine of the generation of the four elements out of one 
another is deeply connected with his account of substantial change.  Though at 
times it is unclear whether Aristotle considers the elements themselves to be full-
fledged substances, his account in Generation and Corruption143 is meant to be 
an inquiry into the nature of “causes and definitions of generation and corruption 
common to all those things which come to be and perish in the course of nature” 
(314a1, cf. Burnyeat 2004, 7).  Despite the supposed generality of the treatise, GC 
for the most part treats the problems surrounding generation by means of an 
                                                 
142 This parallels the conclusion from Physics II.1 that there is some question as to 
whether or not “nature” and substantial generation are compatible. 
 
143 On Generation and Corruption is from here on abbreviated GC. 
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analysis of the elements, how they transform into one another, what is the cause 
of their perpetual becoming, and what their transformative and constitutive role 
in mixtures is. 
 The central issue relating substantial generation and the transformation of 
the elements concerns the nature of the substrate or u(pokei/menon involved.  
Aristotle‟s treatment and employment of the notion of the u(pokei/menon in GC in 
particular has been the focus of a long standing debate between the two 
prevailing interpretations of Aristotle‟s doctrine of material cause because it 
seemingly provides textual evidence supporting both points of view, namely the 
Prime Matter and Functional Matter interpretations.144  The reason for the 
ongoing dispute between two prevailing interpretations of the doctrine of 
material cause in the case of simple generation may be that in fact Aristotle does 
not offer only a single account of generation and its material cause.  This is not a 
fault of Aristotle and we should not chalk up apparent inconsistencies to 
carelessness or short sightedness on Aristotle‟s part.  Rather, it may be because of 
the very difficulty and perhaps insolubility of the problems at hand as well as 
Aristotle‟s own recognition of this that GC seems to lead in opposing 
directions.145  We will examine the merits and deficiencies of each of these 
                                                 
144 Aquinas is a model proponent of the Prime Matter view while, while among modern 
commentators Mary Louise Gill is a good representative of the Functional Matter camp 
(cf. Gill 1989). 
 
145 Bostock perhaps more clearly than other commentators acknowledges these radical 
inconsistencies in GC with its apparent simultaneous endorsement and disavowal of the 
notion of prime matter.  However, he finds that this inconsistency is due to carelessness 
and a series of fundamental mistakes made by Aristotle (Bostock 1995).  While Bostock‟s 
analysis of the doctrines in GC is for the most part correct, I believe he has 
underestimated Aristotle in thinking that he has seen very obvious contradictions which 
Aristotle must have overlooked. 
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interpretations of Aristotle‟s doctrine of material cause specifically in relation to 
his arguments establishing both the character of simple generation and its 
existence in nature. 
 On Generation and Corruption pays special attention to the phenomenon 
of elemental change because it represents in some way the limit case of sublunary 
change.  Because of this peculiar difficulties become visible which are less 
apparent in the case of higher level instances of generation.  In particular the 
question of the nature and role of the substrate in simple generation is most clear 
at the level of elemental change because the normal strategies of identifying the 
form and matter in a given change become difficult to employ.  For example, a 
typically Aristotelian way to identify the principles of change is to look for the 
forms or contraries which limit a given change and then to find the substrate 
which lies below the level of those forms, which provides a substrate for the 
change.  This substrate can be similarly analyzed into form and matter and so on 
until we reach the level of the elements at which the analysis must theoretically 
end. 
For example, the process by which an unmolded piece of bronze becomes a 
statue is analyzable into the forms “unmolded” and “shaped-statue” the matter of 
which is bronze.  In turn, the bronze itself is subject to a similar analysis.  The 
bronze itself can be understood as a composite of positive attributes which have 
come to be and materials that underlie this change, namely the attributes of 
orangish color, malleability, etc., and the materials out of which this bronze 
comes to be, namely the homoeomers tin and copper.  Even further, the tin and 
copper can be analyzed further into the elements out of which they are 
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constituted, namely Earth and Water.  At this point, we presumably reach the end 
of this type of analysis.  That is, because Earth and Water are the ultimate 
constituents of bodies (cf. De Caelo III.3), there can be no further material that 
underlies the attributes they exhibit.146  How then are we to account for the 
phenomenon of elemental change if we cannot do so by the same sort of analysis 
that was employed at higher levels?  It is at this stage that we confront the 
difficulty of considering Aristotle‟s claim that these elements transform into one 
another and what u)pokei/menon underlies this change (if anything) while 
remaining “simple bodies.” 
The heart of the difficulty regarding the u(pokei/menon is that whereas it is 
relatively easy to identify a something which persists throughout higher level 
changes, in the case of the transformation of elements in which the elements 
change “as a whole” (317a22 and 319b15) it is difficult to identify by means of 
perception (318b19-27) what persists and makes the change continuous.  This 
question of continuity is critical in that it seems to be required to make the 
change intelligible, and it is unclear whether Aristotle ever specifically claims that 
elemental transformation as such are continuous.  Rather, he often says that 
                                                 
146 This is not precisely the way Aristotle designates the elemental bodies as simple.  He 
does so rather by an appeal to the simple motions they naturally exhibit (cf. De Caelo 
268b27, 276b8 et al.).  Compound motions indicate compound bodies, and simple 
motions indicate simple bodies.  A definition of element that Aristotle claims to share 
with the majority is “a body into which other bodies may be analyzed” (De Caelo 302a16) 
and presumably which cannot be analyzed any further into bodies of another kind.  The 
elements are analytically complex in that they always exhibit a “yoke” of two qualities 
(hot-wet, cold-dry, etc.).  This however is not complexity of matter and form, since both 
sides of the yoke are contraries and, as it were, forms in some basic or derivative sense.  
It is also worth noting that the characteristics that determine the distinction between the 
simple bodies by virtue of the nature of their motions are not the primary contraries that 
“make up” the elements themselves.  Cf. Gill (1989, 67). 
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there is no “intermediate” between the elements and that the cycle of generation 
among the elements is stepwise (331b4-11).147  This leaves at least the possibility 
that elemental transformation is a sheer replacement of one element by another 
or that when one element perishes another “pops” into being. 
GC attempts to address this question by clarifying the distinction between 
alteration and simple generation, and whether there is such a distinction in 
nature to begin with.  On Aristotle‟s account, elemental change is different from 
change at higher levels (e.g. unmolded bronze becoming a bronze statue) not only 
on a quantitative scale or scale of perspective, but also qualitatively.  If a 
distinction is made between simple generation (a transformation in which the 
subject changes “as a whole” as in the case of the elements (317a20)) and 
alteration (in which only an attribute of a subject is changed and where the 
subject remains intact (317a25)) several questions arise as a consequence, the 
central one concerning the nature of the material substrate involved.  Does the 
substrate in each these distinct processes play the same role, and are they even 
conceptually the same?  Because Aristotle‟s analysis of elemental generation 
seems to answer these questions in different ways, the two main lines of the 
interpretation of Aristotle‟s general theory of matter meet head on. 
Before Aristotle discusses at length the difference between alteration and 
generation in the Generation and Corruption, he tells us that there are two kinds 
                                                 
147 The easiest way for the elements to transform is to transform into an “adjacent‟ 
element, i.e. an element that shares one of its contraries.  Fire which is hot-dry can easily 
transform into air which is hot-wet.  Fire can transform into water or earth as well but it 
is “more difficult [and takes longer] because there is a change of more [factors]” (331b1, 
Gill‟s translation (1989, 70)).  Cf. Gill (1989, 70-5) for a more detailed treatment of the 
issue. 
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of generation: qualified or partial generation (317b35) and unqualified or simple 
generation.  To the latter belongs the transformation of the elements into one 
another as well as the generation of substances (319a16).  To the former belong 
alteration, locomotion, growth, and the other derivative sorts of changes.  The 
task of GC I.3 is to determine whether the distinction can be legitimately applied 
to nature or whether it is a mere artifact of speech. 
Generation in either sense means that something comes to be from what-
is-not.  Something new has arisen which was not there before.  If we mean that 
something came to be from something that existed already, we are talking about 
qualified or partial generation.  It is partial in that there is something identifiable 
which remains through the change, and qualified in that it is a quality or accident 
of a being that undergoes change and not the being itself.148  Generation as a 
whole or unqualified generation, on the other hand, occurs whenever there is a 
change in which nothing perceptibly identifiable necessarily remains and when 
something which exists in its own right, i.e. something substantial, undergoes 
change.  Aristotle also makes this distinction in another way in numerous places 
as that between the generation of something simply and the generation of 
something from something (ge/nesij ti\j).149 
                                                 
148 Joachim notes that “qualified” means that “the basis of genesis only is with a 
qualification, i.e. it is-duna/mei.  To\ a(plwj mh\ o(/n means „that which is, without 
qualification, devoid of being”: but to\ a(plw=j mh\ o)/n means “that which is devoid of 
being, unless you qualify the term „being‟” (cf. *19a29-b4)” (Joachim 1999, 93).  This is 
not un-Aristotelian per se, but it is not clear from the previous passages that Aristotle 
means to mark anything but the difference between changes in which an only an 
attribute changes from that in which a thing changes absolutely. 
 
149 Joachim seems to take this latter distinction as a division only among substantial 
changes themselves: “The distinction between a(plh= ge/nesij and ge/nesij h( kata\ me/roj 
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The question in GC I.3 is whether this distinction holds in nature (317a32).  
If there is simple generation in nature and it follows the model of qualified 
generation which is more easily identifiable in nature, what comes to be in simple 
generation must come to be from what-is-not simply.  Whereas in the case of 
qualified generation where “something comes to be from being something” 
(317a34), in the case of simple generation it is necessary that something come to 
be from “not being simpliciter, so that it would be true to say that not-being 
belongs to some things” (317b1).  Aristotle derives this conclusion on the grounds 
that just as in qualified generation something must come to be from what-is-not 
in a qualified sense (e.g. the man is not-educated, or not-healthy, etc. and only 
from this condition can he properly come to be educated, healthy, etc.), in simple 
generation too, something must come to be from what-is-not. 
The traditional interpretation of Aristotle‟s theory of generation imputes to 
him a belief in what was called by the scholastics prima materia or Prime Matter.  
Prime Matter is understood to be the utterly formless, pure potentiality that 
ultimately underlies all change including elemental transformation.  It is thought 
to persist throughout elemental generation as that in which the contrary qualities 
that the elements exhibit inhere and that therefore supplies the condition of 
continuity for such changes.  This interpretation has the virtue that it goes a long 
                                                                                                                                                 
(b35) has nothing to do with the distinction between a(plh= ge/nesij and ti\j ge/nesij (cf. 
*17a32-34) which is drawn for the first time at 18a27 ff.” (Joachim 1999, 95).  But the 
text he cites directly conflicts with his interpretation if we are to understand the example 
of the man becoming educated not as a case of substantial generation but rather as an 
alteration or substantial generation which is consistent with Aristotle‟s usual use of this 
illustration: “But this “comes-to-be something,” but does not do so without qualification; 
for we say that the student “comes to be learned,” not “comes to be” without 
qualification” (318a33 cf. also 317a32 and Physics I.7). 
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way in explaining simple generation on the standard Aristotelian model of 
change in which any change involves a replacement of contraries in an enduring 
substrate. 
The Prime Matter interpretation finds support in several passages 
scattered about the Aristotelian corpus.150  The weightiest textual evidence for 
Aristotle‟s belief in prime matter in GC is cryptic and ambiguous.  Bostock for 
example cites the following as indicating that Aristotle held such a view: 
And is the matter for each of these different?  But if that were so, 
they would not come into being from one another or from 
opposites.  (For it is fire, earth, water, and air to which the 
opposites belong.)  Or is it that in one way it is the same matter and 
in another it is different?  For [that, whatever it is, that underlies] is 
the same, but its being is not the same.  (319a34-b4)151 
 
Bostock fails to appreciate that this statement is one in a series of aporiai that 
Aristotle presents to which he proposes more than a single solution.  This passage 
is not meant to be taken as implying Aristotle‟s considered view.  It remains 
unclear at the moment which of the alternatives Aristotle endorses.  For in the 
immediate prequel we find:  
However, a difficulty might be raised whether this thing which is 
not simpliciter is one of the pair of contraries – earth, the heavy 
element, for instance, as what-is-not, and fire, the light element, as 
what-is – or whether, on the contrary, earth too is what-is, whilst 
what is not is the matter that belongs equally to earth and fire. 
(319a30-34) 
                                                 
150 Much of the debate about whether or not Aristotle actually believes in Prime Matter is 
centered around Metaphysics VII.3, Physics I.7-9, GC I.3-4 and II.5.  There is however 
no explicit or sustained treatment of matter in Aristotle that expounds a full blown 
theory of prime matter.  The phrase prw/th u/(lh only occurs a handful of times in the 
corpus and only some of these can be even plausibly be read as supporting a theory of 
prime matter. 
 
151 The translation is Bostock‟s (Bostock 1995, 221-222).  He includes a more accurate 
and literal translation as an alternative in a footnote (Bostock 1995, 222n7). 
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Aristotle began the chapter by addressing the Eleatic paradox of change by 
claiming that something can come into being from what-is-not simply, when 
what-is-not is understood as a potentiality.  The notion of potentiality becomes a 
sort of place-holder for the notion of not-being.  While he shows that supposing 
this carries difficulties of its own, he does not ever reject it.152  Further on 
Aristotle raises the question of which of the elements is more rightly called not-
being.  If the elements really transform into one another and this change is from 
not-being simpliciter into being, one of the elements should represent not-being 
(or potentiality) more than the other which would represent the being (or 
actuality) side of the process. 
Aristotle makes some effort to correct the common opinion that what is 
more perceptible has more being.  For example, it was commonly thought that 
earth has more reality than air because it is more perceptible and tangible 
(318b27 ff.) whereas in Aristotle‟s estimation “they are in truth more of a 
something [ma=llon to/de ti] and form than earth” (318b22).  The two points 
together (that potentiality in some sense holds the place of not-being and that 
some of the elements have “more being” than others) suggests that Aristotle 
thinks that earth may be “what-is-not” and fire “what-is” so that the alternative 
that he poses to this, i.e. the prime matter view, may not be his considered 
view.153  
                                                 
152 Aristotle also endorses this strategy (employing the concepts of potency and act) for 
overcoming the Eleatic paradox in Physics I.8 even if only tangentially. 
 
153 Cf. 318b11 ff. 
 
156 
 
To be sure that he endorsed such a view one would have to have sufficient 
grounds for claiming that he ultimately rejects the view that earth that is 
potentially fire represents the side of not-being while fire represents the side of 
being.  Yet we do not find such sufficient grounds.  Rather, what we have is a 
series of arguments that seem to support the thesis with which he began, namely 
that the elements come to be out of one another as being comes to be out of not-
being or potentiality.  This of course does not preclude the Prime Matter 
interpretation, but also this does not imply the necessity of prime matter either.  
By providing an alternative to this view in the form of a theory that posits a 
matter common to the elements (and that leads to the interpretation requiring 
prime matter), Aristotle need not, and indeed does not, indicate that he holds 
such a view but offers it as a way one might be able to overcome some difficulties 
with the potency/act schema he has outlined. 
The second major source of evidence for the Prime Matter interpretation 
relies on a supposed distinction between perceptible and imperceptible matter.  
In GC I.4 where Aristotle takes up the task of distinguishing between generation 
and alteration, he does so by claiming that even though in both alteration and 
generation there is something which persists throughout the change, in the 
former this substrate is perceptible while in the latter it is imperceptible: 
It is alteration when the underlying thing remains, being 
perceptible, but changes in it affections. […]  But when the thing 
changes as a whole, without anything perceptible remaining as the 
same underlying thing (for example, when the seed as a whole 
becomes blood, or water air, or air water), a case of that sort is 
generation. (319b10-18)154 
                                                 
154 On the perceptibility of the substrate see Gill (1989, 48 ff.). 
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The Prime Matter interpretation assumes that the phrase “without anything 
perceptible remaining” means “something imperceptible remains,” but the 
phrase is ambiguous.  It could also mean that nothing remains at all, much less 
something perceptible.  Aristotle confirms our suspicion a few lines later when he 
says that “when nothing remains of which the other [resulting state] is an 
affection or any other sort of accident, we have generation of one thing and 
destruction of another” (319b35).155  What we are left with is one of the 
conclusions Aristotle drew in GC I.3 that served to deal with the possibility that 
when something perishes it perishes into nothing. 
The prime matter interpretation has the virtue that it resolves some of the 
basic difficulties involved with supposing that the elements come into being from 
one another as being comes to be from not-being simpliciter or from potency.  It 
promises to do this by providing a substrate, which in some sense must be 
construed as a being, which is present from beginning to end even in elemental 
generation.  However, an increasingly popular line of interpretation of Aristotle‟s 
theory of matter, the Functionalist interpretation, finds vice in this supposed 
virtue.  It is precisely because the Prime Matter interpretation employs the model 
of change based on Aristotle‟s analysis of alteration (cf. Physics I.7) in the 
analysis of simple generation that it risks conflating alteration and simple 
generation. 
                                                 
155 There is some confusion among the commentators as to how to interpret this phrase 
and in general the argument to which it contributes.  Cf. Williams (1982, 99 ff.); Gill 
(1989, 50 ff.); Joachim (1999, 108 ff.). 
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In order to avoid confusing generation and alteration by making the 
analogy between the role of the substrate involved in alteration and simple 
generation too strong, the Functionalist interpretation holds that at each level of 
analysis, the material aspect of a given change is best understood by means of the 
function that it plays either in the change itself or in the product of the change.  
That is, the material of any given change is proximate to the product which 
comes to be.  For example, the material for the change of a piece of bronze into a 
statue is of course the bronze, not simply because the statue happens to be made 
of bronze, but rather because bronze, as a material cause, itself has certain 
characteristics without which a statue could not be made (e.g. a degree of 
plasticity which would allow it to be molded but also a certain degree of rigidity 
which makes the statue capable of standing on its own).  The material substrate 
for any given change then is relative to the end toward which the change aims. 
Aristotelian matter is not prime matter that holds the potentiality to 
become all things, rather every instance of matter contains within itself certain 
characteristics that allow it to undergo only certain kinds of changes and act as 
the material for certain kinds of beings.  Functionalist matter is always already 
some matter determined in such a way as to be capable of the change that it 
undergoes.  Without specific positive characteristics at least some of which must 
persist through any change, there would be no change and no identifiable 
terminous ad quo. 
For the Functionalist, material is always the material for something 
particular and is itself more or less particular (318b14).  However, when 
confronting the challenge of elemental change, the Functionalist is forced to 
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admit a strange consequence.  Namely, since they are compelled to admit that 
something must survive in the transformation between elements, in lieu of 
positing prime matter, they are forced to say that one of the positive 
characteristics or contraries that an element exhibits acts as a persisting 
substrate, or more precisely that some subject that is not separable from the 
contrary persists.  But even if a contrary/subject survives one step in the cycle of 
generation, it must be destroyed in the next step, so we really haven‟t come to 
grips with the problem but have only pushed it back a notch.  For example, when 
Air (hot and wet) becomes Fire (hot and dry), what remains is the hot and this 
they claim is the substrate and functional matter of the change.  The three 
principles of the change are thus Air and Fire as the termini and the hot which 
acts as the persisting substrate of the change.  What is typically understood as an 
attribute of a subject or substrate is forced to play the role of subject or substrate. 
Even though both of the above interpretations contain aspects that are 
compelling, neither I think does justice to the depth of the problem of the Eleatics 
that Aristotle is trying to articulate.  While there is evidence for both points of 
view in the GC and indeed throughout the corpus,156 each of the theories 
overestimates what Aristotle thinks he actually achieves.  Both suppose that the 
interpretation they offer can do justice to the Eleatic paradoxes of generation that 
Aristotle is addressing in the Generation and Corruption.  Both seriously 
underestimate the difficulty Aristotle saw in the Eleatic objections.  Aristotle was 
extremely cautious in supposing the paradoxes of change could be definitively 
                                                 
156 Cf. Williams (appendix, 1982) and Gills (appendix, 1989). 
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overcome and because of this offered to his readers more than one option in 
order to deal with the Eleatics.  Instead of offering assertions opposing the Eleatic 
objections to natural science, he offers arguments that allow us to confront the 
Eleatic difficulties without necessarily completely resolving them. 
Both interpretations agree that something must persist throughout every 
type of change.  In alteration, it is clear that something does remain.  This is one 
characteristic that distinguishes alteration from simple generation.  In simple 
generation, however, Aristotle never insists that something must remain 
throughout the change.  He says there is always a substrate, but this is not 
necessarily something that persists and often only designates that from which a 
change begins (cf. my reading of Physics I.7 supra).  The model of change based 
on potency and act does not require a persisting substrate but only that a potency 
be transformed into an actuality. 
Even if the potency - actuality model of change may be more suitable for 
understanding generation, there are serious difficulties involved with it.  Aristotle 
offers us his most powerful concepts to solve the paradox of thinking that in some 
way “not-being can be predicated of some subjects,” however he proceeds to show 
us the difficulty involved with supposing that potency can be equated with not-
being: 
For, if there is coming-to-be without qualification, something must 
come-to-be out of not-being without qualification, so that it would 
be true to say that there are things of which “not-being” can be 
predicated; for some kind of coming-to-be proceeds from some 
kind of not-being, for example, from “not-white” and “not-
beautiful,” but unqualified coming-to-be proceeds from unqualified 
not-being.  But even when these distinctions have been made, there 
remains a question of remarkable difficulty, which we must take up 
once again, namely, how is coming to be simpliciter possible, 
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whether from what is potentially or some other way.  One might as 
well wonder whether there is coming to be of substance and the 
individual, as opposed to quality, quantity, and place (and the same 
question arises in the case of ceasing to be).  For if something comes 
to be, clearly there will exist potentially, not actually, some 
substance from which the coming to be will arise and into which 
that which ceases to be has to change.  Now will any of the others 
belong to this actually? What I mean is this: Will that which is only 
potentially individual and existent, but neither individual nor 
existent simpliciter, have any quality, quality, or place?  If it has 
none of these, but all of them potentially, that which in this sense is 
not will consequently be separable, and further, the principle and 
perpetual fear of the early philosophers will be realized, namely, the 
coming to be of something from nothing previously existing.  But if 
being individual and a substance are not going to belong to it while 
some of the other things we have mentioned are, the affections will, 
as we have remarked, be separable from the substances. (317b2) 
 
It is one thing to assert that change can take place by virtue of a potency.  It is 
another to be able to explain exactly what potency or potentiality is in its own 
right.  Simply by calling not-being potentiality, we are not freed from the 
question of the character of not-being though we may be a step closer to making 
it intelligible. 
In order to explore the question of the nature of potency and not-being in 
the context of the question of the intelligibility of change, it will be of great help 
to see how the concept of potency and act operates in Aristotle‟s definition of 
motion.  It is not an accident that the definition of motion is framed in terms of 
potency and act and that there is some question as to whether generation 
simpliciter (substantial generation) can be subsumed under this definition.  In 
the following chapter, I will investigate the role of potency in the definition of 
motion with the aim of determining whether or not substantial generation can be 
included in the kinds of change covered by Aristotle‟s definition of motion in 
Physics III.  This will first require a clarification, motivated by the above passage 
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from GC, on the nature of the potency involved substantial generation that we 
find in Physics II.1. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Substantial Generation and  
the Definition of Motion 
 
 
 
What more exquisite jargon could the 
wit of man invent than this definition? – 
“The act of a being in power, as far forth 
as in power;” which would puzzle any 
rational man, to whom it was not 
already known by its famous absurdity, 
to guess what word it could ever be 
supposed to be the explication of. 
John Locke, Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding Book III 
ch. 4.8 
 
Our Cartesian heritage easily allows us to forget why a definition of motion 
might be important.  It has become unclear why we even ought to regard the 
meaning of motion as anything but self-evident.  Indeed, almost no practicing 
scientist feels compelled to undertake an effort to understand what the word 
motion actually means.  The modern scientist is content to know that motion is 
without feeling the necessity of knowing what it is.  Such an account of „what‟ 
motion is might not even be considered to belong to „science‟ but rather to the 
„speculations of philosophy.‟   We ought to remember that this distinction 
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between philosophy and science is a modern one; for the Ancients this kind of 
distinction is less clear cut.  This raises a question as to whether modern science 
has lost the sense of its original goal.  If modern science renounces an obligation 
to understand those concepts and realities it inevitably presupposes, the meaning 
of modern science exposes itself to the danger of being lost.157  These 
observations alone provide plausible motivation for investigating and taking 
seriously Aristotle‟s definition of motion.  However, our main concern at present 
is more modest.  What we are interested in exploring in the following is the 
narrower question concerning the relationship between the definition of motion 
and substantial generation.  But first we must begin by making some effort to 
understand Aristotle‟s definition of motion. 
Since Aristotle has shown in Physics V that substantial generation is not 
properly a ki/nhsij, the question remains whether or not substantial generation is 
compatible with the definitions of motion in book III.  That is, there is a question 
as to whether the definition of motion is general enough to encompass 
                                                 
157 Cf. Husserl‟s Crisis of the European Sciences (1970, 14-16) and the essays The Origin 
of Geometry and The Vienna Lecture in the same volume.  Husserl argues that there is a 
significant break with the premodern conception of philosophy (the tradition stemming 
from the ancient Greeks continuing into Medieval philosophy) with the rise of the 
modern sciences which eclipses the original methods and goals of the philosophy and 
science of the premoderns.  Heidegger in contrast rejects the idea of the discontinuity of 
the tradition of philosophy on the grounds of his analysis of the relation between the 
Greek conceptions of art and nature which he thinks demonstrates a fundamental 
similarity between the Greek concept of te/xnh and the modern idea of technology (cf. 
Heidegger‟s “The Question Concerning Technology” (1993, 318-320).  For Heidegger, the 
destiny of Greek philosophy culminates with the success of the modern technological 
sciences.  Heidegger formulated this understanding of the trajectory of western thought 
as early as 1926 in the opening remarks to his lecture course entitled Basic Concepts of 
Ancient Philosophy: “Aim [of the course]: a penetrating understanding of the basic 
scientific concepts, ones which not only have determined – decisively determined – all 
subsequent philosophy but which have also made possible Western science as a whole 
and today still provide that science its foundations” (Heidegger 2008, 1). 
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substantial generation despite the exclusion in book V.  What is at stake in 
establishing the commensurability between substantial generation and the 
definition of motion is precisely whether or not knowledge of substantial 
generation is possible within the scope of the science of nature: “Since nature is a 
source of motion and of change, and our pursuit is for nature, we must not let 
what motion is remain hidden” (200b12).  It is clear initially that the various 
formulations of the definition of change given in Physics III are meant to be very 
general.  They are at least general enough to maintain at least nominally the 
interchangeable use of metabolh/ and ki/nhsij Aristotle has exhibited up to this 
point in the Physics and to include both terms in the formulations of the 
definitions.  What then are we to make of the fact that in book V Aristotle 
restricts the scope of ki/nhsij by distinguishing it from the more general class of 
metabolh/?  Is the refinement in book V meant to be also a retroactive restriction 
and exclusion of substantial generation from the definitions of motion in book 
III?  If substantial generation is excluded from the definition of motion, its status 
as a subject of knowledge for natural science is called into question. 
Once we reach the core of the definition we will see that the concept of 
potentiality at work in it is also the critical concept needed at this stage of our 
investigation into the intelligibility substantial generation.  In the following, I will 
discuss in detail the axioms underlying the definition of motion, the possible 
problem of circularity of the definition, the relation of the definition to the 
categories, and end with an interpretation of the definition which takes account 
of grammatical details that competing interpretations cannot and which sheds 
light on some of the difficulties posed by substantial generation.  If we find that 
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substantial generation can be understood in terms of the definition of motion, 
this will in turn show how substantial generation is both intelligible and 
compatible with the study of nature.   
 
4.1 Preface to the Definition 
Physics III marks, as it were, a third beginning to the investigation into 
nature.  Book one gave us the first beginning establishing the necessary principles 
of natural science with its point of departure in the consideration of his 
predecessors.  Book two began afresh by explaining what is meant by the term 
phusis and to explicate the causes that are appropriate to natural science.  And 
now in book three Aristotle turns to start again with a third set of conceptual 
tools providing a definition of motion that will pervade all physical inquiry.158   
Aristotle begins by stating why change [metabolh/] needs clarification: 
“For it is necessary, being ignorant of it [change], to be ignorant also of nature” 
(200b13).159  In the roughly seven formulations that embody Aristotle‟s 
                                                 
158 Another way of considering these differences more specifically is as follows.  In 
Physics I, motion is approached from the point of view of contraries and substrate.  
Physics II considers motion in terms of nature as an inner principle and the four causes.  
In book three, Aristotle employs the ideas of potentiality and actuality to determine the 
essence of motion. 
 
159 Here and following I will translate ki/nhsij as motion and metabolh/ as change 
faithfully to eliminate any confusion in terms.  Occasionally translators either transpose 
the translation of these two terms or translate ki/nhsij as change and metabolh/ as 
mutation or some equivalent.  When referring to a commentary or translation that 
translates in a way different from my own, I will alter their translation to conform to my 
own usage for the sake of clarity. 
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definition, he for the most part maintains the use of ki/nhsij.160  It is clear that at 
this point he is still using this term interchangeably with metabolh/.161 
After foreshadowing the investigations into the infinite, time, place, and 
void (the necessary concomitants of motion) which follow the initial discussion of 
motion (200b16-24, cf. III.4-8 and Physics IV), Aristotle lays out a series of 
presuppositions necessary for the definition of motion.162  First, he makes a 
distinction between those things which exist in complete actuality (to\ me\n 
e)ntelexei/a| mo/non, 200b26) and those which exist both in potentiality and 
actuality (to\ de\ duna/mei kai\ e)ntelexei/a|, 200b26-7).  The beings to which the 
definition will apply belong to the latter class (the former being the unchanging 
beings always existing in actuality including the prime mover and other 
“unmoved movers”). 
As an addendum, Aristotle mentions the categories in order to add that 
motion belongs to all the ways of being.  Of the things that are subject to motion 
they are “either being a this, being this much, being of this kind, or similarly with 
the other ways of attributing being” (220b29-30, emphasis mine).  The fact that 
Aristotle includes all of the categories has caused confusion among 
commentators.  Aristotle indicates that motion takes place in all of the categories 
                                                 
160 201a11, 201a28, 201b4, 201b33, 202a7, 202a15, and 202b27. 
 
161 Cf. Physics 218b18: “That then, time is not motion is clear, and it makes no difference 
to us in the present inquiry to speak of motion or change.” 
 
162 Cf. Simplicius (2002, 15), Philoponus (1994, 13 and 18), and Aquinas (1999, 151). 
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(because potentiality and actuality are present in each of the categories) 163, but 
even when Aristotle restricts the usage of ki/nhsij in Book V the only category 
excluded from ki/nhsij yet included in the class metabolh/ is substance. 
Many commentators find this to be a problem given Aristotle‟s remarks in 
Physics V.  However, an insight shared by a number of medieval Islamic 
philosophers may offer a viable solution.  Ibn as Samh, for example, makes a 
distinction between „accidental‟ and „essential‟ motion: “Motion exists in all the 
categories, but it will be explained that in some categories motion exists only 
accidentally, not essentially – for instance, in the category of the relative” (169, 1-
4; quoted from Lettinck 1994, 195).  Motion proper (ki/nhsij) would belong to the 
categories of quality, quantity, and place alone and motion in these categories 
will be „essential‟ motion.  Motion will be found in the rest of the categories only 
„accidentally‟ as concomitants of the three types of „essential‟ motion.  Thus 
motion will occur accidentally in the categories of relation (as Ibn as Samh 
mentions), action, passion, time (though this is redundant being posterior to 
motion), and also substance.  The inclusion of substance in the list of accidental 
motion poses a special problem of its own.  For although substantial generation, 
                                                 
163 Aquinas (1999, 142): “[…] He sets forth three divisions.  The first is that being is 
divided by potency and act.  This division does not distinguish the genera of beings, for 
potency and act are found in every genus.  The second division is that being is divided 
into the ten genera, of which one is „a this‟, i.e. substance, another „quantity‟, or „quality‟ 
or one of the other predicaments.  The third division pertains to the category of relation.  
Motion seems in some way to belong to this genus, insofar as the mover is referred to the 
mobile object.  In order to understand this third division, it must be noted that, since 
relation has the weakest existence because it consists in being related to another, it is 
necessary, for a relation to be grounded upon some other accident.  For more perfect 
accidents are closer to substance, and through their mediation the other accidents are in 
substance.”  For Aquinas‟ remarks on these presuppositions of motion see Aquinas 1999, 
140-144. 
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according to Aristotle, always involves motion in one of the categories (cf. 
Metaphysics 1042b3 and my discussion of Physics I.7 above), this inclusion may 
violate the notion that substantial generation could be reduced to alteration or 
some other kind of motion (190b18).164 
The second axiom at first appears to bring motion under the category of 
relation: 
Being in relation to something is attributed to exceeding and falling 
short, or to what acts and what is acted upon, or generally to what 
moves [something] and what is moved; for what moves is a mover 
of something moved, and what is moved is moved by something 
moving, and there is no motion apart from things. (200b30-4) 
 
This dense sentence intimates several aporiai that Aristotle deals with in the 
course of the discussion of motion.  What is the relation of the mover and moved?  
What is the mode of being of motion; is it something separate from the things 
that move and are moved?  In which of the two beings in the relation of mover 
and moved ought we to understand the presence of motion?  This statement is 
puzzling in that it seems to limit motion to the category of relation.  In book V, 
                                                 
164 Wolfson provides a quite ingenious reconstruction of a distinction in Aristotle 
between what Wolfson calls a „sustaining subject‟ and a „material subject‟ which relies on 
and follows from the distinction between essential and accidental motion.  On Wolfson‟s 
reading the problem of how to divide up ki/nhsij and metabolh/ is easy once we make a 
distinction between accidental and essential motion.  Unfortunately, this leaves us in the 
position of understanding substantial generation as accidental and hence a derivative 
kind of motion (cf. Wolfson 1971, 71-75 and 507 ff.).  There is a related difficult of 
reconciling this inclusion of motion with his usual statement of either four categories in, 
for example, Categories 14 15a ff. and De Anima I.3 406a.  Wolfson: “It is true, Aristotle 
has stated that there is no motion in the categories of relation, action, and passion, but 
he did not explicitly say that there is no change in those categories.  Furthermore, in one 
place at least, Aristotle has stated quite the contrary, namely, that there is motion in the 
categories of action and passion” (1971, 71-2).  It is at this point that Wolfson makes an 
appeal to the distinction between sustaining and material subjects to help Aristotle: “if 
you consider change with reference to the sustaining subject, it may be found also in 
some of the other categories” (1971, 73, cf. 500 ff.).  Cf. also Simplicius (2002, 19). 
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Aristotle claims that changes in relation are not properly motions but changes in 
the wider sense.165  Motion seems to belong most appropriately to the category of 
relation as it always involves the relation of mover and moved.  But relation is 
understood primarily in terms of quantity (exceeding and falling short, 200b31) 
as well as action and passion (200b32).  In the discussion of the Pythagorean and 
Platonic understandings of motion, Aristotle will determine to which of these 
motion belongs (201b20 ff.).  Ultimately, Aristotle relates motion not with the 
relation of excess and defect as Plato had but with the relation of action and 
passion.  This foreshadows his final and richest articulation of the definition of 
motion which includes reference to action and passion. 
Aristotle illustrates the relation of motion to the categories as a whole, 
whether it is a genus separate from the others, whether it is applicable to all and 
further whether it is thus predicated univocally or equivocally with regard to each 
of the categories.  Or to put it in Platonic terms, whether there is a Form of 
Motion itself by itself.166  Because things change either  
in being [ou)si/an], or in quantity, or in quality, or in place, and 
there is nothing to take hold of which is common to these, and is 
neither, in our manner of speaking, a this much, nor an of-this-
kind, nor any of the kinds of being: so that neither motion nor 
change will be anything apart from the things named, since there is, 
in fact, nothing other than the things named. (200b34) 
   
                                                 
165 Aquinas takes it that “motion seems in some way to belong to this genus [relation], 
insofar as the mover is referred to the mobile object” (Aquinas 1999, 142).  Aquinas 
softens the difficulty remarking that “relation has the weakest existence” because a 
relation is always dependent on two subjects residing in another category.  Simplicius 
raises the question relevant here, “But if all change is viewed in the category of relation 
as consisting in changer and changed, how can changes, being in one genus, not be 
univocally named but be equivocally named?” (Simplicius 2002, 20). 
 
166 Cf. Simplicius (2002, 19). 
 
171 
 
Since the categories are exhaustive, and potentiality and actuality are present in 
them all, motion too will belong to each of the categories since it is not a separate 
genus of its own. 
There is a difficulty here concerning whether motion applies to all of the 
categories in the same way.  If motion is predicated equivocally in each of the 
categories, is there a category to which the term motion applies more than 
others?  Is it the same with motion as health is in a doctor, in medicine, in urine, 
and in the body, as all of these are healthy in reference to the health of the body 
as cause, instrument, indication, and subject of health (to paraphrase Aristotle 
and Aquinas)?  Further, if motion is predicated equivocally among the categories, 
its definition must also likewise be equivocal in the suitable way.  As Simplicius 
remarks, “It has already been said that change is not predicated of the many 
kinds of change univocally but is among the terms with many senses.  Since it is 
such, its definition must also be taken equivocally” (2002, 32).167  Philoponus has 
another way of putting what I take to be the same point: “His intent, then, is not 
strictly to give a definition of change, but to sketch an account which will square 
with every change by analog, just as he has done in the case of soul” (1994, 15).168 
                                                 
167 Simplicius at length: “But if change is equivocally named, how does he define it?  For 
there are no definitions of the equivocally named, or else the definition of the equivocally 
named is also equivocal.  For since the primary (arche) is equivocally named the 
definition that says that the primary is the first in each thing is also equivocal.  Moreover, 
the actuality of the changed qua changed will be equivocal.  For the product of the 
equivocals is equivocal” (2002, 21). 
 
168 Aquinas shares a similar view: “In these genera there is no common univocal thing 
which would be their genus and which would not be contained under some predicament.  
Rather being is common to them by analogy, as is demonstrated in Metaphysics IV.  
Hence it is clear that there is no motion or mutation outside the above mentioned 
genera.  For there is nothing beyond these genera, since they divide being sufficiently 
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 To summarize, the axioms Aristotle has presented in preparation for his 
definition of motion are:  a) there are some beings which are only actual and 
some that are both potential and actual; b) all of the beings that are both 
potential and actual are contained by the ten categories, so that motion will be of 
things in any one of the categories; and c) there is no genus of motion over and 
above the categories, i.e. there is no Form of Motion in the Platonic sense.169  
These axioms serve to demarcate the domain of beings to which the definition of 
motion will apply (i.e. dividing off natural from divine beings), show the scope of 
the definition among those beings to which it applies, and ultimately prepare us 
for the right sort of definition (an equivocal definition for an equivocal term). 
 
4.2 Analysis of the Definition 
Physics III.1-3 supply a progressive, dialectical definition of motion.  They 
constitute a single definition of motion, though some formulations are more 
important than others and some are merely reiterations of a more primary 
formulation.  There are nonetheless three identifiable and distinct versions of the 
definition.  Here are the formulations in the order they appear in the text: 
                                                                                                                                                 
well.  He will show below how motion is related to the predicament of action or passion 
[cf. Physics III.3]” (Aquinas 1999, 143). 
 
169 Cf. 200b32 ff.  Heidegger puts this well: “Ki/nhsij is not para\ ta\ pra/gmata [“beside 
the things”] (200b32f.), is not a ge/noj; on the contrary, in each case only as a 
determination of Being, characteristic of a being which is such and such, and indeed it 
applies to ou)si/a, kata\ poso/n, poio/n, to/pon [„with respect to quantity, quality, place‟] 
(cf. 200b34).  Koino\n {…} ou)de\n {…} labei=n [„something common to them cannot be 
found‟] (200b34f.)” (Heidegger 2008, 143). 
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1) “A distinction having been made in each kind of being between 
the fully active and what is only potentially, the entelecheia170 of 
whatever is potentially [duna/mei], just as such [h(|= toiou=ton], is 
motion” (201a9). 
2) “The entelecheia of what is potentially [duna/mei], whenever, 
being fully at work, it is at work not as itself but just as 
movable171 is motion” (201a27). 
3) “The entelecheia of a potentiality [dunatou=], as a potentiality [h=(| 
dunato/n], is motion” (201b4). 
4) “Motion seems to be a certain energeia, but incomplete” 
(201b31).172 
5) “Motion is the entelecheia of the movable, as movable” 
 (202a7).173 
6) “The entelecheia of the thing causing motion is nothing other 
than this, for it [motion] must be the entelecheia of both” 
(202a15).   
                                                 
170 The terms e)ne/rgeia and e)nte/lexeia remain untranslated at the moment for the sake 
clarity though for there seems to be no discernable difference between the two in this 
context. 
 
171 An alternate reading from version I (I = Vat. 241, saec. Xiii) of the text in the OCT 
reads “not as itself but as another” (o)ux h|(= au)to\ a)ll‟ h(|= a)/llo) in place of “not as itself 
but as movable” (o)ux h|(= au)to\ a)ll‟ h(|= kinhto/n) in Ross‟ text.  The text of version I echoes 
the discussion of potentiality in Metaphysics IX.1 (e.g. 1045b11) and if correct would 
help remove the problem of circularity from this formulation. 
 
172 Cf. De Anima III.7 431a6-7: “motion is actuality of the incomplete, but the actuality 
simply is other, it is the actuality of that which has been completed” (translation from 
Polansky 2007, 482).  Compare also De Anima 416a16-17, Metaphysics 1048b29-36, and 
Physics 257b6-9 (the only place where Aristotle pairs entelecheia rather than energeia 
with ateles). 
 
173 Cf. Physics 251a10 repeats this formulation in book eight.  This formulation and the 
surrounding passages also occur in Metaphysics XI.9 (cf. 1065b16 for the formulation of 
the definition. 
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7) “Motion is the entelecheia of the potentially-active-or-acted-
upon [h( tou= duna/mei poihtikou= kai paqetikou=] as such, both 
simply and in each case” (202b26). 
 
Formulations (1) & (3) constitute the primary formulation of the definition which 
we will identify as type one formulations.174  Formulations (2) & (5) have been the 
source of the majority of confusion about Aristotle‟s definition.  When we refer to 
type two formulations, these are being referred to.  Formulations (6) and (7) are 
closely related and represent the fullest articulation of the Aristotle‟s definition.  
These, which we could call type three though we do not discuss them further, are 
only different from type one formulations by the addition of predicates action and 
passion into the definition.175  The significance of this addition, while important 
for a full understanding of Aristotle‟s definition of motion, is beyond the scope of 
the current essay.176 
The first thing to note is an important semantic peculiarity of the 
definition.  In this definition we have a paradoxical mixture of two of Aristotle‟s 
principle terms which is easily lost in English translation: Motion is the actuality 
of a potentiality insofar as it is a potentiality.  One of Aristotle‟s formulations of 
this brings out the paradox well: “So motion seems to be a certain energia, but 
                                                 
174 Formulation (4) does not really deserve a type designation of its own but can be 
viewed as a lemma to the type 1 formulations. 
 
175 Simplicius, for example, identifies three distinct definitions: (3), (4), and (7) each 
being distinct and increasing the adequacy and exactness of the previous (Simplicius 
2002, 155n174), (3) is most general and defines in terms more primary than motion 
(potency and act), (4) restricts the scope of the definition to four of the ten categories, (7) 
includes a reference to the changer and the changed which yields a complete definition. 
 
176 For a detailed treatment I refer the reader to Gill‟s seminal essay on Physics III.3 (Gill 
1980). 
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incomplete (a)telh\j)” (201b31).  Energeia, along with its fraternal twin 
entelecheia, signifies the complete being of something, something which is not 
lacking anything that is proper to its being.  To say that an energeia or 
entelecheia is incomplete is prima facie oxymoronic: an entelecheia is ateles.  
When potentiality (du/namij), which is by nature incomplete, is somehow 
understood as in full or complete activity, Aristotle tells us, this is motion.  The 
full actuality of what is by nature incomplete is motion.  The incomplete nature of 
potentiality only manifests itself in motion which is the only phenomenon in 
which we can observe the incomplete, and therefore also potentiality, as such.177  
We will see further on that the dependent clauses, h(|= toiou=ton and h(|= dunato/n, in 
the full formulations of the definition strengthen the oxymoronic quality. 
 
i The Charge of Circularity 
Aristotle has often been accused of proposing a definition of motion which 
is patently circular and for this reason not a legitimate definition.  Commentators 
who charge Aristotle with such an amateur blunder focus on type two 
formulations of the definition and read the others through it.178  Formulations (2) 
and (5), while of course not incorrect, add little substance to the definition.  
                                                 
177 “If the only way in which potentiality can exist unfulfilled is in the form of a change 
towards its fulfillment, such a change or ki/nhsij is the only form of actual existence 
which a potentiality can enjoy insofar as it is only a potentiality (i.e. insofar as it is 
unfulfilled). But to say this is to assent verbatim to Aristotle‟s famous definition of 
ki/nhsij” (Hintikka 1977, 60). 
 
178 Formulation (2) “The entelecheia of what is potentially, whenever, being fully at work 
[e)ntelexei/a|], it is at work not as itself but just as movable [h|=( kinhto/n] is motion” 
(201a28), and (5) “Motion is the entelecheia of the movable, as movable” (202a7). 
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However, this is only a problem if we try to understand these formulations before 
the others.  If we overlook the priority of the definitions (even if only the order of 
their exposition) we risk accusing Aristotle of what would really be an amateur 
blunder.  It is therefore important to read the second definition not as a simple 
repetition of the first but as offering some refinement or modification or 
description. 
Even attempts by sympathetic readers of Aristotle have found it difficult 
navigate their way out of the apparent circularity of the definition.  The most 
notable example is Ross who understands by the phrase “entelecheia of a 
potentiality” the “actualization of a potentiality” using a synonym for motion in 
the very definition of motion.179  Ross has been rightly criticized and corrected by 
Kosman180 (whose view has received almost unanimous consent in current 
scholarship) and Joe Sachs.181  Recently some dissent has generated in opposition 
to Kosman‟s interpretation which,182 while not wholly adopting Ross‟ 
interpretation, tries to revive the idea that entelecheia should be understood as 
                                                 
179 Cf. Ross 1966, 81-82.  Many distinguished commentators and philosophers have fallen 
prey to this misunderstanding of Aristotle‟s definition.  Maimonides interprets it such a 
way that renders it a circular as well: “Every motion is the change and transition from 
potentiality to actuality” Guide of the Perplexed Part II, Axiom 5 (Maimonides 1963, 
236).  Also, Shem-tob Falaquera: “a certain learned man said: „motion is a first entelechy 
[of that which is] in potentiality insofar as it is in potentiality, and if you prefer you may 
say that it is a transition from potentiality to actuality‟” (Wolfson 1971, 525; also cited by 
Sachs 1976, 12).  Descartes‟ own definition suffers also from a similar and perhaps worse 
circularity of definition: “motion… is nothing more than the action by which any body 
passes from one place to another” (Principles II. 24). 
 
180 Cf. Kosman 1969. 
 
181 Cf. Sachs 1976.  Sachs for the most part is in agreement with Kosman but gives a kind 
of genealogy of the modern misinterpretations in a way that renders his account clearer 
than Kosman‟s. 
 
182 The primary examples are Kostman (1987) and Heinaman (1994). 
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“actualization” in the formulation of motion as the “entelecheia of a potentiality, 
qua potentiality” despite the fact of its blatant circularity.183 
 
ii The Relations Between the Formulations 
In order to address the problem of circularity one need only recognize that 
there is an important priority among the several formulations of the definition of 
motion.  To avoid circularity, the formulations should be prioritized and 
characterized as follows: (1), (3), and (7) are the most substantial formulations 
being free from the problem of the circularity.  (4) and (6) are helpful 
clarifications and developments of what is implicit in (1), (3), and (7).  According 
to several Islamic commentators, (2) and (5) constitute a refinement to the 
formulations (1) and (3) by restricting the definition of motion to apply only to 
those categories to which it properly applies, i.e. substantial generation, 
alteration, change in quality, and change in quantity. 
 Each of these formulations is meant to address a specific aporia which 
Aristotle develops in the course of Physics III.1-3.  For example, having made the 
distinction between dunamis and energeia, the question arises as to which of 
                                                 
183 Generally there are two camps into which the commentators on Aristotle‟s definition 
of motion fall.  One camp, the most prevalent at the moment, understands entelecheia in 
the definition to refer to the „product‟ or complete actuality; the other takes entelecheia 
to mean actualization or process.  The former we can label the „actuality-view‟ and the 
latter the „process-view‟ following James Kostman.  The process-view which derives from 
Ross‟ interpretation has fallen somewhat into ill repute in recent scholarship though 
Ross has found support from Penner (1970, 393-360, and especially 427-433), Kostman 
(1987), and Heinaman (1994).  Sachs points out that Ross‟ interpretation has its origins 
in Maimonides and Averroes (Sachs 1976, 14).  The advocates of the actuality-view 
include Kosman (1969), Hintikka (1977, 59-77), Hussey (1983, 55-65), Gill (1980, 129-
147, especially 130-133), Owens (1978, 120-132), and Broadie (1982, chapter 3). 
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these motion belongs.  Also from the discussion of axioms, there is still a question 
as to which of the categories motion belongs.  These could be thought of as 
distinctions of what motion „is‟ and what motion is „of‟.  Is motion a dunamis or 
an energeia?  And to which of the categories does the concept of motion apply?   
The first formulation of the definition is designed to address the first question.  
The second formulation narrows the scope of the definition to the categories 
proper to change.  Before the definition Aristotle argued that change can be found 
in all of the categories of being (201a9).  In the second formulation he begins to 
solve the aporia of which of these it belongs to most by making an appeal to the 
things in motion or which are movable.184 
Formulation four arises out of a peculiarity about motion which concerned 
Plato and the Pythagoreans, namely that “motion seems to be something 
indefinite [a)o/riston], while a whole array of negative principles seems also to be 
indefinite, since none of them is a this nor an of-this-kind nor belongs to any of 
the other ways of attributing being” (201b25) on account of which they were apt 
to place motion in the genre of “otherness or inequality or non-being” (201b21).  
                                                 
184 Several Arab commentators defend formulations (2) and (5) from the circularity 
charge on the grounds that the “movable” is better known than “motion” itself (Averroes 
[Ibn Rusd], Ibn Bajja, etc.; for these and more see Lettinck 1994).  This does not however 
completely resolve the objection of Aristotle‟s critics.  What would need to be shown is 
how formulations (2) & (5) contribute and elucidate the first formulation in the 
progression of the arguments in III.1-3. They claim that the first definition (“the 
entelecheia of whatever is potentially, just as such, is motion” (201a11)) holds for all of 
the categories of being while the formulations in (2) and (5) restrict the broader 
formulation to the categories to which motion properly applies.  At this point prior to 
Physics V this includes all four kinds of motion: alteration, growth, locomotion, and 
generation.  This appeal to the greater familiarity of the moved and things in motion over 
motion as such allows Aristotle to say by the end of chapter one that the “definition has 
been well stated” and proceed to a defense of further objections arising from 
predecessors views about the character of motion in chapter two. 
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Motion seems to involve, or even more strongly, even simply be, some sort of lack 
or negation.  The proximity of the Eleatic paradoxes of motion and the ban on the 
study of nature should be felt strongly here.  It is precisely this aspect of the 
phenomenon of motion that led many of Aristotle‟s predecessors to believe that 
strict knowledge of movable beings, nature, and even the idea of motion itself was 
not possible.  The formulations that qualify motion and change as some sort of 
incomplete energeia contribute very little to the definition, but we can 
understand their role as a response and partial capitulation to Plato and the 
Pythagoreans.  These are presented primarily to address the concern of Aristotle‟s 
predecessors that motion partakes in the indefinite.185 
Formulation six contains another principle which addresses a specific 
aporia:  “And the riddle [a)porou/menon] is now solved, since motion is in the 
thing moved” (202a13).186  The aporia concerning „where‟ motion might be if it is 
                                                 
185  This distinction of “being incomplete” is more helpful and perhaps necessary for 
distinguishing motion from energeia in the strictest sense.  We find such an analysis in 
these terms in a controversial passage in Metaphysics IX.6 (especially 1048b19-1049a1).  
This passage has been a major preoccupation for analytic philosophers who are primarily 
concerned with language and who think that Aristotle must have been too.  There is a 
very large literature on this subject which has its roots in an essay in Ryle‟s Dilemmas 
(1954) and Ackrill‟s response to it (1965).  Ackrill‟s essay is responded to in turn by Terry 
Penner (1970).  The debate stems from the interpretation of the so-called “tense test” by 
which Aristotle is thought ground the distinction between kineseis and energeai by 
means of the linguistic difference between activities which can be expressed in the 
present and the perfect tenses concurrently (e.g. seeing and having seeing; living and 
having lived) and those for which the two tenses do not coincide (e.g. building and was 
built, in which case the state of having been built only occurs once building is no longer 
going on).  Polanksy (1983) correctly reorients the discussion of the difference between 
kineseis and energeai by arguing that the distinction is not primarily linguistic but based 
on the peculiar features that many  psychical activities have that most physical motions 
do not.  That is, being complete at every moment, “the end is in the activity itself” 
(Polansky 1983, 165; cf. 160-1). 
 
186 Sachs (1991, 43) thinks the reference is to Zeno fragment 4 in Diels: “The moving 
thing is in motion neither where it is nor where it is not.” 
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not a separate entity in its own right has been present all along but only now is 
Aristotle in a position to solve it with the argument that “motion is in the thing 
moved.”  Given motion entails the interaction of two subjects (the mover and the 
moved), the activity (e)nerge/ia) of the mover is the being-moved of the moved and 
that motion is the entelecheia of both the mover and the moved.  This must not 
be misunderstood as saying that motion is somehow also in the mover for he says 
in the immediate prequel that motion is in or of the thing moved but also from 
the mover (202a13).  Formulation seven will incorporate the solution to this 
aporia in the final and most comprehensive formulation of the definition. 
(It was not uncommon for medieval commentators to reduce the several 
formulations to two distinct definitions of motion.  The first is exemplified by 
formulation (1) and the second by formulation (5) (cf. Wolfson 1971, 523).  
Generally they determine the priority through a consideration of which the 
categories the term motion applies to most.  It is important to understand the 
priority of the formulations in order that we keep ourselves from reading a 
posterior formulation backwards into one prior and to avoid the problem of 
circularity.  Many ancient commentators agreed that there is in actually more 
than one version of the definition or at least that the initial definition evolves over 
the course of book III.  On the importance of a particular formulation over 
another and their meaning, there is wide disagreement and was a subject of a 
lively debate among Neoplatonic and Medieval commentators.  (See endnote for 
a selection of passages relevant to this debate.)187 
                                                 
187
 According to Simplicius, Aristotle modifies the first formulation of the definition lest 
the reader think that change is something merely potential.  He therefore reads the 
181 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
second formulation as anticipating the discussion of the difference between motion of 
bronze becoming a statue from the bronze itself which immediately follows: 
 
He now gives a more complete definition by adding that the potential 
object whose actualization is change is not only potential, but it is 
completely something also in actuality, since it is a determinate nature 
among the existents.  (Simplicius 2002, 39, emphasis mine) 
 
Philoponus understands the second formulation to be a restriction of the first definition 
to the categories to which it properly applies and hence as a modification: 
 
Aristotle, in view of the fact that potential being belongs to every category 
but change does not belong to all, reasonably amends his definition. 
(Philoponus 1994, 39) 
 
Aquinas provides an illustration of how to understand the relation of the two definitions 
and which prioritizes the first definition over the second: 
 
It can be said that he sets forth another definition of motion which is 
[subordinately] related to the definition already given as the material is 
related to the formal and as a conclusion is related to a premise.  The 
definition is as follows: motion is the act of the mobile object insofar as it 
is mobile. (Aquinas 1999, 152, emphasis mine) 
Shem-tob Falaquera also finds the first formulation more helpful in that it gets at the 
“nature” of motion whereas the second definition acts as an articulation of a sort of 
essential accident of motion:  
A certain learned man said: „motion is a first entelechy [of that which is] 
in potentiality in so far as it is in potentiality, and if you prefer you may 
say that it is a transition from potentiality to actuality.‟  The first 
definition explains more accurately the nature of motion than the second, 
for motion must exist potentially, being something intermediate between 
potentiality and actuality […].  It must combine both potentiality and 
actuality. (quoted from Wolfson 1971, 525, emphasis; also cited by Sachs 
1976) 
Averroes finds formulation 5) (the second definition) more helpful:  
The first definition [formulations 1) & 3)] is, according to him [Aristotle], 
equivocal and not especially appropriate and applicable to motion in the 
strict sense of the term [i.e. the sense which is restricted to the four 
primary kinds of motion].  In the second definition he finds that the 
differentia is derived from the term which forms the subject of the 
definition, [hence the charge of circularity].  […] This differentia, used in 
the present [the second] definition, though not the same as the differentia 
used in the first definition, being a differentia derived from the subject of 
motion, is still superior to the differentia used in the first definition, for it 
does not contain that equivocation which is contained in the term 
potentiality. (Wolfson 1971, 523-4, emphasis mine) 
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The key to avoiding circularity in definition is recognizing the priority of 
the definitions.  It is the mis-prioritization of the formulations that is responsible 
for most of the modern misunderstandings of the definition including the charge 
of circularity.  Let us then look at the most important formulations in more detail 
to get a view to the difficulties they have engendered and how these might be 
resolved.  We will then see how the second definition follows from the first and 
how the other formulations are lemmas to these. 
 
4.3 Interpreting the Definition 
Now that we have some sense of the importance of the priority of the 
formulations, we can get a deeper grasp of the definition itself by looking at its 
primary articulation, namely those of type one.  There are typically two 
approaches taken by commentators interpreting Aristotle‟s definition of motion.  
The first is the actuality-view which understands entelecheia and energeia 
always to signify a state of being rather than a process.  The process-view on the 
other hand interprets energeia as “process-product” ambiguous in order to 
account for the idea that motion is a type of energeia.  We will find that the 
                                                                                                                                                 
An anonymous supercommentary on Averroes clarifies: 
 
This differentia, even though not as good as that used in the first 
definition, being a differentia derived from the subject of motion, whereas 
that of the first definition is derived from the things which are only 
appropriate and applicable to motion, is still superior to the differentia 
used in the first definition […] because it cannot be applied to any other 
category outside the four genera of motion, namely substance, quantity, 
quality, and place, whereas the first definition may be applied to all the 
ten categories, for in all the ten categories there are a potential and an 
actual. (Wolfson 1971, 524-5) 
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actuality-view is not only truer to Aristotle‟s text, but is of significant assistance 
with our original problem of reconciling the definition of motion with the 
difficulties presented by substantial generation. 
Again, the primary type one formulations of the definition of motion which 
we are interested in are:  
1) “the entelecheia188 of whatever is potentially [duna/mei], just as 
such [h(|= toiou=ton], is motion” (201a9). 
3) “The entelecheia of a potentiality [dunatou=], as a potentiality 
[dunato/n], is motion” (201b4). 
7) “Motion is the entelecheia of the potentially-active-or-acted-
upon [h( tou= duna/mei poihtikou= kai\ paqetikou=] as such, both 
simply and in each case” (202b26). 
 
A paraphrase condensing all three of these would be something like: “Motion is 
the actuality of a potentiality (to act upon or be acted upon), as such, i.e. as a 
potentiality.”  There are two ways to construe entelecheia and energeia here.  
They can either mean actuality in the sense of an end-state (e.g. the completed 
house in Aristotle‟s example) or actualization.  Ross opts for the latter with a 
number of important consequences.189  First, he prematurely falls into the 
problem of definitional circularity.  Ross makes the problem of circularity 
common to all of the formulations whereas it should really only be a problem for 
                                                 
188 The terms e)ne/rgeia and e)nte/lexeia remain untranslated at the moment for the sake 
clarity though for there seems to be no discernable difference between the two in this 
context. 
 
189 Indeed, as Ross admits, this would be the only such usage in the Aristotelian corpus 
(Ross 1936, 536 ff.).  All other uses of e)ntele/xeia mean the actuality of the end state of a 
process or the persistence in being of a being. 
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formulations (2) and (5).  Second, Ross‟ translation renders the dependent clause 
“h(|= toiou=ton” superfluous.190  Penner (1970) argues that energeia is process-
product ambiguous and for this reason requires a translation into an English 
word that is equally process-product ambiguous.191  Conveniently, he believes, 
“actualization” is such a word and is hence the best candidate to translate 
energeia. 
Kosman (1969) and Sachs (1975) both have argued convincingly that 
e)ntele/xeia and energeia must understood as the state of completion in order for 
the definition to avoid circularity and account for the peculiar syntax surrounding 
the “as such” phrase in the definition.  Ross‟ reading ultimately interprets the 
definition as saying „motion is the actualization of a potentiality‟ which eclipses 
several important aspects of Aristotle‟s definition.  Ross supposes there are two 
ways to construe the definition depending on how we understand the meaning of 
potentiality.  Ross‟ note t0 201a9-b15: 
An aggregate of bricks, stones, etc., may be regarded (1) as so many 
bricks, stones, etc. [i.e. as actualities in their own right, cf. 201a30 
ff.], (2) as potentially a house, (3) as potentially in the course of 
being fashioned into a house.  [That the potentiality involved in 
motion is not (1), is obvious], nor (2) of their potentiality of being a 
house (the house is the actualization of this), but (3) of their 
potentiality of being fashioned into a house. (Ross 1936, 536) 
                                                 
190 Kosman (1969, 42). 
 
191 Penner does not explicitly address Aristotle‟s consistent use of e)ntele/xeia which is not 
unexpected given that his case would be much more difficult to make regarding that 
term.  As Kosman puts it, “the term e)ntele/xeia [would have to] signify a process and not 
a state or condition which might result from a process.  There is a sense in which it 
would be correct, though dangerous, to say this of „e)ne/rgeia‟.  But although Aristotle 
elsewhere speaks of motion as a kind of e)ne/rgeia, he consistently employs the term 
e)ntele/xeia in the version of the definition of motion which we are considering [i.e. those 
found in Physics III]” (Kosman 1969, 42). 
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Ross thus lays out the alternatives for both the actuality-view and the process-
view of the definition of motion.  The former on Ross‟ reading understands 
motion to be the actualization of the potentiality to be a house in Ross‟ (2), the 
latter that motion is the actualization of the potentiality to be fashioned into a 
house in Ross‟ (3). 
But is not the actualization of the potentiality to be a house that is motion, 
but rather it is the actuality of the potentiality to be a house.  This difference is 
important in that it relieves the actuality-view of Ross‟ misgiving that it would 
indicate not the process of becoming a house but the being of the completed 
house itself.  Those who endorse the process-view generally maintain this 
misconstrual of the actuality-view and argue a) that actualization is an accurate 
rendering of both e)nerge/ia and e)ntele/xeia (of which the latter is particularly 
problematic), b) that reference to the end-state is inappropriate in the definition 
of motion but nonetheless the definition is not circular, and c) the phrase “qua 
potentiality” is essential only in the interpretation of process-view.  Kostman 
supports the process-view against the charge192 of rendering the phrase “as a 
potentiality” superfluous: 
For the actuality-view, the problem is simple: “qua potential” serves 
to distinguish the actuality resulting from the change (being 
actually F) from the change itself (being actually potentially F) – the 
latter being a state the changing object is in just when it is changing.  
But is there any evidence in Phys. III.1-2 for this interpretation? 
(Kostman 1987, 5-6) 
 
                                                 
192 Namely the charge made by Kosman against the process view (Kosman 1969, 42). 
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Kostman‟s account demands that we understand the “as such” as making a 
temporal qualification.  His understanding of the “as such” clause is that it is 
meant to emphasize, 
[T]he thrice-repeated point that change exists just when the object 
is changing.  In some fashion, “qua potential” qualifies the 
ontological status of entelecheia or energeia without directly fixing 
the sense of the terms that apply to such entities.  But, at first 
glance, the point that entelecheia or energeia of the sort in question 
is an entity whose existence has temporal limits seems unhelpful; 
and the point that these limits coincide with the times that the 
object begins and ceases changing seems entirely neutral between 
the process-view and the actuality-view. (Kostman 1987, 7) 
 
His claim is that even though the “as such” clause does in fact play the role 
of marking a temporal determination in the definition, he finds that it 
constitutes a fruitless addition to the definition.  Kostman supposes that 
Aristotle is fumbling to make a distinction, familiar to modern analytic 
philosophy, between events and states.193  This statement reveals tendency 
in modern commentary to understand Aristotle in terms of often 
anachronistic concepts like events, processes, states, etc.  As we can see in 
Kostman‟s interpretation of Aristotle, even reverses Aristotle‟s claim of the 
primacy of motion to time since time is a measure of motion (cf. Physics 
IV.10-14, cf. especially 219a1, but contrast 220b17). 
The strongest evidence in favor of the process-view can be gleaned from 
Aristotle‟s examples of building house and sculpting statues which he uses to 
clarify what he means by the phrase “as such”: 
                                                 
193 Cf. Kostman (1987, 7): “The concept Aristotle is analyzing is that of an event, and the 
remainder of his analysis is the claim that an event must be understood as the actualizing 
of a potentiality.”  One should suspicious anytime someone accuses Aristotle of a serious 
gaffe especially if he is thought to be struggling with an anachronistic concept.  It is likely 
that Aristotle deserves the benefit of the doubt more than do most commentators. 
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By the “just as” I mean this.  Bronze is potentially a statue, but it is 
not the entelecheia of bronze as bronze that is motion; for the 
being-bronze itself is not the being-potentially-something [in 
motion]194, since, if they were simply the same and meant the same 
thing, the entelecheia of the bronze as bronze would be motion.  But 
they are not the same, as was said. […]  Since they are not the same, 
just as neither are a color and capable of being seen the same, it is 
clear that the entelecheia of a potentiality, as a potentiality, is 
motion.  (201a29) 
 
The entelecheia of the buildable, just as buildable, is building.  (For 
the entelecheia must be either the building or the house.  But 
whenever the house is, the buildable is no longer.  But it is the 
buildable that is being built.  Necessarily then, building is the 
energeia.)  But building is a certain motion. (201a30)  
 
Proponents of the process-view take the distinction between „bronze as bronze‟ 
and „being-potentially-something [in motion]‟ to elucidate the phrase at 201a16-
18: “when that which is buildable into a house, qua such as we speak of it, is at-
work [energeia], it is being built, and this is the activity of building.”  This 
formulation is generalized at 201a27-29 as “[But] the entelecheia of what is 
potentially, whenever, being fully at work, it is at work not as itself but as 
movable, is motion.”  Ross‟ gloss on this runs: 
Change is not the actualization of anything in respect of its own 
specific character – e.g. of bronze as bronze – but of things qua 
changeable.  It is the actualization, not of the capacity of being a 
statue, but of the capacity of being made into a statue. (Ross 1936, 
360) 
 
Both Kostman and Ross take these phrases to “explain the force of „qua potential‟ 
by expanding it, within the definition, into a longer expression” (Kostman 1987, 
6).195  This interpretation, however, reads the text backwards.  It is only after the 
                                                 
194 Kinhtw=|, bracketed by Ross. 
 
195 Kostman continues: “… but the expression is obscure especially since the expansion is 
in the form of a “when” –clause.  It is almost as if “qua potential” is to be rendered as 
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occurrence of the house and the statue examples that Aristotle says he is 
explaining what he means by „as such‟.  These two examples play a completely 
different role in the argument which is marked by the phrase which introduces 
them: “That this [the first definition] is motion is clear from this: when that 
which is buildable [etc.]” (201a27).  The argument lying between the two phrases 
in fact has little to do with determining the sense of the „as such‟.196  Rather the 
formulations of the type „motion is the e)ntele/xeia of the movable qua movable‟ 
(type two) serve as an example which follows from the definition proper but 
which provides no explanatory power on its own.  The invocation of the type two 
formulation is meant merely to confirm and reinforce the validity of the type one 
formulations.  The phrase “By the „as such‟ I mean this” begins another argument 
at 201a30 in which the type two formulation plays no role.  Only the type one 
formulation is explicitly invoked in the context of these examples (201b4). 
Two things are shown in the arguments that explicate the „as such‟ clause 
(201a30-201b15): 1) being something potential can mean either the actuality 
                                                                                                                                                 
“while it is still potential,” which suggests that the point may be simply that the change 
exists when the object is changing” (Kostman 1987, 6).  The time aspect of the o(tan is 
difficult to reconcile if we are to try to understand this formulation as either the 
definition itself or an essential part of it.  But when we take it as confirmatory evidence 
that the definition proper is true (as several Islamic and Neoplatonic commentators did), 
then this problem disappears.  The inclusion of a time clause is problematic (insofar as 
time is posterior to motion [219a1]) only when we take the formulation that includes the 
time clause as the primary formulation of the definition. 
 
196 Within the use of these exemplifying phrases, Aristotle briefly raises a potential 
aporia concerning whether or not every mover is also moved foreshadowing the problem 
of a Prime Mover.  Interestingly, he may at this point be posing the problem between 
natural and other kinds of motion: “Thus what causes motion in a natural way is also 
moved, for each thing moves both the moved and itself.  To some, indeed, it seems that 
everything that causes motion is moved, but how this truly stands will be clear from 
other considerations (for there is something causing motion and motionless” (201a23). 
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from which something else actual comes to be (e.g. bronze as bronze) or it can 
mean that actuality from which something comes to be not insofar as it is that 
actuality but insofar as it is already, at least partially, something else (e.g. bronze 
as not-yet-statue), and 2) the actuality of the completed thing (statue) can not be 
motion given that there is no potentiality left for it to be what it already is.197  The 
force of both of these is to show that change is found at neither of the termini of 
the change. 
Heinaman defending the process-view reads the argument differently.  For 
him, what Aristotle distinguishes is not the bronze as bronze from motion but 
bronze as bronze from a potentiality to be in motion: 
The two occurrences of „they are not the same‟ immediately before 
and after the parenthetical remark make the same point, which is 
the same point that 201a31-2 makes: to be bronze and to be 
potentially changing are distinct.  And as the first clause of the 
passage‟s final sentence (b3-5) refers to the potentiality to be 
changing, it must be that same potentiality which is referred to in 
the definition of change at the end of the sentence.  So, contrary to 
Kosman‟s assertion, „the potential qua potential‟ refers to the 
potentiality to be changing. (Heinamen 1994, 29, emphasis mine) 
 
Heinaman‟s reading at least has the virtue of accounting for Ross‟ bracketed 
kinhtw=| which is present in all of the reliable manuscripts.198  However, the force 
of his argument hinges on the claim that Aristotle is using the term „potentiality‟ 
univocally in this context and this is not necessarily substantiated by the 
                                                 
197 In a certain sense the potentiality remains even in the completed actuality but in a 
different way than it remains or is present during motion.  Bronze retains the potentiality 
to be in the form of a statue when it is actually in the shape of a statue but now it has that 
potentiality as an actuality rather than as a potentiality.  We return to this important 
point further on. 
 
198 Ironically, Heinamen manages t0 strengthen Ross‟ interpretation by reinserting 
kinhtw=|. 
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grammar of the text.  Heinaman must translate “duna/mei tini/ kinhtw=|” (201a32) 
as “something potentially in motion” (or some equivalent) for argument to hold 
that this is what is being distinguished from the essence of bronze (to\ au)to\ 
to\ xalkw=| ei)=nai, 201a31).199  However, the dative need not be translated as “in 
motion” as Heinaman reads kinhtw=|, but this is not as natural reading it as a 
dative of respect for example.200  The phrase could be rendered “some 
potentiality with respect to motion” or “some motive potentiality” or “something 
in potentiality with respect to motion.”  This would distinguish the potentialities 
that the bronze has as bronze (i.e. heaviness, fluidity, etc.) and its potentialities 
that are specifically relevant to being a bronze statue (which are the potentialities 
that the bronze will exhibit, as potentialities, when it is in motion toward the 
form of the statue). 
Further, the phrase „they are not the same‟ that Heinamen refers on the 
one hand to the being of bronze and on the other to the being in motion of the 
bronze.  What his reading fails to account for is how we ought to understand the 
puzzling illustrations Aristotle gives us to clarify what he means by distinguishing 
bronze from whatever bronze potentially is or is potentially doing.  Aristotle says 
this is like what is “clearly” the case with regard to contraries: 
For to be potentially healthy and to be potentially sick are different.  
If they were not, to be sick and to be healthy would be the same.  
But the subject underlying both the health and the sickness, 
                                                 
199 Saying that something is “potentially in motion” could be a true and even meaningful 
thing to say but of course it would not help in determining a definition of motion.   
 
200 One might expect a participle of some kind if Aristotle were talking about an entity 
potentially in motion.  Aristotle often uses kinoume/non when talking about beings 
capable of motion. 
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whether blood or some other fluid, is the same and one [but 
different from the contraries]. (201a35) 
 
On Heinaman‟s reading, the analogy would have to look like this: 
„to be bronze‟: „to be potentially changing‟ ::  
„to be a substrate‟ : „to be potentially sick or healthy‟ ::  
„color‟ : „visible‟ [as potentially seen] 
 
This would require that „potentially changing‟ must be taken as analogous to 
„potentially sick‟ and „visible‟.  The incongruence of the terms is obvious; sickness 
and visibility are states while change indicates process.  If Aristotle means what 
Heinaman thinks he would have said „potentially becoming sick‟ and „becoming 
visible‟.  It is much more natural to read these terms of the analogy as „potentially 
sick‟ and „visible‟. 
 
i The Actuality View 
To clear up the problems of Ross‟ view and the process-view, we need to 
look more closely at the key terms involved in the definition: actuality, 
potentiality, and „as such.‟  Again, Ross takes entelecheia to mean „actualization‟ 
which is arguably the only such usage of the term in the Aristotelian corpus.  
More likely, entelecheia means actuality in the sense of what exists fully.  It is 
quite probable that this is a neologism invented by Aristotle out of the three 
words e)n = in, te/loj = end, e)xein = having (which would literally yield e)ntele/xeia 
= in-end-havingness201 or having-present-in-it-the-end) and perhaps a pun on 
                                                 
201 See Hintikka (1977); Philoponus (1994, 14 ff.), Sachs (1995), Blair (1992), Gill (1980, 
130-3). 
192 
 
the established Greek word e)ndele/xeia meaning what persists or endures lends 
credence to this meaning in addition to the countless usages in this respect 
throughout the corpus (Lidell and Scott 1996, 558).202  
The actuality-view operates under the idea that the actuality referred to is 
the actuality of the potentiality to be what the object is in motion toward, i.e. the 
finished product.  The potentiality must then be understood either as what is 
potentially a potentiality or what is actually that potentiality.203  Motion is then 
the actuality of that second modality of potentiality.  This assumes that there is a 
difference between a chunk of bronze which might be sculpted (i.e. moved) into a 
statue and the chunk of bronze actually being worked on by the artist.  In the 
latter case the potentiality of the chunk of bronze to be a statue is actual insofar 
as it is fully realizing its potential to be a statue.  In the absence of a working 
artist, the bronze is in actuality but just as this chunk of bronze with a particular 
shape, heaviness, volume, etc. which as such is not a potentiality to be a statue 
except in a derivative sense (i.e. as a potentiality to be potentially a statue). 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
202 Philoponus: “The word „entelchy‟ in Aristotle signifies actuality and completion, for it 
is the compound of the words hen („one‟), teleion („complete‟) and ekhein („have a certain 
state‟)” (1994, 14); and cf. Sachs 1995, Introduction. It is unclear why Philoponus 
interpolates a rough breathing here to render what I have taken as “in” to be “one”.  The 
difference does not change the essential similarity of his understanding of entelecheia. 
 
203 A well known discussion in the De Anima where Aristotle makes a distinction 
between first and second actualities and potentialities may help in understanding the 
different senses of potentiality at work here in the definition of motion.  Kosman‟s 
interpretation of the definition relies heavily on the distinction in the De Anima.  
Polansky has pointed that Kosman may be taking this analogy too far.  He argues that 
the distinction between first and second potentiality and actualities are pertinent only to 
living beings except perhaps analogously.  Because there is motion among natural beings 
that are not alive, Polansky claims that the distinction cannot properly be operable in the 
definition of motion as presented in the Physics (Polansky 2007, 149, and 158; cf. also 
Polansky 1983, 169-70n12). 
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Aquinas offers an appealing alternative to the process-view following 
similar lines.  While not completely compatible with Kosman and Sachs, it offers 
an interpretation of Aristotle‟s definition which both relieves the circularity from 
the definition and begins to understand the paradoxical nature of the definition 
of motion as an „actual potential‟.  Aquinas‟ account of the definition finds a way 
out of the circularity difficulty by proposing that motion is a sort of mixture of or 
“mean” between potentiality and actuality.  Between pure potentiality (bricks 
laying around being bricks) and pure actuality (a completed house), there is a 
motion in which the bricks retain some of their potentiality of just being bricks 
while at the same time already attaining to being a completed house: 
Indeed it is true that motion is in act, but it is an imperfect act, a 
mean between potency and act.  And it is clear that it is an 
imperfect act because that whose act it is is being in potency, as was 
said above.  Hence it is difficult to grasp what motion is. (Aquinas 
1999, 151 emphasis mine)204 
 
Motion is then, contrary to the process-view, not the actuality of the potentiality 
to be moved, but the mixture of potentiality and actuality that takes place 
between the termini of the wholly potential (the potentially potential) and the 
fully completed actuality.  It is the actuality (not the actualization) of a 
potentiality to be at the end-state.  This „mean‟ or mixture is itself a state of 
actuality.  Everywhere we find a state of affairs in which a being is not yet fully 
what it is going to be, but on the way there retaining at least some of its 
                                                 
204 A longer version in Aquinas with the same import: “It must be noted, therefore, that 
to be only in act is one thing, to be only in potency is another thing, and to be a mean 
between potency and act is a third thing.  That, then, which is potency only is not yet 
moved.  That which is in perfect act is not moved, but has already been moved.  That, 
therefore, is moved which is a mean between pure potency and act, which is, indeed 
partly in potency and partly in act, as is clear in alteration” (Aquinas 1999, 146 
emphasis mine). 
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potentiality to be at that end-state.  Aquinas identifies this mixture of potentiality 
and actuality with motion.  Motion then is an actuality of a sort, but an 
incomplete one insofar as it retains some of its potentiality to be that same 
actuality. 
While Aquinas‟ understanding of motion is certainly more appealing than 
the process-view alternative, there is at least one fundamental difficulty.  For on 
Aquinas‟ understanding of the definition we have no way to distinguish between a 
motion between termini and a static state between these same termini.  For 
example, if motion to the state of being heated is the mean between the actuality 
of being hot and the respective potentiality of being cold, the mixture of these 
applies equally well to the transition from zero degrees (being cold) to one-
hundred degrees (being hot) as it does to the state of being at fifty degrees.  There 
must be a way to understand the definition in some way such that motion is a 
mixture of potentiality and actuality but which further specifies a directionality 
and not merely an intermediate state.  To do this we will need to look again at 
what role the phrase “as such a sort” or “as a potentiality” plays in the definition. 
 
ii Potentiality As Such 
Aristotle adds the phase “as such” (h(|= toiou=ton, 201a11) to dispel the 
ambiguities which we have seen that the definition of motion and in particular 
the meaning of potentiality are subject.  As we have seen, on Ross‟ interpretation 
the phrase becomes superfluous.  Aquinas‟ interpretation of motion though closer 
to the sense of Aristotle‟s meaning, suffers from the defect that it cannot 
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incorporate the “as such” phrase within the limits of what Aristotle‟s grammar 
will allow.205  Sachs illustrates this quite well so I will quote him at length rather 
than speak on his behalf: 
Thomas‟ account of the meaning of Aristotle‟s definition forces him 
to construe the grammar of the definition in such a way that the 
clause introduced by the dative singular feminine relative pronoun 
he [sic. h|=(] has as its antecedent, in two cases, the neuter participle 
tou ontos, and in the third, the substantive adjective tou dunatou.  
It is true that this particular feminine pronoun often had an 
adverbial sense to which its gender was irrelevant, but in the three 
statements of the definition of motion there is no verb but estin.  If 
the clause is understood adverbially, then, the sentence must mean 
something like: if motion is a potentiality, it is the actuality of a 
potentiality.  Whatever that might mean, it could not at any rate be 
a definition of motion.  Thus the clause must be understood 
adjectivally, and Thomas must make the relative pronoun 
dependent upon a word with which it does not agree in gender.  
He makes the sentence say that motion is the actuality of the 
potentiality in which there is yet potentiality.  Reading the pronoun 
as dependent upon the feminine noun entelecheia with which it 
does agree, we find the sentence saying that motion is the actuality 
as which it is the potentiality of the potentiality, or the actuality as 
a potentiality of the potentiality.  This, [Sachs‟], reading of the 
definition implies that potentialities exist in two ways, that it is 
possible to be a potentiality, yet not be an actual potentiality. (Sachs 
1976, 16-17 emphasis mine) 
 
The two senses of potentiality are “an actuality, qua potentiality, of a potentiality” 
(motions) and “an actuality, qua actuality, of a potentiality” (bronze as bronze).  
In a sense there are actual potentials (motions) and potential potentials (bronze 
as bronze).206  This chunk of bronze insofar as it is an independent being with all 
                                                 
205 It is not surprising that some subtle grammatical distinctions in the greek text would 
escape Aquinas given that, as it is generally supposed, he had no knowledge of the greek 
language and worked primarily (if not entirely) with latin translations of Aristotle.  This 
makes Aquinas‟ sense for interpreting Aristotle all the more uncanny. 
 
206 Terry Penner offers an alternative interpretation which reads in the definition of 
motion not an ambiguity in the term du/namij but rather in the term e)ne/rgeia.  Penner 
criticizes Ackrill and Ross on the grounds that they make no sense of the distinction 
between ki/nhsij and e)ne/rgeia.  “So far from being „potency‟ that has two readings in the 
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of its positive attributes is, in a derivative sense, potentially a statue.  But it is not 
a potentiality in the same way that the bronze is when it is considered as the 
privation of another form, in this case the form of a statue.  It is this state of 
privation that the “as such” clause allows us to identify.  Motion is the privative 
way of being in which an actual being is present as potentially something else.  
When the actuality of that privation is present as a privation (and not taken as 
some being independent of the end state of the change) that actuality or state or 
way of being is motion.  If we understand the various “as such” phrases to modify 
not tou= dunatou= or tou= o/)ntoj but rather e)ntele/xeia or e)ne/rgeia, the definition 
of motion picks out an actuality the very actuality of which is a potentiality. 
This reading is further supported by Aristotle‟s careful substitution of 
dunato/n for du/namij in formulation (3), the last occurrence of the troublesome 
“as such” clause: h( tou= dunatou=, h|=( dunato/n, e)ntele/xeia fanero\n o(/ti ki/nhsi/j 
e)stin (201b4-5).  By not using du/namij he relieves us of the ambiguity of gender 
(cf. 201b4).  This is the only place in this context where Aristotle substitutes 
dunato/n (a neuter substantive adjective) for du/namij (a feminine third declension 
noun) which are used synonymously.  This substitution requires a reading of h|(= 
dunato/n as a modification of e)ntele/xeia and not tou= dunatou=.  If he had written 
“h( tou= dunatou=, h|(= du/namij, e)ntele/xeia” the antecedent of the h|(= du/namij would 
have been ambiguous (in that it could refer to e)ntele/xeia or du/namij) and would 
                                                                                                                                                 
passage, it is energeiai, or as I shall henceforward call it, „actualization,‟ that has two 
readings – and it is the function of the „qua‟ clause to make clear which of these two 
readings it has” (Penner 1970, 429-31).  Even some of the proponents of the process view 
find Penner‟s appeal to two senses of e)ne/rgeia uncompelling and “arbitrary” (cf. 
Kostman 1987, 7).  
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have allowed both Aquinas‟ reading or Kosman‟s and Sachs‟.  Aristotle‟s use of 
the neuter dunato/n reconfirms the claim that the grammar of the relevant 
formulations of the definition of motion prohibit the modification of e)ntele/xeia 
or e)ne/rgeia by the “qua” or “as such” (i.e. both types of clauses marked by h(|=) 
clause and requires that it modify du/namij.  This supplies definitive grammatical 
evidence against the process-view in favor of the actuality-view. 
 
4.4 Motion as Potentiality and Substantial Generation 
As indicated at the beginning of the chapter, the question posed in Physics 
V concerning the definition of motion and the intelligibility of substantial 
generation is whether this definition can be applied to the generation of 
substances.  Our analysis of the definition of motion shows the critical role that 
the concept of potentiality plays.  In previous chapters, I have shown that the 
central difficulty with respect to substantial generation is how potentiality and 
substrate should understood (cf. especially Physics II.1 & V.1, and On Generation 
and Corruption I).  It should therefore be clear that understanding the role of 
potentiality will shed light on the present problem of whether the definition of 
motion is applicable to substantial generation.   
Aristotle‟s definition of motion explicitly distinguishes between two 
meanings of potentiality.  One relates to motion and the other relates to beings 
existing in potentiality only.  In other places Aristotle employs also a third 
concept of potentiality which is present when a being is fully actualized.  In this 
last sense potentiality is not destroyed but perfected in a change and in a way this 
198 
 
potentiality is preserved and remains in the fully actual being.  The way that the 
potentiality is preserved (remains, is perfected, etc.) when the form is fully actual 
is different from the way the potentiality is preserved while there is still motion 
toward the form or full actuality.  These are both in turn different from the 
potentiality which exists before the motion begins.  These three modes of 
potentiality can be gleaned from the distinction made by the "as such" clause by 
picking out the one that corresponds to motion:  
1)   Before the motion begins: the actuality of a potentiality as a 
potentiality.  The bronze is actually there, not doing much except waiting 
to really become the potentiality to be a statue (i.e. waiting to be in 
motion).  
2)   During the motion: the actuality as a potentiality of a potentiality.  The 
bronze is now actually (the bronze exists as...) the potentiality to be the 
statue.  
3)   Once the motion is complete: the actuality of a potentiality as an 
actuality.  The bronze is now actually the statue.207 
 
Aristotle addresses the difficulty of the first way of understanding potentiality in 
On Generation and Corruption I.  There Aristotle presents an aporia concerning 
what a potential substance could actually be (e.g. what attributes it could have) if 
there is not yet an actual substance and in this case the context is primarily 
                                                 
207 Even though the example is of an artifact, each of these also pertains to the 
phenomenon of substantial generation in its more proper manifestations, e.g. in living 
beings.  I have emphasized the dissimilarity of the coming-to-be of artifacts in from that 
of genuine substances in my analysis of Physics I.7 claiming that although it appears to 
some as if Aristotle is using the coming-to-be of the statue as an example of substantial 
generation he is really highlighting the difference between the nature of the material 
substrate involved in each.  In the context of the definition of motion however, because 
the question of the substrate is not at issue, the analogy between substantial generation 
and the coming-to-be of artifacts is stronger. 
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concerned with problems of substrate.  The third view of potentiality finds its 
best articulation in the domain of biology, namely in Aristotle‟s definition of soul 
in the De Anima where he says, “soul is substance as form of a natural body 
having life in potentiality” (412a19-21; translation from Polansky 2007, 154).  
Although the point is illustrated in many places in the corpus, living beings show 
more dramatically than non-living beings the way in which potentialities are still 
present and are at work in a fully actualized being.  There is of course a strong 
analogue in the case of an artifact like a bronze statue in which the bronze of the 
actual being must retain its potentiality to be a statue (e.g. its characteristic 
rigidity, etc.) if the statue is to remain a statue.  But since the bronze is „inert‟ in 
the final product, its potentialities that remain are much less visible than those of 
a living being in which those potentialities of the body are constantly „at work‟. 
In contrast to these potentialities which exist before and after motion 
takes place, the potentiality that exists (or better, the way in which that 
potentiality exists) during a motion is more difficult to identify or describe.  The 
peculiar difficulty stems from the fact that in substantial change it is the material 
substrate identified with the potentiality in question that undergoes 
transformation.  In the case of artifacts, the enduring potentiality in question was 
identifiable precisely as the material substrate which was easily identifiable as the 
same in the terminous a quo and the final product.  In the case of the bronze 
statue, at both ends the bronze retains the same characteristics that identify it as 
a substrate containing a certain set of potentialities.  In the case of an actual 
living thing, the body is a more or less constant material substrate that also 
exhibits a certain set of potentialities through the activities of the soul. 
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The difficulty with living things is that the terminous a quo, that from 
whence they came, while it may contain the very same potentialities present in 
the fully actualized being, does not exhibit those potentialities in a material 
substrate that resembles the material substrate that is present in the fully formed 
living being.  The problem as it has traditionally been formulated has been trying 
to identify the substrate as a persisting material continuant with potentiality as 
such.  This is a slightly more complex way of stating the problem of the substrate 
as a continuant that we have been dealing with since our reading of Physics I.7.  
However, now that we have the concepts of potentiality and actuality at our 
disposal, we are in a position to reorient the problem in a way that relieves us of 
much of its perplexity.  The simple way of stating it is this: if we are looking for 
some constant in the case of substantial generation, perhaps we should not look 
for an identical material present at the beginning and end of the process but the 
potentialities or capacities that are present throughout the process and even 
remain in the completed being.  The question becomes one of identifying 
potentialities which as we have seen can have different modes of actuality at each 
of the three stages of change.  This approach can go a long way toward resolving 
the problems of substantial generation and even confirms the existence of 
Aristotle‟s “second solution” to the Eleatic paradoxes of motion alluded to in 
Physics I.8. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Since the advent of modern science, Aristotle‟s investigations in the 
natural sciences have largely been dismissed by philosophers and scientists alike 
as relics of a bygone era.  This dismissal is largely due to a shift in the motivations 
which historically guided the study of nature.  This shift is exemplified by 
Descartes who declared that the aim of scientific knowledge is the mastery of 
nature for the sake of practical human ends.  The study of nature is not for the 
sake of understanding nature as it is in itself and humankind‟s place in it but 
rather for the sake of subjugating the forces of nature to the will of man.  For 
moderns impressed by the technological successes of the modern sciences, the 
motivations of the ancient natural scientist are almost wholly eclipsed by our 
fascination with the powers we currently enjoy.  This fascination, unfortunately, 
can prevent us from understanding the importance of those investigations into 
nature which lie at the foundation of western culture.  Even if only a remnant of 
that original drive which conceived the first investigations into nature survives 
today, it is important to hold open the possibility that the earliest attempts to 
understand nature harbor important insights about physical reality which are 
overlooked or even inaccessible by the modern sciences. 
It is endemic to many contemporary treatments of Aristotle that they hold 
him to certain standards set by modern science and philosophy.  What we must 
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come to appreciate is that though many of the details of Aristotle‟s natural 
philosophy are now thought to be falsified by experiment and observation, often 
Aristotle is engaging with different sorts of questions than we are accustomed to 
ask.  Clear examples of this are Aristotle‟s inquiries into what motion is, what 
place is, what time is, etc.  These involve types of questions almost entirely 
foreign to the modern scientist who takes for granted that such questions are 
answered in advance insofar as they are prerequisite to any progressive scientific 
research.208  Even if the modern scientist would not admit that there is something 
like an „essence‟ of motion, she necessarily operates under some assumption of 
what the idea of motion means even if it conceived as merely a relation between 
objects.  In order to try to reawaken a sense of the importance of these sorts of 
questions, we must try to understand what motivates Aristotle to take up these 
kind of investigations. 
The history of natural philosophy in the ancient world is a complex 
narrative of competing views each seeking to lay hold of some elusive truth about 
an inconstant world.  Aristotle arguably stands as the culmination of this 
historical narrative having provided a foundation for the investigation into nature 
which would last for millennia.  In the dissertation I have tried to make clear the 
connection between Aristotle‟s attempt to lay the groundwork for natural 
philosophy and the specific problem of the generation of substances.  The central 
focus maintained throughout the dissertation was the paradox that confronted 
                                                 
208 Even more foreign to the modern scientist is idea of the necessity to investigate the 
very foundations and presuppositions of their practice without assuming in advance 
their legitimacy.  But even for Aristotle these considerations may not properly reside 
within the domain of physics though he clearly recognizes the importance of addressing 
such questions before the investigation into nature begins (cf. Physics I.2). 
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Aristotle and his contemporaries which concerns the very possibility of the 
intelligibility of becoming.  In book one of the Physics, Aristotle identifies this 
fundamental impasse as a problem that Parmenides posed and which still strikes 
the modern ear as a salient difficulty: It appears that something can come to be 
neither from what-is nor from what-is-not, for what-is need not come to be 
insofar as it already is, and what-is-not cannot come to be inasmuch as it is 
nothing at all. 
This Eleatic paradox stood as a direct obstacle to the establishment of a 
science of nature.  Some natural philosophers responding to Parmenides found 
their way around the impasse by ignoring one horn of the dilemma.  Empedocles 
and Democritus, for example, while they agreed with Parmenides that something 
could not come into being from nothing, found a way to make sense of the 
possibility that something could come to be from what already is.  Thus they gave 
an account of generation in terms of the change in arrangement of immutable 
units of matter.   Since these irreducible elements neither come to be nor pass 
away, they could account for coming into being as the rearrangement of what 
already is.  When something comes to be, it comes to be from what already is 
though the subjects of change are never themselves generated or destroyed.  Thus 
they avoid half the problem by showing how change is not a coming into being 
from nothing.  The atomists did not distinguish between this sort of generation 
and the positional change of the various arrangements of atoms.  They did not 
accept as Aristotle did that there were genuine substances and much less the 
coming into being of these. 
204 
 
Aristotle realized that in order to defend natural philosophy from its 
critics, he would have to give an account of what seems to be the most natural of 
all processes, i.e. the birth and growth of natural beings.  In order for Aristotle to 
maintain the idea that there are genuine substances and at the same time hold 
that the phenomenon of natural generation of these substances was intelligible, 
he was faced with the task of overcoming both horns of the Parmenidean 
paradox.  This means he had to show a way in which something could indeed 
come to be from what-is-not, just as the atomists had shown that what comes to 
be can come from what-is.   In the end, Aristotle has difficulty including the 
phenomenon of generation in the science of nature by means of an account that is 
common to all types of change.  It is precisely this difficulty that interested us 
throughout the dissertation. 
As Aristotle understands the problem, what is at stake is the very 
possibility of natural philosophy as a genuine science.  If change in its most 
observable manifestations cannot be understood in a way that would defeat the 
Eleatic challenge to the intelligibility of nature, the body of knowledge which it 
founds will by extension be subject to the same objections.  It is thus imperative 
in Aristotle‟s eyes to overcome this problem if the study of nature can be expected 
to yield anything more than mere opinion.  It is clear from works like Generation 
of Animals and On Generation and Corruption that Aristotle does in practice 
consider substantial change to fall within the scope of natural science.  Yet, only 
after the arguments in the opening chapters of the Physics which establish the 
scientific legitimacy of natural philosophy could these be considered 
investigations which could yield genuine knowledge.  
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Over the course of the dissertation, I have traced the development of the 
problem of substantial generation from its origins in the thought of the 
presocratics to Aristotle‟s proposed solutions in the physical writings.  Chapter 
one began by demonstrating that the epistemological status of natural philosophy 
was at stake at least since the work of the Milesians was called into question by 
the Eleatics.  The Eleatic critique of the first attempts at the study of nature set 
the stage for Aristotle‟s effort to establish natural philosophy as a rigorous 
science.  Through our detailed analysis of the first book of Aristotle‟s Physics, we 
have seen that Aristotle‟s solutions to the problem of substantial generation are 
not unproblematic.  It was shown that the three-principled account of change 
Aristotle presents, at least as it is traditionally interpreted, falls short of providing 
a definitive solution to the problem of substantial generation.  Further, even 
Aristotle‟s attempt to solve the problem of substantial generation by considering 
it as a case of generation per accidens was found to be lacking in that it did not 
seem plausible that Aristotle would admit that generation only takes place by 
concomitance or accident. 
While the problem had fully come into focus by the end of the analysis of 
Physics I, it was not yet clear that Aristotle had provided an adequate solution to 
the Parmenidean dilemma in such a way that would guarantee the legitimacy of 
further investigations into nature.  Aristotle did however leave us with the hint 
that there was an alternate approach to the problem in the form of an account in 
terms of potentially and actuality.  My interpretation of Aristotle‟s definition of 
motion in Physics III is an attempt to locate that alternate account of generation.   
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First it was established that the definition is applicable to the phenomenon 
at issue.  There was cause for concern here given Aristotle‟s claim in Physics V 
that substantial generation was not properly a motion (ki/nhsij) but rather 
belonged to the more general class of change (metabolh/).  However, upon 
analysis, the generality of the definition of motion reassured us not only that it 
was safe to conclude that substantial generation could be understood in terms of 
the definition of motion, but that the definition of motion could provide much 
needed insight into substantial generation through its employment of the idea of 
potentiality.  We found that the definition of motion provided the necessary 
framework for understanding how the idea of potentiality applied to substantial 
generation.  In particular, it allowed a resolution to the difficulty of identifying 
some persistent aspect of the substance undergoing generation.  What the 
definition of motion allowed us to see is that the same potentialities persist 
through generation even though the underlying material changes.   Since the 
same potentiality can manifest in different ways, it is not necessary that when a 
potentiality persists that it always reveal itself in the same way.  For example, the 
nutritive capacity which is present from the very beginning of embryonic 
transformation and remains throughout the existence of the living substance but 
is not always actualized in the same way.  Before a living thing reaches full 
maturity the nutritive capacity acts only to maintain metabolism and growth 
whereas once it is mature the same nutritive capacity shows itself in the ability to 
reproduce as well. Once we begin looking for persisting potentialities rather than 
identical material substrates, the problem of the continuity of substantial 
generation is at least partially resolved. 
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In the context of contemporary scholarship, the present work has sought 
to bring attention to often overlooked aspects of Aristotle‟s argumentative 
rhetoric and to passages that are sometimes ignored because they are difficult to 
fit into an orthodox Aristotelianism.  This is especially evident in the first two 
chapters where I explored the character of Aristotle‟s deep and conscious 
relationship with the tradition of natural philosophy which he inherited.  This 
dissertation makes its most significant and original to Aristotle scholarship 
through its interpretation of Physics I.8.  I do not claim to have fully understood 
this passage, but I think I have made headway on the interpretation of a text that 
is notoriously difficult and widely neglected in the discussion of Aristotle‟s view of 
change. 
One of the primary theses of the dissertation is that Aristotle‟s idea of 
potentiality as employed the definition of motion is the key to understanding the 
generation of substances.  We have dealt almost exclusively with how the 
problem of generation relates to potentiality and material substrates.  However, 
we have not considered the difficulties that arise when one considers the problem 
from the point of view of form and actuality.  An investigation into question of the 
generation of form would be a fitting complement to the research undertaken in 
present work. 
The discussion of Plato has been almost entirely absent.  Yet, Aristotle‟s 
defense of natural science is not only from the attacks of the Eleatics but is also 
attempt to overcome Plato‟s more sophisticated condemnations of the study of 
nature.  Determining Plato‟s views about the viability of natural philosophy is 
complicated in much the same way as it is for Parmenides‟.  For, even though 
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Plato‟s Socrates abandons and belittles the study of nature (e.g. the Second 
Sailing of the Phaedo and Socrates‟ disparaging remarks about nature in the 
Phaedrus), Plato‟s Timeaus puts a great deal of effort into developing an account 
of nature.  Of course, even with Socrates‟ praise throughout the Timeaus, there 
remains the important caveat to the account that it is at best a „likely story‟.  Of 
course it is plausible, as the dissertation has hinted on occasion, that Aristotle to 
a great extent may share this view.   Still, it is clear that Aristotle took more 
seriously than either Parmenides or Plato the idea that something important 
could be learned from nature. 
One issue that was not explored in depth is whether Parmenides would 
have been amenable to a solution to the paradox of motion in terms of 
potentiality and actuality.  It is not clear that Parmenides would even think that 
the idea of potentiality was intelligible insofar as it includes the idea of non-
being.  Can an account of change and substantial generation in terms of potency 
and act provide anything more than an adequate description of the phenomenon?  
More specifically, can an account of change in terms of potency and act provide 
explanatory power to an argument aiming to overcome the Eleatic paradox?  If 
we say the Eleatic paradox stands refuted because things that change move from 
potency to act, have we done anything but beg the question without shedding 
light on how this transition from potency to act was possible?  Would Aristotle be 
subject to the same criticism Nietzsche made of Kant when he claimed that the 
solution to the problem of how synthetic a priori judgments were possible was 
“by virtue of a faculty”?  How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?  By 
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virtue of a faculty.  How is change from what-is-not possible?  By virtue of a 
potency? 
Aristotle‟s idea of potentiality is precisely a way to speak about non-being, 
or better, a being insofar as it is not.  In much the same way the Plato‟s stranger 
renames non-Being as the Other in the Sophist, Aristotle renames what-is-not as 
potentiality.  Interestingly, in the same arguments from the Sophist the Eleatic 
stranger says that Being is power or potentiality (du/namij) which seems to be the 
exact inversion of Aristotle‟s designation of potentiality as non-being.  It would be 
a worthwhile pursuit to establish a genealogy of the concept of potentiality from 
Parmenides to Plato to Aristotle.  If Aristotle could convince Parmenides of the 
intelligibility of the idea of potentiality, he might persuade him that all kinds of 
change can be understood in turn. Still, it seems unlikely that Parmenides would 
not detect non-being under the thin veil of Aristotle‟s notion of potentiality and 
would therefore not accept our solution to the paradox of generation.  
One of the overarching goals of this dissertation has been to gain insight 
into what Aristotle sees as the limits of scientific research into nature.  If the 
arguments are sound or are at least collectively persuasive, they will have led the 
reader to some unorthodox views about Aristotle‟s contribution to natural 
philosophy.  As my analysis of Physics I shows, Aristotle was extremely sensitive 
to problems concerning the very possibility of the project he invested so much of 
his life pursuing.  A consequence of this is that often what appear to be his 
considered views turn out to be much less doctrinaire than is often supposed.  If, 
contrary to the views of orthodox Aristotelianism, it can be shown that Aristotle‟s 
arguments about nature are frequently made on an aporetic and sometimes even 
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tentative basis, we will find that what are often taken to be Aristotle‟s considered 
views are actually more or less refined positions meant to open new paths for 
thinking in the reader.  This claim, if true, would reorient the common 
assumption that Aristotle‟s writings are statements of dogmatic science to an 
understanding of them as dialectical inquiries in which the reader is not always 
meant to grasp a doctrine but instead is led toward thinking through 
philosophically fundamental problems on their own.
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